



DEFENDOLOGY

Scholarly journal for protection, security, defense,
education and training issues

Year XXIV

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- **SECURITY AND CRIME IN MONTENEGRO**
- **NATIONAL IDENTITY AND COMMUNICATION**
- **DURKHEIM'S SOCIOLOGICAL SCHOOL**
- **BH MEDIA AND CYBER SECURITY**
- **THE FUTURE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION**
- **STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT AND FOREIGN LANGUAGES**
- **BH CONSOCIATIVE DEMOCRACY
AND THE DAYTON PEACE AGREEMENT**




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EDITORIAL

DEFENDOLOGY AND PONEROLOGY, NEW SCIENTIFIC DISCIPLINES

Defendology, as a scientific discipline on protection, defense and security, is a new scientific discipline, a paradigm based on the scientific discourse protection + defense = security. *Defendology*, according to Hegel's dialectic, unites developmental areas, narrower scientific areas of protection, defense and security into dialectical unity, as a whole. As such, it has a university level, while the development areas that constitute it are of a more vocational character. It should be borne in mind that security is one and indivisible and is not constituted as a scientific discipline.

Ponerology is the science of the study of evil, it is our beacon — how to discover the nature of evil, the causes of evil, and the development of evil? Two Greek monks, philologists, gave the name ponerology, Greek poneros = evil, and the process of genesis of evil in accordance with that, was called “ponerogenesis”. Our humble initial research should enable us to overcome evil by understanding its nature, cause, and development. Moralists have advised us for centuries to develop ethics and human values; they are in search of the right intellectual criteria. Despite their efforts, they have not been able to overcome the many kinds of evil that have plagued mankind for centuries and which are increasing to unimaginable proportions in modern times. The ponerologist does not want to diminish the role of moral values and knowledge in this area; he would rather support it with one, for now underestimated, scientific knowledge, in order to complete the whole picture, in order to better adapt it all to reality, and thus enable a more efficient action on the moral, psychological, social and political level. This new discipline, ponerology, is thus primarily interested in the role of pathological factors in the origin of evil, especially because one conscious control and supervision over them, on a scientific, social and individual level, could effectively stifle or disarm these processes. Our scientific thought and the struggle based on it do

not arise only from our ideas, but from a clear vision of the cause that causes evil. Ponerology as a scientific discipline studies the nature of evil and the complex processes of its genesis, from where it opens new ways to oppose it. The fact is that as long as characteropathic personalities play a dominant role within the social system and movement inspired by the ponerological process, ideology, whether doctrinal in the beginning or subsequently vulgarized and perverted, retains and supports its content connection with the original prototype.

Pathocracy, as a system of government, was created in such a way that a small pathological minority took control of the community of normal people. *Pathocracy* progressively paralyzes everything. Science should be a lighthouse of time for a critical and analytical approach to ideologies, which have become “systems of deception” throughout history. Scientific and social minds diligently and critically examine national history, in search of an interpretation of facts that would be more thorough and deeper in terms of psychological and moral realism. **The danger of the pathocratic government** is also in the fact that it controls scientific works, scientists in order to determine whether they contain some data that would be dangerous for pathocrats. Experts and scientists with distinct talent and the results of their work become the subject of blackmail or malicious control. The therapy for the fight against pathocrats and pathocratic authority must be to strengthen the general defense power of the human community and to attack this most dangerous disease. Therapeutic efforts should be aimed at subjecting known operational factors of the genesis of evil, as well as the process of ponerogenesis itself, to a single control by professional, scientific, educational and social consciousness. People and values mature in action, and truth becomes medicine.

In front of You, we have two issues, forty five-forty six (45-46) of the Journal *Defendology*, which has been published continuously for 24 (twenty four) years. The Journal *Defendology* was, is and will be consistent with its multidisciplinary program orientation. Diversity and multidisciplinary of topics is also a feature of this issue, and the following topics stand out in particular: *Trends in juvenile delinquency in Montenegro; National identity and communication; Sociology of Emil Durkheim between universalism and sociologism; The Impact of Social Media on Stability and Security: The Western Balkans and Ethnopolitical Patterns of Cyber Secu-*

riety Inefficiency in BiH; The European Union at the Crossroads of Past and Future; The importance of learning foreign languages in companies; The Dayton Peace Agreement - a synthesis of the arbitration process and the establishment of institutionalized consocialism. The Journal *Defendology*, published in Serbian and English, has for a quarter of a century made a great, huge contribution to the development of the theory and practice of protection, security defense, ponerology as a science of evil, pathocracy and other fields of social sciences, theory and practice. The Journal *Defendology* made a special contribution to the constitution of defendology as a science of protection, defense and security in the scientific discourse protection + defense = security, which unites defendology, according to Hegel's dialectic, as a new paradigm in science.

It is a great pleasure that the Journal *Defendology*, cited by various authors, is on citation databases such as: *Scopus, Orcid, Clarivate analytics*, etc., which are automatically downloaded by *Google Scholar*. The levels of scientific knowledge of the authors in *Defendology* have been constantly rising from description, scientific explanation, scientific discovery, scientific prediction, all the way to scientific mastery. Through this double issue, as well as earlier issues of the journal, the authors make a great contribution to the development of education and research, as the first and second missions of the University, but also affirm the third mission of the University development which refers to greater engagement of the University in the community.

In addition to teaching and research as basic university missions, the third mission of the university means the relationship between the university and the community, the environment. The third mission of the university consists of three dimensions - social, civil and economic, which should be equal. The third mission of the university can be realized through two paradigms, namely community service, as opposed to the paradigm of community advocacy. Research and experimental development are very important, as well as their components, and the *Defendology* team pays maximum attention to them, which is visible on our website. Basic research, applied research and experimental development are the foundations of our scientific research work. The definitions of the above terms have stood the test of time for more than half a century. Knowledge capital is very important for research. Research and experimental development

are present in the social sciences, humanities and arts, as well as in the natural sciences and engineering and similarly. The relationship between basic research, applied research and experimental development must be viewed from a dynamic perspective, which the authors in *Defendology* do. Knowledge should be used to solve problems. This dynamic interaction between knowledge generation and problem solving connects basic and applied research and experimental development. The time of automation and digitalization introduces the world to the modern era, but also to new challenges, risks and security threats that need to be permanently studied, improved and solved.

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SECURITY AND CRIME IN MONTENEGRO

JUVENILE CRIMINALITY TRENDS IN MONTENEGRO

Original scientific paper

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Slavko Milić¹

Abstract: Based on the records of relevant appropriate authorities and services (police and judiciary), this paper presents exact data and statistical results of juvenile criminality in Montenegro. In this paper, we consider the state and tendency of juvenile criminality in the period from 2000 to 2020 of both genders, ie a full 20 years, ie. a fifth of a century. Unlike the usual research, this research was not done on a sample but on a population consisting of: (*reported, accused and convicted*) juveniles of both genders. Based on the available relevant records, statistical processing was performed, followed by analysis, where three categories of juveniles were emphasized. As a rule, the first category, ie. the group consists of juveniles who have been reported to the appropriate authorities and services for a criminal offense. The second category consists of juveniles who have been charged on the basis of a criminal report and the third category consists of juveniles who have been convicted by a final judgment.

Three goals and three hypotheses were set. Acceptance and rejection of hypotheses was performed based on the results of relevant statistical methods and tests. The primary goal was to determine exactly the trends of juvenile criminality in the observed period of 20 years, and to perform a crime assessment for the next year. After conducting an adequate and

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relevant statistical procedure and analysis, it can be reliably and validly concluded that in the analyzed period there was a stabilization and stagnation of juvenile criminality. Detailed analysis shows and indicates that the variability was extremely high until 2012, after which there was stabilization, ie. moderate variations, and thus a more realistic prediction of crime, which is associated with the adoption and application of the Law on the Treatment of Juveniles in Criminal Procedure of Montenegro.

Keywords: criminality; juveniles; reported; accused; convicted

INTRODUCTION

Modern society recognizes juvenile criminality as its biggest challenge and problem. Juvenile criminality is increasingly difficult to monitor analytically and statistically because the abundance of specific solutions in the field of juvenile criminal law sets it apart to a significant extent in relation to Criminal law which regulates material, procedural and executive provisions for adults as perpetrators. The set of legal regulations in the field of the Law on the Treatment of Juveniles in Criminal Proceedings² primarily determines the criminal status of juvenile offenders, determines special treatment in the procedure of prescribing the imposition and execution of criminal sanctions. Juvenile criminal law thus represents a set of legal regulations that regulate the position (rights, obligations and responsibilities) of juveniles (Čejović 1985: 492) in criminal law as a whole (Perić 2000: 27).

Thus, in addition to the concept and type of juvenile as a subject of criminal law, the type, conditions, purpose, content, manner and conditions of prescribing and imposing criminal sanctions, but also the

² Law on Treatment of Juveniles in Criminal Proceedings (Official Gazette of Montenegro: 64/11)

procedure for imposing criminal sanctions for juveniles is of special importance for comprehensive monitoring of juvenile criminality, execution of pronounced criminal sanctions, ie informal measures (*educational orders*) as diversionary (*diversionary*) measures from the classic criminal procedure. Increasing the number of diversionary measures significantly affects the accused and convicted juvenile offenders, which is the goal of the restorative judiciary, but through statistics, it also affects the reduction of the number in both categories, because the application of these measures diverts proceedings outside the Juvenile Court, and the number of reported perpetrators is not included in the number of accused or convicted persons, which seems to mean that when it comes to juvenile crime, the number of accused and convicted perpetrators is lower than it really is when reporting. On the basis of quantitative indicators of linear functions, it can be concluded that juvenile criminality in the observed period at the general level stagnates.

THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS AND PREVIOUS RESEARCH

Juvenile criminal law in a broader sense is nothing but the response of society to the prevention of juvenile criminality. Statistical measurement of criminality enables the measurement of criminality as a mass phenomenon as a whole. Statistical monitoring of juvenile criminality, especially in relation to the number of perpetrators, classified by gender, enables the description of the evolution of crime through long-term tendencies (trends) of juvenile criminality, certain variations in relation to different normative approaches in the period from 2000 to 2019 in Montenegro.

Previous research

Given that crime is a complex social phenomenon that has sociological, legal, psychological, biological and other aspects, monitoring crime is a very dynamic process. In Montenegro, crime is monitored through analytical and statistical monitoring in various state agencies. However, the most reliable data on juvenile delinquency are from the Expert Service of the Supreme State Prosecution Service, the Judicial Council and the Montenegrin Directorate for Statistics - MONSTAT.

Monitoring juvenile delinquency has a multiple goal for the community, primarily in monitoring and applying criminal sanctions in relation to juvenile offenders, but also their importance for the prevention or reduction of juvenile delinquency. Based on the set research problem for the subject of this paper, we have singled out the total number of juvenile offenders in the period from 2000 to 2019.

SUBJECT, PROBLEM AND OBJECTIVES OF THE RESEARCH

The subject of the research is an evident undesirable social phenomenon, ie social and state, and it refers to juvenile delinquency. Juvenile criminality is a universal and globally serious and permanently current subject and problem not only in Montenegro but is a crucial global problem, which can be compared to the problem of “overheating”. Historically, crime dates back to the creation of the state and will be more or less as long as there are states. The notion of crime in wider - everyday communication implies that crime refers only to adult-adult citizens and primarily refers to the male gender. Exact indicators “say” that crime is not just a property, ie. a negative attribute of adults (adulthood), as a rule for men, but also for women as minors. Criminality has long since “broken” the age limit of adulthood, evidently crime is present in the juvenile population, with regrets of both genders. Trends inexorably show that in this social phenomenon men are followed by women, for now statistically

significantly less, but as time goes on, the differences are decreasing. As things stand, there is a tendency towards equality and gender equality “is knocking at the door”, and according to this undesirable attribute, this time to the detriment of the female gender.

Very briefly, definitely and unambiguously, the subject of this research is criminality in the population of minors of both genders in the territory of the state of Montenegro.

The problem of research is in causality with the subject of research and is reduced to the following three questions:

- Do criminality trends in the observed period of 20 years have a tendency to fall, stagnation or growth?
- Is there a correlation between the variables: *Reported, Accused and Convicted*?
- Is there a difference in the number of *Reported, Accused and Convicted*?

The objectives of the research are implicitly defined in the previous chapter. There are explicitly three goals that come down to scientifically based, statistically valid and reliable answers to the three questions asked.

1. Identify trends in juvenile delinquency in the period from 2000 to 2019. Based on linear models, estimate the number of juvenile delinquency for 2020.

2. Determine the correlations between the variables (*Reported, Accused and Convicted*).

3. Identify the differences between the variables (*Reported, Accused and Convicted*).

RESEARCH HYPOTHESES

Consulting the available literature, primarily professional and scientific journals, the mentioned issues and topics have not been scientifically treated in the territory of the state of Montenegro so far.

There is no or very little concrete scientific empirical research in the surrounding countries.

Based on many years of experience, working on various jobs starting from the direct prevention of crime, expert investigations, prosecution and sanctioning of actors as well as daily contact with adults and juvenile offenders of both genders, the following hypotheses are set analogously:

H1: Juvenile delinquency is expected to stagnate in the observed period.

H2: A statistically significant correlation is expected between the variables (*Reported, Accused and Convicted*).

H3: No statistically significant difference is expected between the variables (*Reported, Accused and Convicted*).

Hypothesis testing will be performed at the level of statistical error $p \leq .05$.

Statistical methods. The paper uses standard descriptive statistics as an introduction to the one-factor analysis of Anov variance. Linear trends and linear correlation and regression coefficients were calculated. According to the Montenegrin Bureau of Statistics, it is possible to monitor data on juvenile perpetrators of criminal offenses in the period from 2000 to 2019. Table 1 provides original data on the number of reported, accused and convicted persons for each year from 2000 to 2019. Table 2 shows descriptive statistical indicators. Table 3 shows the values of the one-factor analysis of variance (*Anova*). Table 4 shows the (*Pearson*) correlation coefficients of the variables: (*Reported, Accused and Convicted*). Tables 5, 6 and 7 show the results of the Regression Analysis for each variable separately. Acceptance and rejection of hypotheses was performed after a consistently conducted statistical procedure for each hypothesis. Decisions to accept and reject hypotheses were made with a probability of error $p \leq .05$. The graphs: (1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6) show the empirical and theoretical values for each variable, as well as the linear solutions of the functions.

Table 1

Year	Reported	Accused	Convicted	Total
2000	264	133	98	495
2001	348	136	101	585
2002	157	83	70	310
2003	209	126	114	449
2004	194	101	91	386
2005	212	128	109	449
2006	286	215	208	709
2007	314	194	148	656
2008	302	211	192	705
2009	310	276	254	840
2010	316	196	177	689
2011	240	166	154	560
2012	207	126	118	451
2013	224	138	130	492
2014	236	134	126	496
2015	244	123	117	484
2016	235	144	140	519
2017	243	133	128	504
2018	217	145	140	502
2019	219	139	137	495
Total	4977	3047	2752	10776

Table 2 Descriptive Statistics

Variable	Min.	Max.	Mean	Std. Error	Std. Dev.	Skewne	Std. Error	Kurtosis	Std. Error
Reported	157	348	248.85	10.992	49.160	.384	.512	-.461	.992
Accused	83	276	152.35	10.083	45.091	1.224	.512	1.710	.992
Convicted	70	254	137.60	9.669	43.239	1.141	.512	1.639	.992

Table 3 One-factor analysis of ANOVA variance

Variabilty	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Between Groups	146042.500	2	73021.250	34.665	.000
Within Groups	120069.900	57	2106.489		
Total	266112.400	59			

Table 4 Correlations

Variable	Reported	Accused	Convicted
Reported	1	.723**	.583**
Accused	.723**	1	.965**
Convicted	.583**	.965**	1

** . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Table 5 Reported

Regression Coefficients ^a						
Model		Unstandardized Coeff.		Standardiz. Coeff.	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	263.353	23.136		11.383	.000
	Years	-1.381	1.931	-.166	-.715	.484

a. Dependent Variable: reported

Table 6 Accused

Regression Coefficients^a						
Model		Unstandardized Coeff.		Standardiz. Coeff.	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	148.774	21.499		6.920	.000
	Years	.341	1.795	.045	.190	.852

a. Dependent Variable: accused

Tabela 7 Convicted

Regression Coefficients^a						
Model		Unstandardized Coeff.		Standardiz. Coeff.	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	120.516	20.118		5.990	.000
	Years	1.627	1.679	.223	.969	.345

a. Dependent Variable: convicted

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION


Discussion, comments and polemics follow the set goals and hypotheses. In accordance with the defined first goal and the first hypothesis and the obtained results, i.e. statistical indicators, it can be stated that there is a decline, i.e. reduction in the number of reported cases at the general level and the observed time period from 2000 to 2019.

Linear function of reported cases from 2000 to 2019:

$$Y_{(x)} = 263.354 - 1.381 * x$$

For the sake of clarity and brevity, it is sufficient to comment on the value (-1,381). The stated value is the absolute value and refers to the reduction in the number of reported cases by approximately 1.38 from year to year. So the number of applications, i.e. potential offenders is declining as shown in Graph 1.

Graph 1 Reported cases



*The estimated number of applicants in 2020 is: $Y_{(2020)} = 263.35 - 1.38 * x \sim 234$ cases.*

The broken line represents empirical values, and the straight line represents the expected, i.e. theoretical values. Based on Graph 1, a large difference between empirical and theoretical values can be noticed. A detailed analysis can be made based on the Regression Coefficients Table 4. As can be seen the standard error of the model is 1.931 which ultimately means that the regression parameters B and Beta are not statistically significant. In the example the error is Sig. = .484. which is significantly higher than projected at .05. The arithmetic mean³ of the number of reported cases for the observed period of 20 years is 248.85. The difference of 15 cases is significant and is statistically significant at the level of error $p \leq .01$.


³ See attached Table 2

Linear function of the Accused cases from 2000 to 2019:

$$Y_{(x)} = 148.774 + .341 * x$$

A criminal prosecution value of .341 indicates that there has been a slight increase in the number of defendants over a period of 20 years. How it looks like you see Graph 2 and Table 6. There are huge differences between empirical and theoretical values visually and numerically. In general, the number of accused is increasing, but increased according to parameter .341 is not statistically significant. A large variation is evident as shown by the standard model error size which in the example is Std. Error = 1,795 and Sig. = .852. As shown in the graph, particularly large variations were in the period from 2001 to 2011. From 2012 to 2019, a period of stabilization occurs (*see graph 2*). Similar almost identical variations can be seen in Graph 1. Both graphs show a period of stabilization from 2012. This stabilization can be linked to the Law on the Treatment of Juveniles in, which came into operation in 2012.

Graph 2 Accused cases



The estimated number of defendants in 2020 is: $Y_{(2020)} = 148,77 + 0.34 * x \sim 156$ cases.

Linear function of convicted cases from 2000 to 2019:


$$Y_{(x)} = 120,52 + 1,63 * x$$

As can be seen, there is a tendency to increase the number of convicted cases. The value ($B = 1.63$) shows that the increase in the number of accused in the observed period from year to year by 1.63 cases, which is not statistically significant but not insignificant. The dynamics of the increase in the number of convicts is shown in (*Graph 3*). The magnitude of the standard error and the statistical significance of the coefficients are shown in Table 7.

An insight into what the dynamics are, i.e. how the empirical ones move and how they are followed by theoretical values is precisely shown in the graphs (1, 2 and 3). The size of the relevant coefficients on the basis of which the number of cases was estimated is shown in Tables (5, 6 and 7). Based on the same algorithms, the number of cases could be estimated before 2000 as well as after 2020. Criminality is a social phenomenon that is influenced by many factors that are often unpredictable. With the come into operation of the Law on the Treatment of Juveniles in Criminal Proceedings, it has indisputably affected the stagnation of crime and the reduction of variability in the period from 2012 to 2020. See graphs (1, 2 and 3).

The first hypothesis explicitly reads: Juvenile delinquency is expected to stagnate in the observed period. From a statistical point of view, this hypothesis can be accepted. However, it is important to point out once again that a general decrease in the number of reported *reported* cases and a simultaneous increase in the number of accused and convicts *accused* и *convicted* were observed, but this decrease and increase is not enough to be statistically significant.

Graph 3 Convicted cases



The estimated number of convicts in 2020 is: $Y_{(2020)} = 120,52 + 1,63 \cdot x \sim 155$ cases.

The second goal of the paper was to determine the correlations between the number of *Reported*, *Accused* and *Convicted*. Table 4 shows the linear (Pearson) correlation coefficients of these variables. The matrix is symmetrical so that above and below the main diagonal are the same coefficients. As can be seen in the main diagonal is the standard units.


It is important to note that *Pearson's* linear correlation coefficients range from (-1 to 1). The correlation coefficients (-1 and 1) are the same in strength, it is a complete or functional connection of the opposite sign. The difference is in the direction. Correlation coefficients with a negative sign indicate that with the increase of one variable it follows the decrease of the other variable. If the coefficients are positive, they are variables in

the same direction. The significance of correlation coefficients increases if the coefficients approach (-1 and 1), and weak if the coefficients approach zero. The statistical significance of correlation coefficients depends on the size of the coefficient itself, but also on the size of the series (*sample*).


To note that the highest correlation between the variables *Accused* and *Convicted*, in the example is .965 ** and the lowest between *Reported* and *Convicted*.583 ** Marks ie. two asterisks in the exponent of correlation coefficients indicate that the coefficients are statistically significant with the acceptance of an error of less than 1%. The height of the correlation coefficients and the statistical significance are not one and the same. Under the same statistical probability, the size of the coefficients is very important, so in the example there is a very strong and high correlation between the variables *Accused* and *Convicted*, the correlation is almost complete, normally and statistically very significant. Using the language of an ordinary citizen can be said: *Whoever is accused is also convicted*. The correlation between the variables *Reported* and *Convicted* is the smallest but at the same time statistically significant, which means that not every reported case will be charged at the same time, and therefore will not be convicted. However, the information are not baseless, which is shown by the correlation coefficient .723 **.


Interpretation of statistical indicators, better understanding, ie. a better visual and quantitative representation is completed by the graphs (4, 5 and 6). The obtained results are naturally expected, so the correlation coefficients do not indicate and show whether there were too few or too many *reported, accused and convicted*, but relations or correlations between the first, the second and the third variable. Certainly, the obtained results are extremely interesting and useful, especially if they are compared with the results of other countries, not only the region. Generalizing and drawing conclusions about good and bad, big and small crime is incomplete if there is no comparison. Given that this research covers an extremely long period of time, a full 20 years, or a fifth of a century, as well as the fact that the data obtained from official institutions, it is a pity that they are incomparable with the results of the region and beyond.

Grafikon 4



Grafikon 5





The second hypothesis is that statistically significant correlations are expected between: *Reported*, *Accused*, *Convicted*. According to the exact indicators of the correlation matrix Table 4, hypothesis H2 can be accepted with the acceptance of a statistical error of less than 1%.

The third goal of the paper was to determine the differences between the number of *Reported*, *Accused* and *Convicted Juveniles*, assuming that there is no statistically significant difference. Table 2 shows all relevant descriptive values that indicate that there is a difference. The differences are evident as shown by the values of the arithmetic means of Table 2, column Mean. The difference of arithmetic means was tested using One-factor analysis of Anova variance Table 3. The coefficient of average variability between variables and within variables is: $F = 34.665$. Statistical significance or error probability Sig. = .000. Value of F and Sig. unequivocally shows that differences at the overall level are present, which is confirmed by arithmetic means, and that the differences are statistically significant. The probability of error that there is no difference is less than 1%.

In accordance with the obtained results of the One-Factor Analysis of the Variance of Anova, we reject the hypothesis H3 with arguments, so the differences between the number of *Reported, Accused and Convicted Juveniles are present*.

CONSLUSION

The final word is the usual methodological approach of empirical research. The intention of the author is that instead of hard and strict, goals, hypotheses, statements, conclusions, methodological and statistical entropy, in the end the problem relaxes a bit, simplifies, ie. translate from the scientific to the vernacular, so that the average reader would understand what the writer wanted to say. Without controversy and argumentative criticism, there is no progress. The absence of controversy and comments is a bad signal, it is about work for work, research for research. This time, instead of sublimated classic Conclusions, I start the controversy with myself. The informal goal of this paper is precisely to “challenge” the professional to arouse interest in continuing research on this and similar topics. Confirmatory-type research, no matter how methodologically and statistically consistent, usually does not solve problems to the end. At first glance, it is paradoxical, but it is true, research usually opens more problems than closes them. More questions than answers. The value of research of this type is precisely that, on the basis of scientific knowledge, new guidelines, road maps, where and how to proceed are given. Based on scientifically empirical research, the causes, latent dimensions (*factors*) are detected, which are a signpost to solving the problem. Undoubtedly, this research also gave reasoned answers to the questions asked.

It has been statistically proven and confirmed that the Law on the Treatment of Juveniles in Criminal Proceedings has influenced the stagnation, stabilization and even reduction of crime in the State. The causes were not discussed. There is no solution to any problem without discovering the cause of the problem. Metaphorically, this work is “extinguishing a fire” without going into the causes of the fire. The crucial problem of

crime is the causes, which this time are on the margins of the topic. As a rule, crime factors are latent, they are very numerous, variable, difficult to identify and even more difficult to predict. The causes of global crime are similar, differing in time and space. Means and methods are rapidly transforming. Crime in turn follows current social events and modern technological achievements.

The special value of this research is that on the basis of relevant data, consistent methodology, we came to know and answer what it is about and what trends are expected. This topic is globally current, was and remains permanently socially justified. It is expected that this paper will arouse interest, controversy and criticism from the competent services, researchers of various specialties, primarily and especially from researchers, scientists, critics in the field of social sciences, humanities and defendological science.

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Abstract: The paper presents the main determinants of national identity and the impact on the collective behaviour of the nation as well as individuals belonging to that nation. It also analyses the importance of religion for the national identity and international communication. The paper will try to give answers to the following questions: Is the national identity overall present?; Does it change over time?; To what extent is it subjective?; Is there a scientific basis for factors influencing national identity? And how much is it a political instrument of manipulation or a real need for some common features and belongings? Overall, the answer to the question of what determines national identity and how intensely the national identity influences (and in what direction) international communication will be given.

Keywords: national identity; factors of influence on national identity; influence of national identity on international communication

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INTRODUCTION

The question of the nation and national identity takes an important place in many debates (Anderson, 1998) and researches in the social fields. Although it was expected that, through the evolution of mankind, multi-ethnicity would develop, it did not happen. Multi-ethnicity or pan-nationalism (Toomer, 1929; Gans, 1979; Connor, 1994; Brubaker, 1996), as an ideal of the 20th century, did not come to life in reality beyond scientific texts and research papers. Nationality, nationalism or national identity, no matter how defined and what is specifically understood by them, are not overtaken by phenomena (Smith, 1998; Cornell, Hartman, 2006; Burgoyne, 2000).

THEORETICAL SETTINGS

From a family, through a kind to a tribe, a quantitative change leads to ethnicity, the national community, and the people. (“Such a community of territorially, biologically and culturally distinct groups of origin that do not yet possess the characteristics of the nation” - Romsics I.). Converting to a nation implies a qualitative change since the nation is a qualitatively higher level of people that is inseparable from the notion of the state (Ardai, 2012). For Hobsbawm, the nation is a sufficiently large community of people whose members see themselves as members of one nation (Hobsbawm, 2005).

Gellner defines a nation in the following way:

- People belong to the same nation, if they share the same culture (in terms of a system of thoughts, signs, associations and ways of behaviour and communication). Belonging to this culture, the individual belongs to the nation;
- People belong to the same nation, if they recognise and accept each other as members of the same nation (Gellner, 1983). Modern nations are more “products” of the state than the other way around.

From the above, it is noted that the notion of nations emerged as binding to a country. The first European nation, French, was founded at the end of the 18th century, after which the process of making nations began in Europe, for example, a German nation formed in the mid-19th century. At that time, there were no South-Slavic nations. In these areas, the population, mostly peasant, was identified with the village community, with landowners, and religion, with the czar, but with no nation. The national identity as the kind of collective identity points to the similarity within the group as well as to the intergroup diversity (diversity in relation to others). National identity implies a sense of belonging to a social (national or ethnic group) and the belief that these components and related interests and goals can be realised in that ethnicity or with it (Calhoun, 1994; Billig, 1995).

Numerous authors point out that it is important to determine what national identity means for an individual and how it relates to other collective identities (Calhoun, 1994; Billig, 1995). For the emergence and meaning of the nation different aspects are stated: the language, demographic explosion of the early 20th century, the spreading of the reading audience (Gellner, 1983), great social mobility (Ilić & Cvejić, 1997), a specific social character (Golubović et al. 1995), religious affiliation, national music as one of the main features of a culture.

One of the key dilemmas in considering this phenomenon is whether national identity is acquired by birth or acquired during adulthood, with an individual having the option to choose. Primordialism starts from the principle that national identity is fixed and durable, immutable throughout life. It is a solid and basic, fundamental human category, given by birth (Cornell & Hartman, 2006), binds people by the ancestral origin (Putinja & Žoslin, 1997), painted by irrational, uncertain feelings. Contrary to this approach, according to an instrumentalist understanding, the national identity is variable, fluid and related to particular circumstances. People will emphasize national affiliation exclusively in situations in which it can bring some benefit to them. National identification is not fixed and

invariable, but it is variable and fluid. With changing the situation, the identification of an individual will change, or at least its intensity will change. National groups are interest, artificially maintained and created exclusively for pragmatic reasons. Many newer approaches combine certain aspects of an instrumentalist and primordialist explanation of national identity.

One of them is a constructivist approach, according to which national identity is being built, constructed during life, and is a matter of individual choice, but sometimes it is represented by deep, inexpressible and unchangeable relationships (Cornell and Hartman, 2006).

ELEMENTS OF THE NATIONAL IDENTITY

Various analyses and opinions are, in theoretical practice, regarding the elements of national identity? Generally accepted characteristics are those given by Adam Smith, and these are the following (Rađenović, 2006):

- Historical territory /homeland: the understanding that nations are territorially bound entities and require their own homeland;
- Common myths and historical memories;
- Common mass, public culture: members of the nation have a common mass culture and common historical myths and memories;
- Common legal rights and duties of all members of the nation within a common legal system;
- Common economy, with the territorial mobility of members of the nation: within the nation there is a common division of labour and production system.

One of the elements that inosculate through the above-mentioned features is the notion of tradition, as a common set of values, customs and attitudes of a nation. Some of the theoreticians' who studied this area are that traditionalism (Hobsbawm, 2005) is "a fictitious tradition," while Nancy Wood notes that, like every memory, a national common memory

is a project of imagination (Wood, 1995). Tradition also often differs greatly within a nation, so it cannot be regarded as an exact common element. On the other hand, it is practically evident that the nurturing of the tradition of a certain nation and the attachment to national identity is evident. The importance of the language also cannot be considered as a key determinant of national identity, for example in the Balkans, we have different nationalities. This is seen not only on the domestic example, but also on the example of many other polycentric languages spoken by several nations, for example, German, English, Dutch, French, Arabic languages (Kordić, 2008; Gröschel, 2009). It is concluded that the French did not become French because they spoke French, but the action of the French state through the education system consolidated the use of the French language and defined the “boundaries” of this use, i.e. “dialects” are suppressed, i.e. the mother idioms of a large part of the population, and the French language as the general language of the “French” was constituted. If taking into consideration the religion as an important determinant, in reality there are many examples of the manifestation of national identity, through common religion, as well as examples of international communication, which is most often in correlation with the same religion. There are also numerous examples of negative international communication between nations with different religions.

However, on the other hand, we have numerous examples of deep and difficult conflicts between nations belonging to the same religion (Islamic nations in the Middle East, Germany and France, etc.). If one considers a culture, which includes a multitude of features, there is a certain homogenisation within one nation. Yet, on the other hand, the same culture is noticed outside of one nation, or even within certain groups or territorial regions of different nations (for instance comparison of Vienna and Budapest: the inhabitants of Budapest and Vienna have much more in common than for instance Vienna and Munich or Vienna and Stuttgart (Pauer, 2000)). From all above stated, the conclusion is that national identity is a very complex and virtual concept, which rests more on subjectivity than on exactness. All aforementioned elements constitute factors influencing the creation of a national identity, but on a subjective

basis. The logical conclusion is that it is supported by the development of consciousness and society, and as such it should be more often present at a lower level of development, but both history and today deny it.

Structure of national identity

Basic components of national identity were obtained from surveys conducted in countries with high levels of multiculturalism and nationally mixed populations (in the US, on ethnic minority samples) (Phinney, 1990).

In this way, four components of national identity were identified (Phinney, 1990):

- The component of self-identification / self-refinement of oneself as a member of a particular national group. Self-identification can be determined by origin, but also by a statement of one's own commitment. According to a study conducted in Australia by Feather (1994), stronger national identification has been shown to be associated with more pronounced favoritism of one's own group, greater group bias, and more pronounced collectivist values.
- A sense of belonging to a particular group. This feeling can vary in intensity from a very strong sense of belonging, where there is a strong emotional attachment, to a feeling of only formal belonging to the group, where there is an absence of emotional attachment. This component is mainly tested through attachment to one's own group or as a sense of difference, isolation of one's own from other groups.
- Positive or negative attitudes towards group membership. Being a member of a group does not necessarily mean having a positive attitude towards that group. Positive attitudes are explored through positive affective reactions, e.g. pride, satisfaction with belonging, acceptance of one's group. The absence of positive or negative views indicates a rejection and denial of one's own

national identity, and manifests itself as a desire to move to another national group.

- Involvement in the work and life of a national group refers to participating in nurturing one's own national tradition and culture. The most important indicators of involvement are: the use of national language, the way of forming friendly and intimate relationships, participating in the formation of national institutions (local clubs, societies), nurturing national values, knowledge of history and culture, etc.

In a series of studies, it has been shown that people determine their national identity based on different criteria, which may be differently clear or obvious. Thus, birth and citizenship, language and religion are clear and obvious criteria, and a sense of belonging to a particular nation is less a clear criterion (Corkalo and Kamenov, 1999). When referring to the importance of particular criteria, the results of a survey conducted in 1995 by the International Social Survey Program show that birth, citizenship, place of residence, respect for state institutions, language proficiency and sense of nationality are equally important criteria in determining national identity (Feather, 1994).

Phinney distinguishes the aforementioned components of national identity from a series of studies, as those aspects that most commonly occur with this term (Phinney, 1990). In measuring ethnic identity, in previous studies, different combinations of these components were used, with different characteristics describing each component. In a small number of reports, measurement reliability data existed, and where they existed, the reliability coefficient ranged from 0.35 to 0.90 (Phinney, 1990). Most often, reliability was particularly low. Also, very rarely the same measure was used for the given construct. Such results have shown that by far the most important next direction in the study of national identity is the development of valid and reliable instruments for measuring national identity, ie its components.

The forms of national attachment

Forms of national attachment can be viewed from two aspects. The first aspect relates to the stage of social development of a particular nation-state, and the second aspect to the individual. With respect to the first aspect, Katz (Šiber, 1998) lists forms of national attachment with respect to the stage of social development in which the nation-state is situated. The invocation of national identity in states that are in the process of formation aims at uniting the population and defending themselves against other authorities. It insists on national sovereignty and cultural identity. In developed societies, in a period of strengthening and expanding power, national ideology is characterized by an emphasis on the cultural superiority of the country, which “justifies” the exploitation of other countries. In bureaucratic-technocratic societies, such as capitalist or socialist, it is characteristic of the greatness of the state, its power and strength. Where the ruling layer loses power, tradition and history are emphasized.

With respect to the second aspect, therefore, the aspect of the individual that is more psychological, Guetzkov distinguishes five forms of national attachment (Šiber, 1998):

- Exclusive national attachment exists when there is a particular awareness of belonging to one’s own nation, with disparagement of other nations. The psychological content of such attachment is expressed as nationalism, ethnocentrism and chauvinism.
- Emphasized national attachment signifies a degree of national idealization as well as patriotism but also acceptance of other nations (in the sense that they are not inferior to their own nation).
- Multiple national attachment or internationalism implies belonging to one’s own nation, but strives for interethnic co-operation and communication. Loyalty to humanity, to what is humane, valuable, advanced, is emphasized.
- Cosmopolitanism does not involve a sense of belonging to a nation, but rather a sense of attachment to the common human

community and an aspiration to overcome narrow national interests.

- Anationalism implies individualism, a complete absence of attachment to the nation whereby national sentiments are considered harmful and unnecessary.

INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATION

Intercultural communication is the process of sending and receiving messages between people who, because of their cultural traditions, may interpret verbal and nonverbal signals differently (Kumbier & Schulz von Thun, 2009). Calling some communication intercultural, it focuses on the influence of culture on the interaction between members of different cultures. At the same time, there is a need to indulge in something unknown and difficult to understand, that is, in another culture (Lazibat and Kolaković, 2004).

Intercultural communication involves the interaction of people whose cultural perceptions and symbolic systems are different enough to change the communication act (Mesic, 2006).

Perception, verbal and non-verbal communication are basic aspects of intercultural communication. Perception, in the sense of a complex process that enables the selection of those “stimuli” that affect human emotions and their evaluation, with beliefs, worldviews and social organization playing an important role (Pirschl, 2001). The main means of verbal communication is language, which, in addition to its communication function, defines, expresses and transmits culture, because it is actually part of an ethnic, cultural or other group. Non-verbal communication conveys attitudes and emotional relationships, and a particularly important segment of intercultural communication is the non-verbal communication that transmits most of the information.

Intercultural communication is important because of the connection and openness of society, the promotion of democracy, the strengthening of the role of civil society, the promotion of basic human

rights. The basis for successful intercultural communication is intercultural sensitivity, among other things, as the ability to understand and accept cultural differences. Intercultural sensitivity is sensitivity to others in the sense that it directs behavior towards responsible coexistence and active cooperation in a culturally pluralistic environment. Intercultural sensitivity is the ability to perceive and recognize the existence of different worldviews that allows one to accept and acknowledge not only one's own cultural values but also the values of culturally different persons.

The creator of the Intercultural Sensitivity Development Model is Milton Bennett. Bennett's model consists of an ethnocentric and ethno-relative approach, as the two basic worldviews, where the ethnocentric view measures the evaluation of other cultures by one's own culture and compares one's ethno-relative culture with other cultures (Bedečković, 2010). According to Bennett, there are six levels of that model that are based on a specific continuum in which each successive level leads to greater sensitivity to cultural diversity. The more complex and frequent the experience with the culturally different, the greater the competence in intercultural relations, and the advancement in individual levels is associated with certain abilities and maturity of the individual (Bedečković, 2010).

Figure 1 Bennett's developmental model of intercultural sensitivity



Source: (Bedečković, 2010)

Global and social changes today require each individual to develop new knowledge, attitudes and skills, or to develop new intercultural competences as an essential prerequisite for successful communication in intercultural situations. Competence can mean ability, skill, competence, talent, experience, knowledge, and intercultural communication competence is actually a behavior that is appropriate and effective in a particular place, and contains a combination of different abilities that an individual may function in an environment other than culture his culture.

Intercultural communication competence is a person's overall internal ability to manage key challenging features of intercultural communication, such as cultural differences and unknowns, attitudes that exist between particular groups, and the experience of stress that accompanies such a situation (Samovar, Porter & McDaniel Edwin, 2013).

In the last few decades, the national intolerance and extremist glorification of national identity have been very pronounced in the Balkans. The question arises as to whether this is truly essential, or is it the result of political processes, or political manipulation through mass psychology? This is a very complex question and the answer is far from simple. Some authors consider it to be a more political process. As people look and value their origin, history, language and religion, it is the result of the decisions of the political elite, which determines a certain way of watching and intensifies it, or turns it forward by various political steps." (Riedel, 2005). The specific elite took care of spreading group identity, it made a picture accordingly to the political goals it strived for and expanded it with the help of the media (Riedel, 2005). In contrast to such a standpoint, a logical question arises, which in itself is imposed, and that is, in the everyday folk said to be "hard to make frog go in water," i.e. can such a political manipulation of the masses be carried out, if there was no suitable soil? Today's global processes are distinguished by the strengthening of the right-wing forces, expressed xenophobia and the glorification of one's own nation. These processes are very strong throughout the world and

practically disprove theoretical considerations about the national identity being a myth (Kordić, 2008).

International communication is at a very low level, even among people of the same language, of a similar culture and of the same religion. Nationalism gives the foundation of a group identity, portraying it as a valuable achievement. Nationalism is an ideology that claims that one endangered by global processes can restore meaning if we return to the roots and cultural identity (Eriksen, 2004). Nationalistic ideals tend to connect the concept of the homeland with the myth of origin with the complete cultural dominance of the community that is the bearer of this ideal. The nationalists strive to possess the historical background of their ancestors who were witnesses of the blooming of the nation's spirit (Giddens, 1996). However, under the existing conditions, we cannot completely deny the significance of a national identity by exclusively adhering to universalism or cosmopolitanism (Tamir, 1993). People from different national groups will share commitment to society if they understand it as a context within which they can nurture their national identity rather than being subordinate (Kymlicka, 1995).

Increasingly interconnectedness and communication among citizens of different countries, nations and cultures are removing many intellectual as well as physical boundaries. The level of intercultural communication competence is related to the level of development of society, that is, of the individual. In doing so, intercultural communication competence means the outgrowth of ethnocentrism, as well as the recognition of other cultures. The main goal of interculturalism in education is to make the young generation aware of their cultural identity, but also to be tolerant of diversity. For this reason, it seeks to develop a sense of belonging to one's community, as well as more tolerant forms of behavior in daily life. Intercultural communication competence means qualitative and successful communication, which takes place between two or more persons from different cultures. Thus, some persons have a high degree of intercultural competence, that is, they are able to communicate successfully with persons from other cultures, while persons with a low

degree of intercultural competence always behave in the same way, even when communicating with persons from other cultures.

CONCLUSION

From all of the above stated, it is concluded that national identity is one phenomenon, which should be studied in more detail, through the causes of its origin, but also through political processes. Practically, in today's context, it proves that national identity is a significant factor of negative international communication. Such processes are destructive, but they are the reality, which must not be ignored. There are no exact factors and elements of the emergence of national identity and its intensity. All of these elements are part of the national intensity, but the degree of their participation is subjective. Human, as an emotional social being, is subject to external influences, especially the media, which can manipulatively act and thereby manage the direction of creation and expression of national identity. That is why it is necessary to act studiously and to make significant efforts on the global level to make such blissful passions calm and that humanity begins behaving rationally. But it is always of a cyclical character and it is evident that the global goal of the emergence of a unique nation and civil state is far from practical realisation.

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DURKHEIM'S SOCIOLOGICAL SCHOOL

EMILE DURKHEIM'S SOCIOLOGY BETWEEN UNIVERSALISM AND SOCIOLOGISM

Review scientific article

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Abstract: Examining the whole of Durkheim's teaching, the conclusion is unequivocally that his understanding of sociology and social sciences can be characterized as sociologism, which means that he believed that society is primary in relation to the individual, ie that the individual finds his existence exclusively within society. It is indisputable that this French thinker was among the most prominent sociologists who advocated the idea of the primacy of society in relation to the individual, and such thinking led him to the idea of considering all social aspects and elements in the spirit of sociological views. Many theorists agree that sociologism is most fully presented in the explanation of the religious phenomenon, which is constituted on a special and not understood by the individual glorification (worship) of sociability. Durkheim's culture, politics, and economy were necessarily understood in accordance with the idea of the primacy of society. Universally understood, society is a special entity that lives for itself, independently and separately from the lives of different individuals, acting in its own name and striving for goals different from those that guide those individuals. Durkheim's entire idea of the calling of sociology required that this new science cross the threshold of the university classroom and address a wider audience, even all of humanity.

Keywords: Durkheim; sociologism; universalism; society

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INTRODUCTION

When I decided to devote myself more seriously to reading the available editions of Durkheim's works, I wanted to write some review of the entire work of this leading classic of sociology. However, I was faced with the dilemma of what to write about this all-time sociological genius that has not already been written, or as A. Mimica says, an area of Durkheim's work that has not been thoroughly examined so far. When I shared my dilemma with my sociological guru, Professor Dragan Kokovic, without thinking, he told me to dedicate the space for analysis to Durkheim between universalism and sociologism. I liked the idea at the first Mass and I headed in that direction.

If we accept the fact that Kont's greatest contribution to sociology was his advocacy of a new science of society, then we can thank Durkheim for making official, almost half a century later (1888), the beginning of university status in sociology. 'Our society needs to regain awareness of its organic unity ... Well, gentlemen, I believe that sociology, more than any other science, is able to establish these ideas' (Durkheim, 1888)². If one science, regardless of the area of reality, be included in the system of university disciplines as the highest, most permanent and most influential form of organization of cognitive activities enters the mature period of its development. By gaining university status, completely new opportunities were opened to her, which had been denied to her until then, or were more difficult to access. The university status provided sociology with

2 One seemingly insignificant event in the academic life of France at the end of the 19th century had, however, even outside the borders of the country in which it took place, far-reaching consequences for the development of sociology as a science and profession. By a ministerial decree of July 20, 1887, Emil Durkheim, a twenty-nine-year-old high school professor of philosophy in Troyes, was appointed as a lecturer, that is, as an assistant professor without a doctorate, as a lecturer in a subject founded for him 'pedagogy and social science' at the Faculty of Philosophy in Bordeaux. Beneath this eclectic title of the course was, covertly, the institutionalization of a new science, Sociology, as an academic discipline. This date and event are marked in the history of the development of sociology as an event that marked the beginning of a new phase in the development of sociology, because until then a mostly marginal intellectual activity was integrated into the academic establishment and thus gained the legitimacy of 'strict science'.

the possibility of organized and methodical transfer and dissemination of knowledge in its field, as well as the training of experts supplied with academic knowledge. Special emphasis should be placed on the possibility of more systematic scientific research, fitting into the interdisciplinary division of labor, establishing an objective relationship with related disciplines, as well as a stricter selection of theoretical knowledge, experiential generalizations and methodological tools that sociology will incorporate into its system.

HISTORICAL AND SOCIAL CONTEXT

Sociological-cognitive analysis of the broader social conditions in which sociology emerged indisputably confirms that, at least in France, it acquired university status precisely due to the fact that, in its Durkheimian version, it most directly corresponded to the non-scientific goals of the then republican order. If, as Durkheim himself claimed, sociology was and remains a distinctly French science, it is necessary, according to some sociology theorists, to find an explanation of how, precisely in France, sociology gained academic status, and on the other, to come up with the idea to use it for ideological purposes.

The Industrial Revolution left an indelible mark and confirmed the decisive influence on the thought of the nineteenth century. In all spheres of spiritual creation, the industrial revolution showed its strength and legitimized itself as typically English, just as the political revolution of 1789 would be typically French. However, the implications of the industrial revolution will not pass either France or Germany. The position of the labor force, the transformation of ownership, the industrial city, technology and the factory system, notes R. Nizbet, have become the most challenging aspects of the industrial revolution that will determine the emergence of sociological issues and thinking. These concepts of sociology, created under these conditions, will have a decisive influence on the leading thinkers of sociology of that time. This can be seen in Durkheim's work *On the Division of Social Work* in which he presented a significant analysis

of social change according to which the emergence of the industrial era marked the emergence of a new form of solidarity.

Durkheim's sociology, notes Mimica (2004), has been seen in most analyzes as a closed body of knowledge subject to various forms of reconstruction, and Berger and Kellner (1991) point out that Durkheim and the entire French school of sociology, of which he is the founder, is much closer to the Enlightenment. His method is essentially positivist, based on the natural sciences. Over time, the socio-political context in which these seemingly rigid academic texts originated and addressed has faded. Durkheim's work was marked by the period of the French Third Republic, from the end of the 1870s until the beginning of the First World War. It is indisputable that this historical context had an impact on Durkheim's teaching because he was in constant dialogue with the intellectual, social, and even political problems of his time. But, in his theoretical works and public appearances, except in the Dreyfus affair, one can rarely see a direct reflection of the recognizable events of that time that shook the Third Republic, such as parliamentary crises, the colonial question, workers' movements, etc. Although he refused to 'get involved in the crowd', Mimica notes, this does not mean that he considered sociology an esoteric activity that must be kept away from everyday public life. It is clear, needless to say, that Durkheim created a unique and comprehensive program of theoretical and methodological grounding of the new science of society at a time when its expediency and cognitive possibilities were strongly doubted. No one has worked so persistently, systematically and even fanatically, not only on the professional, institutional and organizational consolidation of sociology, but also on its establishment into a kind of official doctrine. If we agree with the previous statement, then we can conclude that any discussion about whether Durkheim's sociology is 'value-neutral' or 'socially engaged' is completely meaningless. That this is so is confirmed by the fact that in Durkheim's work one phase in his positivism is clearly visible, which we recognize as a program for an applied sociology that will formulate the rules of social orientation. He believed that this science will not only teach us how to find the best way to achieve social goals, but will also determine the goals that a particular society should strive for, and it

will do so entirely on the basis of scientific observation of empirical data. According to Durkheim, this can be achieved by establishing an objective criterion for determining social health and social pathology. In this regard, he believed that sociology can apply the general laws of sociology to preserve the health of society in the same way that medicine applies physiological laws to preserve the health of the individual.

In his study of *Suicide* (first published in 1897), Durkheim wanted to use the process of establishing sociology as an academic discipline in France during the late 19th century, and showed that his particular approach to the subject was superior to others. In sociology, he succeeded in gaining the patronage of the creators of the Third Republic, who ensured the speed of ascent with this science. 'Sociological-cognitive analysis of the wider social conditions in which sociology itself was born cannot conclude that this science, at least in France, gained university status precisely by the fact that - in your Durkheimian version - it most directly corresponded to the non-scientific goals of the then republican origin' (Mimica, 2004: 20). Durkheim believed that sociology could be used to build a better society. Therefore, Durkheim, in the tradition of the entire positivist current in Comte's sociology, believed that the goal of science was to succeed and effectively solve practical social problems. It is a major subject of sociology seen in the question of how it is possible to explain the integrity of society despite its expansion. What is important in Durkheim's contribution to sociology, Turner's application, is that he recognizes that systems of cultural symbols are an important basis for social integration. Using a functionalist approach, Durkheim pointed out that sociological revelation is needed to discover how some element of social structures meets a particular social need, that is, only one need: to lead members of society into a harmonious whole. Starting from the fact that philosophy is a one-way tradition, sociology must be completely independent of philosophy, if it wants to be constituted as a science, it may be Durkheim. He wanted to constitute sociology on the model of the natural sciences in accordance with the tradition of French positivism, and time freed it from its attachment to philosophy. In this sense, he developed a comprehensive methodological program which he set out in

his very significant work *The Rules of the Sociological Method*, which was published in 1894. The collective consciousness of the idea is presented at the center of his sociological theories. According to Durkheim, 'collective consciousness' is not a simple collection of individual consciousnesses, but a qualitatively new reality that constitutes the basic individual consciousnesses.

UNIVERSALISM AND SOCIOLOGISM AS FOUNDATION OF DURKHEIM'S STUDY

Durkheim believed that society is primarily in relation to the individual, that is, that the individual finds his existence exclusively within society, which characterized his approach to sociology and social sciences as sociologism. It is undeniable that this leading sociologist was among the most prominent sociologists who advocated the idea of the primacy of society in relation to the individual. 'In order to understand the way society imagines itself and the world around it, one needs to consider the nature of society, not the nature of the individual' (Dirkem, 2012: 24). Such thinking led him to the idea of considering all social aspects and elements in the spirit of his sociological views. Science, culture, religion, politics and economics, as subtotalities in which the totality of society is manifested in Durkheim, are viewed universally, because they were necessarily understood in accordance with the idea of the primacy of society. Universally understood, society is a special entity that lives for itself, independently and separately from the lives of different individuals, acting in its own name and striving for goals different from those that guide those individuals. In *Elementary Forms of Religious Life*, Durkheim argues that 'the Universe exists only if it is thought, and as the only society thinks of it in its totality, it finds its place in society, becomes an element of its inner life, and so society itself is a total genus beyond which there is nothing' (1982: 399). The structure of social life, claims Durkheim (2012), cannot be explained by purely psychological factors, ie states of

individual consciousness. What collective representations express is the way a group thinks about itself through relationships with objects that have an impact on it. The states of collective consciousness are of a different nature from the states of individual consciousness, they are representations of another kind. Positivistically, Durkheim compares water and its nutrients and other properties, which do not result from the properties of the two gases that make up water, but in the complex substance they form by their association. In the same way, in society, observed sui generis, the synthesis that forms every society releases new phenomena, different from those that take place in the individual consciousnesses of its members. With the 'theory of progress' to which Durkheim adhered, as well as with the apotheosis of a society full of morality and professional solidarity, he emphasizes the philosophical basis of the concept in which this teaching is classified as universalism. 'Generally speaking, it is easy to understand that individuals can only be subjected to some collective despotism; for the members of a particular society can be exclusively under the power of a certain force which is above them, and there is only one which has that property: it is the force of the group. No person, no matter how powerful, could do anything against the whole society; it, therefore, could not be subjugated against his will' (Dirkem, 1972: 213). In this fact, Durkheim sees the reason that authoritarian regimes do not derive their power from themselves, but from its very social structure. The main critique of Durkheim's theory is directed at the fact that he failed to free himself from Spencer's evolutionism³ in *The Division of Labour in Society*. Durkheim agreed with Spencer that the aspect of change from primitive to civilized forms of society should be sought in the growing division of labour or specialization, but he believed that Spencer and the utilitarians overemphasized economic change and neglected much more significant changes in morality and law. According to Durkheim, the basic difference between primitive and civilized societies is in the type of morality or

3 'When a clan disappears, the organized type does not exist alone, in a pure state. The population is no longer divided according to blood relationship, real or imagined, but according to the division of territory. Segments are no longer family groups, but territorial units. The transition from one state to another takes place, after all, through slow evolution' (Dirkem, 1972: 206).

social solidarity. In this study on the division of social work, he was significantly subject to the economic understanding of the division of labour of Adam Smith, although it is evident expressed antipathy to economism. However, Durkheim's merit is that he tried to turn it towards the specific nature of society and look at the division of labor more broadly within the social structure. In the mentioned study, Durkheim notices two types of solidarity, 'mechanical' and 'organic', which established the existence of two types of society⁴ that suit them. Mechanical solidarity is immanent to primitive societies in which the division of labor is only in its infancy where people live homogeneously, in solidarity, blindly adhering to governing standards, norms and traditions. The more primitive people are, the more similar they are to each other, which is why in primitive societies people think, feel and behave collectively, Durkheim claims and states that people are totally depersonalized and deindividualized. In a society of organic solidarity, people are not connected by blood, but by profession, whereby everyone individualizes themselves through improvement in their profession, with the goal of general social harmony. These two types of solidarity develop in inverse proportion to each other. In the process, he notes, of the two corresponding social types, one regularly regresses if the other progresses, and the latter is determined by the division of social work. Through the division of labour, and in later works, Durkheim further developed the view that society is not a 'natural thing', an organism, but 'nature itself sui generis', because 'if we consider social facts as things, then they we consider it a social thing' (Durkheim, 2012). In other words, social facts are objective, because they are independent of the human will and psyche, they can be found out by objective observation because they are in a deterministic relationship.

Sociologism, therefore, represents a synthesis of positivist

4 Mechanical solidarity, in Durkheim's theory, represents the idea that primitive societies are held together by an underdeveloped division of labor and the fact that they all do the same kind of work. Organic solidarity is the idea that in a modern-developed society, due to the developed division of labor, solidarity arises from diversity; in order for a society to function and even survive, the contribution of a larger number of individuals is needed. Increasing the dynamic density of the population leads to the transformation of mechanical into organic solidarity.

methodology and a special collection of essential theories for which the unique name *agelicism* (from the word group) has been adopted. Age-licism is a general sociological doctrine that adheres to reality as sui generis (unique, special, distinctive) or the causal priority of a social group as a group. Positivism is a doctrine by which the social sciences should adopt the methods or schemes of the natural sciences, and Durkheim's study *Suicide* (1997) is often considered a typical model of positivist research and indeed follows many of the methodological procedures of positivism. Durkheim advocated this thesis, although positivism was first developed by Saint-Simon, and he considered sociology to be completely independent of philosophy, because philosophy is not a positivist science. In this regard, Durkheim was convinced that he had discovered the laws of human behavior that govern the suicide rate, and that rate 'always rises during periods of economic expansion or recession.' Durkheim and other positivists were convinced that the laws of human behavior could be detected by collecting objective facts about the social world in statistical form. By carefully analyzing these facts and repeatedly checking the findings in different contexts, Durkheim concluded that people do not have much choice in their own behavior, because external forces control their behavior. 'We do not observe only individual and mutually separated events, but we consider a set of suicides in a given society during a given time unit, we will find that the whole thus obtained is not a simple sum of independent facts, but that it itself constitutes a new sui generis fact, which has its unity. and its uniqueness, that is, its own nature which is, moreover, in the highest degree social' (Dirkem, 1997: 37). It was through the study *Suicide* that Durkheim wanted to use the example of suicide, as the most individual act, to show the possibility of sociology as a systematic science of society, interpreting this act as a consequence of the action of social factors. Every society is destined, Durkheim claims, to give a certain number of voluntary deaths. 'This predestination can, therefore, be the subject of a special study that falls within the competence of sociology' (1997: 46). Based on many facts, Durkheim concludes that the social rate of suicide can only be explained in a sociological way (1997: 331).

His basic methodological postulate is that 'sociological and social facts should be treated as things.'⁵ Social facts should be explained in terms of another social fact, and never by a lower-order fact (e.g., a biological or psychological cause). Social fact, Durkheim argues, must have two important characteristics: it must be external (in the sense that it is not the same as the researcher's idea) and it must impose a certain coercion on the researcher (in the sense that it possesses independent characteristics not influenced by the researcher's will). He agreed with Spencer and the utilitarians that an important aspect of change from primitive to civilized forms of society should be sought in the rise of the division of labor, or specialization. He does not agree with the utilitarians in that he believes that they overemphasized economic changes, and neglected, according to him, far more important changes in morality and law.

Emil Durkheim, like no other sociologist, demanded the autonomy of sociology as a science, as an empirical analytical science. In the beginning, he was often in dissent with the representatives of other theoretical directions, primarily with psychologists, who denied the benefit and independence of sociology as a science. Therefore, in the *Rules of the Sociological Method*, he tried to prove that society is a reality of a special kind of 'sui generis', which cannot be reduced to psychological facts. The subject of sociology is the sociological factual situation. What carries Durkheim's special value relates to his social facts. In this regard, Durkheim uses the substantive doctrine of the exteriority of social facts to consider that for the individual who acts, the social fact is external because it is perceived as an independent reality that he, or any other individual, did not create, which is part of his objective environment. Social fact, therefore, has the character of coercion because it does not adapt to the will of the individual, but is imposed on individuals as a regulator of

5 'What's the matter?' A thing is opposed to an idea such as what we know on the outside is opposed to what we know on the inside. A thing is any object of cognition that does not permeate naturally with understanding, all that we cannot make an appropriate notion of for ourselves by a simple process of spiritual analysis, all that the spirit can comprehend only on condition of coming out of itself, through observation and experimentation, gradually moving from external and most directly available features to those less visible and deeper' (Dirkem, 2012: 19).

their behavior, and even their will. 'Social fact is recognized by the power of external coercion that it exerts or is capable of exercising over individuals, and the presence of that power is recognized, either by the existence of a certain sanction or by the resistance that fact offers to each individual endeavor that seeks to distort its meaning' (Dirkem, 2012: 40). The fact of social coercion enters the direct experience of an individual who cannot ignore the rules in the field of law and morals, which Durkheim considers to be the most typical of social facts, without experiencing certain manifestations of social disapproval. If coercion is such an important element in law and ethics, it means that it is present in other types of social facts as well. Regarding the state of general decline in morale, Durkheim claims that the fact is that the largest number of citizens are engaged in economic functions today, and because of that, 'there are a large number of individuals whose almost entire life is spent in the industrial and commercial environment; the consequence of which, since that environment is quite poorly imbued with morality, is that most of their lives take place outside of any moral activity' (Dirkem, 1972: 53). That is why Durkheim points out that the only organized society enjoys the moral and material superiority that is necessary in order to impose the law on individuals, because the only moral person who stands above special personalities is the one who is educated by the community. The community is most interested, Durkheim points out, in maintaining order and peace. If anomie is evil, it is evil because it primarily suffers from a society that, in order to live, cannot exist without cohesion and without order.

Durkheim marks the beginning of the last decade of the 19th century with a new and special phase in his work, which especially emphasizes the idealistic conception of the social group with a greater emphasis on collective ideas in relation to the internal social environment. The first sociological methods (2012) represent the starting point of methodological reflection and have become a sociological opinion which, as a set of cognitive, instrumental and ideological views on the role and goals of sociological science can be attributed to the status of collective performances, and they 'fade if they are not occasionally confirmed in a gathered group that ritually forms its moral unity' (1982). 'The ability of society to ascend

to god or to create gods was nowhere more visible than in the first years of the [French] revolution. At that time, under the influence of general enthusiasm, things of a purely secular nature, such as homeland, freedom, mind, turned public opinion into saints' (1982: 198). In further analysis, Durkheim notes that one religion, which had its own dogma, symbols, altars, and feasts, tended to establish itself. Nothing comes from nothing, Durkheim points out, the believer is not deceived when he believes in the existence of a moral force on which he depends and from which he draws the best in him. That force exists, it is society, and God is only a pictorial expression of society (1982: 208-210). In this way, Durkheim shows with a firm stance that religion is essentially a social thing and should be defined as a distinctly social phenomenon characterized by its position outside and before individual consciousness, as well as its ability to exercise coercion over them. Accordingly, Durkheim concludes: 'Religion is called to be transformed rather than to disappear' (1982: 390).

CONCLUSION

The history of sociological thought unequivocally confirms that Durkheim, after O. Comte, had the greatest influence on the history of sociology. His influence is shown not only by his extensive scientific research work, but also by his practical organizational ability to manage research work. He created his methodological program of sociology with the intention of establishing sociology as an objective science, rejecting the classical sociological systems of Comte and Spencer. He advocated an inductive approach 'from things to ideas', from the individual to the general in sociology. He showed this in the best way with the study *Suicide*, in which he rejected all theories that explain suicide from the point of view of psychological-physiological, biological, climatic and geographical. In contrast, Durkheim developed the concept of understanding suicide as a 'social fact' that can only be explained by social causes. He believed that in his sociological theory of society he found where that same society figured

as the first and last criterion of the existence of all that exists. Criticizing the individualistic disintegration of modern society, contrasting it with the deep moral solidarity of primitive communities, he pastorally calls for 'a moral renewal of society that can only be achieved through choirs, assemblies and councils in which individuals, closely brought together, reaffirm their common feelings.' 'Only when a man revives the spirit of communion in himself,' says Durkheim, will he be able to live as a human being.

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BH MEDIA AND CYBER SECURITY

**THE INFLUENCE OF SOCIAL MEDIA ON THREATS TO
IDENTITY, STABILITY AND NATIONAL SECURITY;
INSTITUTIONAL INEFFICIENCY AND VULNERABILITY OF
B&H**

Review scientific article

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Abstract: A sound security system represents the most significant degree of unity of diversity, which means that all the different details are brought into harmony. B&H does not have adequate cybersecurity: privatization of political influence, insufficient institutional cooperation, fundamentally hostile political environment (ethnopolitical institutional structure), fragmented cyberspace (state-entity-cantons), lack of finances, scientific-research frameworks, and professional human resources. Good management, i.e., state, should be based on institutions' and individuals' independence, expertise, and integrity. Appointments and employment in the public sector by party practice require urgent analysis and systematic reforms. The use of social media can jeopardize national security or help pursue national strategic interests. Defense mechanisms and instruments must be carefully tailored, modeled on more developed countries, emphasizing monitoring the use of social media, especially for organizations with more or less linear structures. Public awareness

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of cybersecurity is essential for adopting and implementing information security measures at all levels and in all time frames. The number of users in B&H is significantly above the world average, expressing concern for the security of the data they store. The adoption of a cybersecurity strategy focusing on social media by ethnopolitical leadership within the broader framework of a national security strategy means choosing a specific approach to social media due to a balanced choice between two opposed lines of action. The B&H cybersecurity system's inefficiency is inextricably linked to ethnopolitical leadership during the process of adopting and implementing the national strategy and all levels of implementation of the mechanisms involved in protection. The Western Balkans are in a decades-long economic depression, with internal conflicts. In the coming period, social media diffusion may affect the increased coherence of organized crime, revolutions, terrorism, ethnonationalism, and violence as the least desirable factor of implosion.

Keywords: social media; national security; cybersecurity, Western Balkans; B&H; instruments; strategy; ethnopolitics; institutions

INTRODUCTION

This paper aims to provide an up-to-date picture of the situation regarding the threats and benefits of using social media, cyber security issues, and to analyze the current and future impact of social media on security and stability in the world, including the Western Balkans. Moreover, Bosnia and Herzegovina (B&H) outlining the main risk scenarios. B&H, in the study, is problematized as an “institutionally weak state” with dominant ‘entity’ roles and the rule of ethnopolitics, ‘without’ sufficiently adapted defense tools, general policies, scientific research activities, developed awareness, primary purposes, common strategies and adoption procedures, and implementation of more efficient management within the organizational parameters of cybersecurity. It is confirmed by the European Commission's 2016 Progress Report on B&H,

which states that ‘B&H does not have a comprehensive strategic approach to addressing cybercrime and cybersecurity threats.’ The report states that the response to cyber threats needs to be strengthened. Security, existing capacities to fight cybercrime, and the capacities of teams for prevention and protection against cyber incidents and threats to the security of public information systems (CERT/ CSIRT²). The total number of researches on the problems and impact of social media on threats to privacy, identity, networks and data, socio-political threats to the state and institutions, and the impact of phenomena on the Western’s stability and national security Balkans concerning B&H, is modest.

In general, the main advantage of social networks is considered to be the extensive possibility of disseminating posted content in a fast and efficient manner among users or interest groups. Bulović et al. (2013) explain this as branching among users using multiple different media channels, where the connection can take place in two ways: by simply linking to other sites or by sharing among other sites (Bulović, 2013). The author suggests a definition of social media, according to which social networks are defined as instruments or tools. Given that each instrument carries with it positive and negative elements, this paper aims to define threats to national security arising from its use and show how and to what extent the use of these instruments can prevent or eliminate threats and help protect national interests. It is necessary to address the threats and benefits to national security that arise from social media use. Besides, it is important to know how and to what extent protection mechanisms, ie. ‘tools’ can help prevent, limit, or eliminate such threats and help protect the state’s strategic interests. With an emphasis on social media, the paper studies the issues of terrorism, organized crime, revolutions, armed conflicts, ethnonationalism turmoil in B&H, and the impact on the socio-political climate and the maintenance of peace and stability. The study problematizes the hypothesis of the effects of mass communication, which has survived and even flourished in recent years within the discourse

² CERT (eng. Computer Emergency Response Team or CSIRT (eng. Computer Security Incident Response Team)

of mass mediation by someone else's attention, influencing public opinion and undermining national interests. Threatening the security of cyberspace, be it cyber threats, terrorism, escalating relations between states, citizen riots, the illegal economy, and all types of cybercrime, has long been not within the local framework, but the global. Secure, open, and stable cyberspace is not only an essential need of state institutions and societies as a whole, but respect for principles and standards in this area is an obligation that B&H has based on membership in the United Nations and the OSCE. Investments are needed to achieve their goals. In cybersecurity, the problems are often not material, but human resources (professional staff) and 'employment' policy in the public sector. On the other hand, the lack of a common approach of all participants to cybersecurity protection leads to fragmented and inefficient action. Stimulation and activities within scientific research work in cybersecurity, participation in international scientific research projects in cybersecurity, and cooperation of the academic community with institutions are not at an enviable level in B&H (OSCE, 2019).

The media agenda has broader effects, with the mass media directly influencing the public agenda, the weight of attention, and the media's authority. Public opinion influences the policy agenda, and at the same time, the media program itself has an independent direct impact on the policy agenda. Comparing traditional and social media, we can conclude that 'other communications are more dynamic, personal and interactive' (Al-Deen, Hendricks, 2013). Users do not receive information and content passively but can create information, content, and distribution. Today, human knowledge and freedom are considered the greatest wealth, and public sphere politics as a space of communication-mediated social life in which all are free, equal, with the possibility of developing knowledge and skills that will further enable them to participate in creating society. Based on this, knowledge and creativity can change the nature and environment in which he lives, creating new living conditions. Social, cultural, and economic changes are based on high technologies. In this regard, the socio-political and legislative climate directly relates to the institutional effectiveness, strategies, parameters, and national security mechanisms.

Social media can prove to be an effective ‘information’ tool because it allows its users to achieve significant results without investing much money (their accessibility and cheapness, both strategically and tactically). They operate in the domain of cyberspace that is different from traditional military space (land, sea, air), dimensions different from war, strictly speaking (e.g. psychological, anthropological, cultural, media, perceptual dimensions), not only against military goals but also against society (as a whole or to which it refers) special ethnic, religious, cultural or professional communities) and critical infrastructures of the state (strategically relevant companies, telecommunications networks, banking systems). With such tools, it is possible to quickly share a considerable amount of content and information with many recipients at a low cost. Information is transformed from expensive goods into cheap, uncontrolled ones ‘and becomes almost universally available’ (Himanen, 2001). In addition to being potential tools of threat, social media can be a significant opportunity to preserve national security and achieve strategic state interests if used properly by the institutions. Many security incidents on social networks are not a direct consequence of viral or criminal attacks, but due to poor protection of social networks, security vulnerabilities in the technologies used, and the negligence of users. It is noticeable that the security of social networks and the content stored are compromised in various ways (Reznik, 2013). The greater the amount of data stored on profiles, the greater the possibility of their misuse when such data is acquired. When it comes to B&H citizens’ attitude towards the security of data published on their profiles, 62.23% of respondents express concern about the possible misuse of published data (Osmanbegović, 2011).

In terms of security, B&H is an unstable state that is vulnerable due to numerous internal and external threats and factors of its destabilization. In terms of security, B&H is an unstable state that is vulnerable due to numerous internal and external threats and factors of its destabilization. According to a 2019 report by the European Parliamentary Research Service (APRS), the biggest security threat comes from the realm of ‘cybersecurity’. In second place are threats to the ‘disintegration’ and third is the economic crisis. Freedom of the media and climate change

poses a significant threat to the country's security (EPRS, 2019). For the functioning of democracy in B&H and institutions' smooth operation, there must be a consensus among political representatives to make policy-making, ie political decision-making. Although the war in B&H ended in 1995, after an agreement reached and signed by the political representatives of B&H, Croatia and Serbia in Dayton (USA), the society is still profoundly affected by the scale and extent of the conflict, and the state remains high polarized along ethnic lines and disrupted by ethnically divided institutional practices in politics and governance. B&H society's fragility has enabled the emergence and presence of radicals groups and individuals (Salafis, Ravna Gora movements). Any political decision-making guided by ethno-national interest, unless it is ethnonationalism of any ethnicity's rights, results in bad policies. This situation, the trends that have been present for even more years, suggest the conclusion that the political crisis is the essence of the social crisis in B&H. More precisely, the crisis of the political factor. It means that it is not just a crisis of relations between political parties, but a fundamental weakness of the political factor. In this regard, there is a kind of balance of powerlessness and inability to resolve the social crisis, increasing the government's degree of efficiency, and with it, the efficiency of security. The constant 'verbal political war' the 'persistent' lack of agreement between the parties regarding the political solution for B&H, is a factor in the security sector's inefficiency, activities, adoption, and implementation of the national cybersecurity strategy.

At the level of B&H, there is no adequate and functional cyber security: the privatization of political influence, insufficient institutional cooperation, fundamentally hostile political environment (ethnopolitical institutional structure), fragmented cyberspace (state-entity-cantons), lack of finances, scientific research frameworks and professional human resources. Ethnic conflicts affected social disintegration and the institutional vacuum in the first years after the end of the war. The international community still plays a vital role in the reconstruction of B&H society and in the creation of institutional frames, as well as activities within the state security sector. In the long run, the author

suggests that this balance must change in favor of domestic institutions. Political instability, limited financial resources to combat the observed phenomena, lack of professional human resources, and the government's inability are a limiting factor in carrying out most activities. We see this and based on the last adopted document within the practical problem. Guidelines for the strategic framework of cybersecurity in B&H were presented in Sarajevo at the end of 2019. They were developed under the auspices of the OSCE Mission to B&H and with the support of the Delegation of the European Union and the Office of the European Union Special Representative in B&H and the Geneva Center for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF). The existing human and material capacities and organizations' capacities are not sufficient to ensure the required level of security in cyberspace in B&H. Furthermore, different government levels have different preparedness levels, which has led to different approaches to cybersecurity issues within B&H. The result is an unequal level of user protection, both in the public and private sectors, which undermines the overall level of cyberspace protection, vulnerability to threats and attacks, and the inability to act, cooperate and coordinate with other countries in the region and the world (OSCE, 2019: 6). Public awareness of cybersecurity is essential for the adoption and implementation of information security measures at all places, at all levels and, at all times. A society that achieves a level of general information will be safer. Also, prosecutors' offices and courts are not sufficiently aware and adequately trained on contemporary cybercrime.

B&H needs to increase the number of experts if it wants to protect itself in information and communication systems successfully. On the other hand, good management, i.e., state, should be based on the independence, expertise, and integrity of institutions and individuals. In B&H, with 207 active political parties (per 3.5 million people), the party affiliation of candidates or other links with the ruling parties is almost, as a rule, an essential reference when appointing or recruiting in the entire public sector (Arapović, Lučić, 2014). Appointments and employment in the public sector under party patronage and practice need urgent analysis and systematic reforms.

At the same time, it is indisputable that state institutions' stability significantly depends on the economic and political stability of society, and B&H is a precarious state economically and politically. The country is rapidly gaining a reputation as an emerging market or as a lawless and incorrigible state dominated by organized crime and corruption (Peter, 2004: 17). The consequence of "quasi" macroeconomic stability in B&H is a registered unemployment rate of 50%, which is above the unemployment rate of 48% that preceded Hitler's coming to power in the 1930s. All of these were ideal preconditions for a safety halt. Foreign investment is the basis for revitalizing the economy, which should reduce unemployment, increase public revenues, and generally positively impact the development of society and strengthen security institutions. The insufficient inflow of foreign investments is directly conditioned by the high rate of crime and corruption (Hadžić, 2020). The region, especially B&H, remains 'frozen' by ethnic-religious conflicts, especially the majority-minority discourse, and inter-ethnic trust measures have not yet been established. Columns from web blogs, articles from web portals in B&H, which are actively shared on social media, often affirm religious, national, racial, and even segregation rhetoric, directly influencing security threats through interethnic turmoil, showing the core of systemic ethnopolitical indoctrination, not presenting the ontology of journalism as a profession that advocates the public interest and educates citizens about civic culture.

All the above factors inevitably harm the national security of B&H. On the other hand, the long-term absence of a political will, which manifested itself through the ethnopolitical institutional vacuum in B&H, created a strategic basis for developing a fragile security situation (Mary, 2001: 77). The crisis of political governance and disagreements between the ruling group and the opposition party group does not occur as in most parliamentary democracies - it is a matter of disagreements over the development of the B&H state (Pejanović, 2011). The author suggests a lack of will and inability of ethnic parties to establish consensus on major state development issues, security issues, and social and economic development. In addition to the fact that they do not have the power to reach a consensus within the state's development, constant mutual

ethnopolitical conflicts are transferred to the citizens.

Furthermore, given the ease of use, cheapness, and accessibility, the diffusion of social media in Southeast European countries (stability and security continue to undermine unresolved status issues) in the coming period may affect the increased coherence of organized crime, terrorist organizations, revolutions, and ethnopolitical turmoil. It could seriously jeopardize the current 'fragile' security and the political architecture of Southeast Europe, which would have unpredictable wider consequences (Hadžić, 2020: 257). At the same time, the region still deals with the legacy of a period of prosperity and incomplete transition. As a result, the Western Balkans countries still lag far behind the new EU Member States in terms of economic transformation and income levels, which amount to about one-third of the level of advanced EU economies. Until the onset of the global financial crisis, the Western Balkans' growth was driven more by abundant global liquidity and unsustainable capital inflows than by real progress in economic reforms. Clear evidence of shortcomings in the region's economic model is reflected in the too-high unemployment rates in many countries, even at the peak of pre-crisis prosperity (IMF, 2010).

We can problematize national security as guaranteed freedom of the state and society, territorial integrity and sovereignty, human rights, 'political and social stability, economic development, personal security, and environmental conditions' (Maier, 1990: 5). A sound security system represents the most significant degree of unity of diversity, which means that all different details are brought into harmony. Security threats on social networks are reflected in privacy threats, network and data threats, identity threats, and social threats; the number of users in B&H is well above the world average, expressing concern for the security of the data they store. The adoption of a social media strategy by political leadership within the broader framework of a national security strategy would mean choosing a specific social media approach due to a balanced choice between two opposed lines of action. Furthermore, the use of social media may jeopardize national security or assist in the pursuit of national strategic interests, depending on who uses them, in what way, and for what purpose.

SOCIAL MEDIA

Despite its many years of existence, the non-existence of an equally generally accepted definition of national security and the generally accepted definition of social media is identical. According to the Hague Center for Strategic Studies (2011), the level of social media penetration into everyday life is growing, and a significant increase is expected not only shortly, but in the long run. Compared to traditional media and the difference we defined earlier, the element that characterizes social networks is their ‘virality’, the power to make all information and content immediately available worldwide, removing problems of time and space and forwarding them to a large catchment area, an area whose range increases as do biological viruses. A common conclusion drawn from most definitions of social media is that it represents more than just the sum of the tools and technologies used, and equally important components are user-generated content and the online communities in which it is consumed (Weber, 2009). Furthermore, social media is a social instrument of communication. The author of this study problematizes the social network in a broader context as instruments or tools. Given that each instrument carries with it positive and negative elements, this paper aims to define threats to national security arising from the use and show how and to what extent these instruments can prevent or eliminate threats and help protect national interests.

Threats to national security through the use of social media

The term ‘national security’ has long been used by politicians as a symbolic phrase and by military leaders to describe politics’ goal. The threat to any element of national power creates security problems, and the role of the media in war is not just to design development activities in a particular area, but to provide a comprehensive picture that includes all aspects of a country’s politics. Thus, wars are not waged only by the armed forces, but the whole nation is involved and the economic, scientific, political, and social component. The traditional understanding

of national security is associated with conflicts between states. Security was directed at the state, and it also involved military force, which was, in fact, a traditional understanding of security that was declared as state security. Therefore, the concept of security was militaristic, the focus was exclusively on the military-political aspects of security issues, and the primary means of ensuring security were a military force. However, in the 21st century, when the so-called 'soft' security challenges come on the scene, it was almost unrealistic to equate national security with state security, i.e., with the assumption of eliminating the threat to stability. Defining national security only (or even primarily) in military terms conveys a wrong picture of reality thoroughly. That image is dangerous in many ways. First, it causes states to concentrate on military threats while ignoring others and perhaps even more harmful dangers. Second, it strengthens the militarization of international relations, so that in the long run, it can only exacerbate global insecurity. Suppose we define security only as a structural element of the existence and action of the individual, society/state, and the international community. In that case, this contradicts Grizold (2000), who suggests that national and international security can only be achieved if three entities are considered: the individual. security and global security); society/state (concepts of national and social security, which accept in addition to military-political and broader social and cultural-civilizational aspects of national security) and 'the international community, the concept of international security' (Tatalović, 2006).

We define national security as a state in which the freedom of the state and society, territorial integrity and sovereignty, political and social stability, the rule of law, environmental conditions, and citizens' security is ensured. We have already problematized in the introductory part that the long-term absence of a political will, which manifested itself through the institutional vacuum, created a strategic basis for developing a fragile state of security. Although not a narrow topic of the study, the author suggests that the current exodus and the problem of displacement of people, which has lasted for many years, is increasingly becoming a matter of national security and the survival of both the people (all three ethnicities)

and the state. If we take the example of the Western Balkans as a whole, for example, Croatia, the economic situation has only partially improved thanks to EU funds; however, in the long run, the system has caused the most massive population exodus, reducing the tax base and jeopardizing pension health systems. The results of a recent survey (2018) in Croatia show that the main reasons for mass emigration are “a disorganized and corrupt state” (Juric, 2018).

Negative factors for national security can arise when the state and non-state actors use social media, and mostly when social media is used by people who come into contact with sensitive security information, such as diplomatic representatives, state strategic companies, intelligence services, and the like (Drapeau, Wells, 2009). If we extend the analysis to the international dimension (called areas where other states have their sovereignty, and the area is subject to the rules of customary and treaty law), I identify the following organized groups as a potential threat to national security: international terrorist groups (jihadist groups, separatist organizations, Panaban extremism), transnational criminal organizations (Chinese, African, Balkan and South American), non-allied foreign states or states other than politico-military and economic-financial states (including security services), multinational corporations, cracker groups (mostly in foreign countries), companies (with a share of foreign capital), religious sects (transnational), hacker groups, NGOs, international organizations, countries with a politico-military and economic-financial partnership

Because social media is evolving rapidly and growing worldwide, the mapping mentioned above cannot be considered comprehensive and definitive. In the future, newly organized groups could emerge as social media users; several groups operate simultaneously, both internally and internationally; therefore, their precise and unchanging position in one of the two-dimensional areas is quite challenging to achieve, ‘hence some spaces have created that overlap’ (Freytag, Savona: 2011). Furthermore, the higher the level of informatization of a country’s population, the more widespread the use of I.T. devices by its citizens, companies, and public agencies, the more frequent the Internet’s use to exchange,

purchase or transmit information, the greater the vulnerabilities. Cases of unauthorized and uncontrolled publication of classified, sensitive data or content (audio, video, photos) through social media are becoming more common. In these cases, national security can be seriously compromised by the use of social media. Freedom of expression and communication must stop where the need to protect the confidentiality and integrity of sensitive data begins, that is, to fulfill the general duty of confidentiality at work.

A specific national policy is desirable to reduce the risks to national security arising from the inappropriate use of social media, based on which all institutions can develop their guidelines for their staff according to their area of expertise. In societies where the government controls traditional public media, social networks present a unique opportunity for the civilian population and opposition to the regime. Also, social networks reduce the cost of participating and organizing protests. Social media contributed to the violence that erupted in 2012 in Libya and Egypt after an anti-Muslim video was posted on YouTube. The film clip provoked protests by Islamists in front of the U.S. Embassy in Cairo and the U.S. Consulate in Benghazi. The violence occurred on the anniversary of the Sept. 11 attacks on U.S. targets carried out by the Islamist al-Qaeda network. Several thousand Egyptian protesters gathered in front of the U.S. embassy in Cairo to protest the film, which they believe was attacking the Prophet Muhammad, after which they forcibly entered the embassy building and set fire to the American flag (Lindsay, 2011). On the other hand, in the protests in Libya, the American ambassador and three American consulate employees were killed.

At the same time, social media appear as instruments through which terrorist organizations carry out ideological radicalization, recruitment and training of new members, and communication channels. Criminal organizations also use social media as an aid, communication, and coordination tool to carry out their illegal activities. In 2010, Wikileaks published about 77,000 documents on the war in Afghanistan and almost 400,000 documents on the war in Iraq, which were not previously available to the public. U.S. officials confirmed that the case

was the most significant omission of U.S. military secrets in history. Social security users' information security has also been compromised by collecting digital user records, ancillary data, user face recognition, photo discovery, linking to data and tags in photos, and the inability to delete a user profile completely. Network and data threats include receiving spam, virus attacks, and the use of tools to group the profiles of multiple social networks. U.S. politicians have been mostly critical of Wikileaks and have defended the government's right to keep classified information (Leigh, Harding, 2011). The value of Wikileaks is undeniable in cases that have indicated violations of human rights and civil liberties (Guantánamo prison). However, some critical information has seriously called into question the national security of individual countries. Confidentiality and transparency are not mutually exclusive but are two sides of the same coin. As civil services increasingly use social networks for their institutional purposes, as civil servants use them for personal interests, campaigns must be launched to use social networks in civil services. It would increase awareness of risks to personal and national security. It is highly desirable to adopt a specific national media and public policy to mitigate national security risk arising from the misuse (Tatalović, 2003). Based on a specific media strategy, institutions can develop their staff guidelines according to their area of expertise.

Terrorism, organized crime, conflicts, ethnonationalism and social media concerning B&H

The closest interpretation of today's understanding of terrorism is that terrorism is violence aimed at inciting fear and crushing resistance to achieve a political goal first. However, the common characteristic of all definitions is that the basis of terrorism is terror, i.e., violence. In the literature, the group of Al-Qaida, ISIS, is mostly mentioned and appears as an example of such a terrorist group. A. It is common knowledge that Al-Qaida used Facebook and YouTube channels to recruit new members and increase the number of followers, especially in the West. It was manifested by disseminating photographs and videos of "successful" terrorist attacks,

the publication of a list and biographies of suicides, preaching ideological texts, and the like. One of the leading proponents of this strategy was the infamous Anwar al-Awlaki, who took excellent advantage of all the benefits of social networks, actively participating in most of them and using them to spread propaganda materials influencing members to commit terrorist crimes. Besides, terrorist groups can be used for propaganda activities to spread false information during or after a catastrophe (earthquake, fire, or flood) to make their harmful consequences even more pronounced, and the civilian population to be even more panicked. Social media is increasingly using terrorist organizations to promote ideological radicalization, recruitment, communication, and training (Theohary, Rollins, 2011). Also, terrorist groups use social media to communicate with cybercrime associations and to coordinate with them fundraising activities (from illegal activities) that are carried out in part (drug smuggling, weapons) or in full (e.g. identity theft³) on the Internet.

The link between organized crime and terrorist organizations is growing significantly in the cyber world, and ‘this coalition will be able to produce new destructive technologies’ (Interpol, 2011). At the same time, social media play an important role in influencing individual behavior and their willingness to participate in collective actions because of their inherent functions of socializing, employment and decision-making, in addition to facilitating social interaction and creating social connections, which in turn can lead to changes in attitudes and behaviors over time. These changes in attitude may involve the acceptance of various ideologies (Bowman-Grieve, 2010). Social media and, more generally, the Internet allow the publication and dissemination of extremist ideas and materials that can lead a vulnerable person to partition, sometimes without the help of any intermediary.⁴ F. Furedi (2006), a sociologist, argues that today’s culture of fear did not begin with the collapse of the World Trade Center. The very use of the term ‘War on Terror’ was intended to create a culture of fear deliberately because it ‘obscures reason, amplifies emotions, and

3 A computer scam is sent by sending counterfeit messages via e-mail or social media, and its goal is to obtain secret information for illegal purposes.

4 Implementation of the UN-Terrorism Implementation Force Task, 2011

makes it easier for demagogic politicians to mobilize the public on behalf of politicians wanting to continue' (Brezinski, 2010). Ideas about safety and controversy over health, the environment, and technology have little to do with science or empirical evidence. Instead, they are shaped by cultural assumptions about human vulnerability. Since the dissemination of news and content on social media can be considered "viral," this type of propaganda can significantly outweigh the media effect already produced by traditional media and communication (satellite TV, newspapers, radio) and cause even more significant dangerous consequences than those caused by terrorist attacks themselves (e.g., the spread of news about an attack on communication and communications infrastructure). The benefits of the stock market can lead investors to panic and, consequently, lead to a small sum of money being saved to behave irrationally, inflicting even more significant economic damage than the damage to the material infrastructure itself.)

As for B&H, security agencies claim that the threat of terrorism in this country is no greater than in other countries in the region and across Europe. The fact is that out of 143 attacks in Europe and the world behind the armed group, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, not a single B&H citizen participated in any act. Terrorism is not only not a severe security threat to B&H, according to a 2019 report by the European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS), but it is less than the terrorist threats to which the European Union is exposed (EPRS, 2019). On several occasions, the report states that B&H, like other countries in the Western Balkans, is subject to the harmful and anti-European influence of Russia and Turkey. So, there are all possible conditions and nuances for the development of specific terrorist movements and the strengthening of radicalism in practice.

Until the emergence of ISIS and its recruitment of Islamic fundamentalists from around the world to go to Syria and Iraq as foreign fighters, the phenomenon of extremism did not receive much attention in the Western Balkans region. Due to the international community's growing concentration on Islamic extremism, all Western Balkan governments have focused their response almost exclusively on tackling

this type of extremism, ignoring other domestic extremism forms that are the legacy of interethnic conflict and unfinished state-building in the region. As research by the Kosovo Center for Security Studies shows, other politically and ethnically motivated violent extremisms had a 'higher execution rate than religious threat incidents' in Kosovo (Kursani, 2017: 35). However, Kursani warns that this could be because 'Incidents with a religious threat belittled' or 'some of them remain in alert status'. In addition to Islamic extremism present in the region, there is right-wing extremism in Serbia, Montenegro, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, which has resulted in the sending of foreign fighters for the conflict in Ukraine.

Moreover, national and fascist groups have sparked a series of incidents against groups perceived in parent societies as 'others' such as LGBT+, Roma, refugees, and migrants from the Middle East. It is important to note that in Serbia, far-right organizations are 'institutionally marginal, in the sense that the vast majority of them remain outside parliamentary politics' their public influence is much more significant due to increased tolerance of state institutions towards them (Stakić, 2016). In addition to religious extremism, 'ethnic/national extremism' is also a threat to B&H security. There are several factors, ideologies, and groups in B&H, such as the existence of Salafi returnees from the Syrian battlefield, returnees from the battlefield in Ukraine, ideologies from the NDH period, and several Ravna Gora movements, calling for national and religious hatred and denying the existence of B&H as a state.

Columns from web blogs, articles from web portals in B&H, which are actively shared on social media, often affirm religious, national, racial, and even segregation rhetoric, giving such dimensions to the crime. Titles: 'Three Roma minors killed a Serb woman', 'Bosniak minors killed a Croatian minor', 'The group consisted of four members, only one of whom was an adult. Two were Bosniaks, one was a Croat from Stup, and one was a Serb from Pale and so on' (Vukobrat, 2008), shows the core of systemic ethnopolitical indoctrination, not presenting the ontology of journalism as a profession that advocates the public interest and educates citizens about civic. The region, especially B&H, is still 'frozen' by ethnic-religious conflicts,

especially majority-minority discourse, and inter-ethnic trust measures have not yet been established, so social media directly affects security threats through interethnic turmoil. Suppose we problematize this media phenomenon in B&H within the framework of framing theory. In that case, we can conclude that it manifests itself in a way that the news focuses on establishing cognitive shortcuts, simplifying, distracting the audience from essential issues, and limiting their ability to think 'outside the framework.' Entman (1993) distinguishes two types of frameworks: specific, concerning the consequences of events, predictions of developments, and problems of responsibility, dealing with conflicts and political games instead of value frameworks. The theory's foundation lies in the fact that the media focuses attention on specific events, which they then place in the realm of meaning. Frame theory says that how what is presented to the public affects how people choose to process and accept it.

One of the biggest threats to individuals and state institutions' security, which is often mentioned in the literature, is a crime. These types of illegal activities can be either purely informational (e.g., dissemination of child pornography for a fee, 'virtual' identity theft, the spread of viruses), or 'traditional' (e.g., drug trafficking, human trafficking, money laundering, transfer of documents from industrial espionage) (Intelligence and National Security Council, 2011). The use of social media and IT technology in general for criminal purposes is expanding dramatically. The same happens for the extent of the damage caused by their behavior and risk (Ramacciotti, 2011). In B&H, organized crime today is a heterogeneous and complex phenomenon that is increasingly taking on global proportions. With the strengthening of organized crime's financial power, the influence on the overall political, economic, social, and security developments in the state and society is growing. The constant improvement and increasing sophistication of cybercrime and cybercrime and the methods and techniques by which cybercrime is perpetrated require continuous capacity building to respond effectively to cybercrime. Cybercrime and electronic evidence require a specialized response from B&H law enforcement agencies. Competent law enforcement institutions do not have adequate human and material resources. Prosecutor's

offices and courts are not sufficiently aware and adequately trained on contemporary cybercrime (OSCE, 2019). Continuous and in-depth monitoring of social media can be implemented as a means of warning in the event of current and future threats to national security, as the use of social media by criminal organizations, terrorist groups, adversaries, and other competitors is growing. In the broader framework of Southeast Europe, countries in which the crisis of refraction of countries is underway, currently, the most serious threat comes from a vast transnational criminal network (Albania, B&H, Kosovo, Macedonia, Serbia, and Croatia) (Hadžić, 2020: 259). One of the interesting understandings comes from the American author A. Peter, who believes that war economies in places such as the Balkans, the Caucasus, and Central Asia are criminalized because they rely on criminal actors and the black market as the primary source financing and supply (Peter, 2004: 79); there is a close link between conflict and crime, which gives these conflicts the form of 'criminalized conflicts'. In this regard, the war economy's legacy has profoundly influenced the post-war processes of social reconstruction. Of course, the visible fragmentation of B&H's security space stems directly from the undefined political and social order, the ethnically fragmented institutional framework, the reform process and the transition position, the porosity of borders, and the semi-protective international political subjectivity. Furthermore, the factors that contributed to the development of organized crime in B&H directly stemmed from citizens' vulnerable economic and social situation (unemployment, poverty, economic and economic crises) and 'the consequences of suspicious privatizations in the 1990s' (Tabaković, 2007).

Because the number of wars between entities with international subjectivity has been deficient⁵ in the last decade, and this material is scarce, it is impossible to investigate cases of military campaigns led by the actual use of social media to support the military for operations. Nonetheless, it may be useful in this regard to briefly mention the two conflicts between Israel and Lebanon. During the second Israeli-Lebanese war in 2006,

5 Which corresponds to the times of affirmation and diffusion of social media.

Hezbollah, using social media, managed to create a 'perception of failure' into an Israeli politico-military organization that conditioned the conflict (Mayfield, 2011). During the war, Hezbollah posted several videos and photos on social media to strengthen its positions while downplaying Israel and the Israeli security services. Israel demonstrated effective social networks management during the next war of 2008-2009 by incorporating them into an information campaign. Thus, social networks can serve as a specific additional source of information, i.e., a sequel to traditional media (radio, tv) for propaganda, influence, and even deception.

In a broader security sense, B&H is an unstable state that is vulnerable due to numerous internal and external threats and factors of its destabilization. According to a 2019 report by the European Parliamentary Research Service (APRS), the biggest security threat comes from the realm of 'cybersecurity'. Freedom of the media and climate change poses a significant threat to the country's security. In B&H, ethnic conflicts affected social disintegration and the institutional vacuum in the first years after the war. Such circumstances have made the fragile political situation even more volatile, but the international community has taken on reconstructing a nationally polarized B&H society (Chandler, 2010). At the same time, B&H is home to the world's most complex state administration system⁶, with trends that favor the ethnoreligious principle (Spahić, 2012). Instead of development and social program, a national and religious glorification program, interethnic accusations, and conflicts are opened, which opens space for political elites to manipulate the fear of domination over each other, directly affecting national security (cybersecurity).

On the other hand, the foreign media do not understand the severe political problems of delegitimizing the Balkans' current political class. They fail to show immense dissatisfaction with corrupt governments and political parties as if these problems are not yet within the Balkan peoples' civilizational reach. They are entirely closed to progressive voices from the

6 240,000 employees in administration and public enterprises, 14 governments, 180 ministers, 3 languages, 3 presidents, 2 entities, 1 district, 10 cantons and 207 active political parties

region, to political ideas that could significantly contribute to rethinking the current European political stalemate and fighting the return of ultranationalist and xenophobic policies in EU member states.

Social media and possibilities of protection

In addition to being potential tools of threat, social media can be a significant opportunity to preserve national security and achieve the state's strategic interests if appropriately used by institutions. In this sense, social media can 'pose a threat to governments, and it could be crucial for security services to improve and update plans to disrupt new Internet technology continually' (Noonan, 2011). There are several tools to prevent or reduce opportunities threats.

Examples of such frameworks are the PCI DSS standard for the card industry, the GDPR Regulation related to the protection of personal data, and the NIS Directive is also attracting increasing attention in critical infrastructure protection (Jušić, 2019). It is very likely that in the future, we can expect other similar frameworks that have a common ultimate goal, which is to increase resilience and reduce the risk of a so-called—cyber attack. Besides, governments can use the tools for content creation, external collaboration, community building, and other applications. Failure to adopt adequate tools can reduce the organization's relative capabilities over time (Drapeau, Wells, 2009). Social media can also be used simultaneously for defense activities (prevention, warning, anticipation, institutional communication, crisis management, counter-propaganda) and various actions (influence, propaganda, deception). These social media perspectives can become an invaluable resource for the benefit of security services, both military and civilian, as they can quickly become a valuable intelligence-gathering tool. However, media users leave traces of their identity, abilities, preferences, movements, contacts (Bowman, Grieve, 2010). It can be easily collected and analyzed, even though they do not have an updated or active profile.

For the security and stability of B&H, its immediate neighborhood, the European continent, and the whole world, a

prerequisite for economic and cultural development, international trade, and quality bilateral and multilateral cooperation in various fields with other countries. In today's world, the security and stability of sovereign states are threatened in traditional but also very non-traditional ways by various actors at the international level, which indicates that their foreign policy dimension is becoming increasingly important. The growing unconventionality of threats to stability and security requires comprehensive responses. Research and development are crucial and make it possible to anticipate and prevent possible cyber threats. Research and development with a focus on cybersecurity areas that are specific to B&H are incredibly modest (OSCE, 2019). Research and development require investments that need to be planned in the budgets of institutions and ministries responsible for science. Scientific research and professional projects are the basis of research and development of cybersecurity in each country, and the B&H academic community does not sufficiently cooperate with state institutions and the economy.

The more society and its citizens rely on technology, the greater the exposure to various dangers in that sphere. Because of such threats, critical infrastructure, important information, and even people themselves are at risk. The very threat of attacks that have taken place has changed the security picture we face today. The production of malware programs is relatively cheap, and access to such programs is simplified for government organizations and ordinary users. Terrorist organizations and other groups can use such programs to attack institutions. The regulations available to B&H institutions today are limited (Report of the Ministry of Security of B&H, 2018) and do not provide a concrete response to such threats. It is a consequence of taking steps towards the adoption of legislation to defend against such threats. The B&H Armed Forces, with the support of the B&H Ministry of Defense, should recognize the importance of cybersecurity at a higher level. Creating a secure cyberspace would improve B&H's security and create integration opportunities both in the region and beyond. In addition to the critical information and communication infrastructure with essential service and database operators, it is necessary

to protect the public information and communication infrastructure. Operators of this infrastructure are all holders of licenses issued by the Communications Regulatory Agency of B&H.

Furthermore, continuous and in-depth monitoring of social media can be carried out as a means of warning in the event of current and future threats to national security, as the use of social media by criminal organizations, terrorist groups, adversaries, and other competitors is growing. Thus, continuous analysis of the intelligence media can serve as early warning, surveillance of social media to identify the first signs of hostile or potentially dangerous activity for the state's security. Collecting and analyzing messages to opposing movements through the websites of some (e.g., protests) can be useful for preventing rebellion or mitigating its negative consequences (Papic, Noonan, 2011). Studying the information that crackers share on specialized blogs in order to launch an information attack on critical infrastructure can be prevented by appropriate safeguards; tracking military recruitment tutorials can help find users who use them by understanding attack methods and techniques and devising effective methods to respond to and combat threats with continuous control of Facebook profile updates and careful photo review.

At the same time, it can be possible to monitor members of a criminal group's movements and activities and map their connections, strategic warning and scanning the horizon⁷ aimed at outlining the long-term and medium-term trend of threats. Gathering signs of protest by following the main pages of social networking can help anticipate and possibly collapse a rift that could turn into an organized protest movement or even a revolutionary group, analyzing discussions on blogs specializing in international politics and strategic studies that may be useful for understanding the possible long-term development of foreign policy and strategic thinking of the state leadership. Studying discussions from blogs specializing in science and technology can help measure the possible long-term development of scientific and technological expertise in a particular place; relational mapping networks developed on social media

⁷ The expression horizon scan is used to refer to a methodology for analyzing and predicting possible future long-term scenarios.

by members of subversive groups and analyzing their evolution can make it possible to predict the possible development of the group itself. With particular reference to national security agencies, the use of social media (potentially projected and modified in this area) represents a significant opportunity to complete their functional and organizational evolution, gradually moving from 'need for knowledge' to 'need for sharing'. Such organizational and functional development must go hand in hand with accurate risk analysis and subsequent adoption of security measures to avoid sensitive information leaking from security agencies (as mentioned above).

Simultaneously, the development of computer and communication technology has led to significant technological changes in banks' function, and we have long been talking about the creation and development of electronic banking or e-banking. The positive effects of electronic banking use stem from potential opportunities that would enable economic and efficient business compared to traditional business. The scams that are increasingly occurring in electronic banking are a growing problem both for business within the organization and for the users who do it. Cybercrime is spreading rapidly, and experts predict that this trend will continue in the future. Internet banking is one of the most sensitive areas where scams are repeated daily (Hadžić, Čebić, 2016: 22).

Habits and perceptions of social media users in B&H

The number of devices connected to the Internet is growing exponentially and the number of active Internet users⁸, which indicates the positive development of B&H society. It can be established that Internet users in B&H use social networks by developing the Internet environment, and there are no significant deviations concerning the

⁸ Report on the results of the annual survey of users of CRA licenses for the provision of Internet services in Bosnia and Herzegovina for 2018 - it is estimated that in 2018 there were 3,195,294 Internet users, ie that the rate of Internet use in Bosnia and Herzegovina for 2018 is 90, 49%. <https://docs.rak.ba//documents/ea9d822c-b1dc-4ad9-b2d9-735dc6c8ea91.pdf>

use among Internet users in the EU. Empirical research on the habits of using social networks was conducted on a sample of 368 users of the Facebook social network, as the dominant network in B&H (Osmanbegović, 2011). The research sample was built based on 2617 contacts that the author has on this social network, and a sample of 368 respondents was obtained, which represents 14% of contacts selected by systematic sampling, 42.39% of men, and 57.61% of women. The data collected from the respondents are grouped according to the way of grouping data on personal profiles of the Facebook network and refers to personal data that respondents publish on their profile, data on education and employment, data on lifestyle and interests, data on personal status, and contact information. Respondents were asked a particular question regarding concerns about the data on their profile regarding their possible misuse, given that the considered data regarding misuse belong to the domain of privacy threats and threats to the identity of social network users. Personal data refers to the following data: name, surname, photograph, date of birth, place of birth, and residence. When it comes to respondents' attitude towards the security of data published on their profiles, 62.23% of respondents express concern about the possible misuse of published data (Osmanbegović, 2011). Threats to social network users' identities are reflected in data disclosure and the creation of fake user profiles. Social threats are reflected in the occurrence of stalking and monitoring of users, online violence, and professional espionage. By disclosing personal data on social networks, users are exposed to numerous dangers, only some of which are directly related to identity theft, disclosure of confidential user information. Many security incidents on social networks are not a direct consequence of virus attacks or criminal attacks, but due to inadequate protection of the social network, security vulnerabilities in the technologies used, and the negligence of users.

It is also necessary to mention the results of a recent, eighth global survey of habits, needs, and behaviors of social media and Internet users entitled "Wave 8: Content-Language" for 2014 conducted in 65 countries, including in addition to B&H and neighboring countries

(the Republic of Croatia, Republic of Serbia and Macedonia), which enabled better comparison of results from B&H with those at the global level and with those from the countries of the region (Mediabrand Marketing Sciences G14 / EMEA, 2014). The research sample consisted of over 50,000 active Internet users¹⁴¹ aged 16 to 54, a representative indicator of the needs, views, and behaviors of over a billion social media users worldwide. The obtained results indicated that most respondents on the Internet watch videos, visit various pages, profile their friends' profiles, and edit their social networks profile. While in European countries, respondents value social media primarily because of the possibility of improving social relations; they see them primarily as a means of entertainment and relaxation in the rest of the world. The research results for B&H indicate that the percentage of active Internet users who have their profiles on a social network is significantly above the world level. As many as 90% of active Internet users in B&H stated that they use social networks globally, it is slightly less than 70%. If this is related to the Communications Regulatory Agency of B&H data, it can be concluded that 2,005,173 Internet users in 2014, or 52.4% of the total population in B&H (Agency for Statistics of B&H, 2015), actively use social networks.

It is noticeable that the security of social networks and the content stored are compromised in various ways (Reznik, 2013). The greater the amount of data stored on profiles, the greater the possibility of their misuse when such data is acquired. The Communications Regulatory Agency of B&H, as the body responsible for licensees for the provision of communication services, should ensure that communication service operators have a legal obligation to implement cyber protection of their systems. Furthermore, the safety requirements to be met and monitored by operators should be prescribed. These requirements should, as a minimum, include international cybersecurity standards that operators should adhere to.

VULNERABILITIES OF B&H CYBERSPACE AND INSTITUTIONAL WEAKNESSES

As in most other countries, state administration bodies have information of a high degree of secrecy of political, military, economic, and other nature that may be the subject of interest of some foreign intelligence services, foreign economic entities, and organized criminal and terrorist groups. Information security covers five areas: security clearance, physical security, data security, information system security, and business collaboration security. With the development of technology, more and more data important for national security are stored in state administration bodies' information systems or are exchanged through information and communication channels. The European Commission's 2016 Progress Report on B&H states that 'B&H does not have a comprehensive strategic approach to addressing cybercrime and cybersecurity threats.' The report states that the response to cybersecurity threats needs to be strengthened. Against cybercrime and the capacity of teams to prevent and protect against cyber incidents and threats to the security of public information systems (CERT/CSIRT).

The constant 'verbal political war', the 'persistent' lack of agreement between the parties regarding the political solution, is one factor of the security sector's inefficiency, activities, adoption, and implementation of cybersecurity strategies. Any political decision-making guided by ethnonational interest, unless it is a direct violation of any ethnicity's rights, results in bad policies. A prominent example of the use of ethnicity for political purposes and the conduct of lousy politics is, for example, the use of the right of veto to protect vital interests at higher levels of government. Leaving room to use anything to violate the constituent peoples' vital interests has produced an absolute abuse of this mechanism. Eg. Several years ago, HDZ B&H vetoed the protection of vital interests due to the adoption of the Law on Games of Chance in the Parliament of the Federation of B&H. Then, the delegates of the Bosniak Club raised the issue of vital national interest in order to adopt a decision on the removal of three members of the Council of Ministers, the B&H Minister of Security,

the B&H Minister of Defense, and the Deputy Minister of Finance and Treasury of B&H (Handžić, 2018). Paradoxically and symptomatically, the Ministry of Security and the Ministry of Defense of B&H are directly responsible for the observed issues and phenomena. According to the Law on the Council of Ministers, the composition of the Council of Ministers is ethnically determined so that equal representation of the constituent peoples of B&H must be ensured during the mandate.

The existing human and material capacities, as well as the capacities of organizations, according to several sources mentioned in the study, are not sufficient to ensure the required level of security in the cyberspace of B&H. Different government levels have different levels of preparedness, which has led to different approaches to cybersecurity issues within B&H. The result is an unequal level of user protection, both in the public and private sectors, which undermines the overall level of cyberspace protection, vulnerability to threats and attacks, and inability to act, cooperate and coordinate with other countries in the region and the world. Furthermore, B&H is the only country in Europe that does not have (already mentioned) an established CSIRT system (system of assistance to Internet users in B&H in the application of proactive measures to reduce the risk of computer security incidents and provide assistance in combating the consequences of computer security incidents). In parallel with the escalation of political rhetoric, political elites' confrontational attitude is causing bad and worse results in government institutions. It applies to the state, entity, and cantonal levels in terms of a range of indicators: government legislative activity, EU integration, 5 + 2 requests to close the OHR, constitutional reform and compliance with the European Court of Human Rights' Sejdić-Finci decision, meeting the criteria for access to external credit and protection of the domestic economy (Bassuener, Azinović, Weber, 2011: 19).

In light of its commitment to future EU membership, B&H needs to adopt new legislation and harmonize existing cybersecurity legislation. The leading documents are the EU General Data Protection Regulation⁹

9 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 2016 on the

and the Directives of the European Parliament and the European Council on measures for a high standard security level of network and information systems throughout the European Union ('NIS Directive'). Although EU regulations indicate the direction of future efforts, OSCE confidence-building measures in cyberspace are politically binding on B&H.

Electronic attacks and threats to information security are becoming more complex, and in response to them, constant learning, monitoring of trends, and innovation in solutions are required. The possibility of cyber threats for B&H is not negligible due to the high level of IT knowledge and experience possessed by potential cyber attackers and a relatively complete circle of like-minded people capable of carrying out this type of attack. Information security is also essential for B&H businesses, especially those that use modern, high technology. Technological secrets can be the subject of interest of various individuals, organizations, and individual states. It is not a big problem for hackers today to break into the strictest guarded systems of military and spy organizations or bring down police institutions' sites. The Ministry of Defense (MOB&H), with about 10,000 members, is the most extensive in B&H in number and uses one-third of the state budget. According to the latest official information from 2019, MOB&H has managed to digitize processes to battalion levels where there are 5,000-6,000 users, although it is not easy to connect all levels (Report of the B&H Ministry of Defense, 2019). A big challenge is accepting and changing people's awareness of new ways of functioning. However, if investments in systems do not accompany investments in their protection, we can open discourse about why invest in those systems in B&H? B&H has consciously become more vulnerable with the digitalization of particular business processes than the previous situation where everything was done traditionally, i.e., on paper (Agić, 2019). The precondition for the implementation of any strategy is the support of institutions and individuals who make decisions. Decision-makers need to understand the need to adopt and implement a cybersecurity

protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data and repealing Directive 95/46 / EC (General Data Protection Regulation), <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?qid=1552662547490&uri=CELEX%3A32016R0679>

strategy. This understanding should be based on useful information and understanding of the problem to be solved. It is enough to be aware that the security of information and information and communication infrastructure can be endangered, resulting in catastrophic consequences, and that there are measures that can reduce the risk of such events. In addition to decision-makers, all persons who come into contact with data that is considered critical and who work on critical information and communication infrastructure should be aware of the need to protect this data and infrastructure. Society's awareness of cybersecurity is essential for the adoption and implementation of information security measures at all places, at all levels, and at all times. Therefore, a society that achieves a level of general information will be safer. By building trust and awareness of the security of all transactions among users of communication and information systems and the Internet, as well as awareness that the digitalization of business processes contributes to more accessible work of each individual, better decision making, and savings, cyberspace should be created as a smooth basis for information and communication systems and network.

In 2017, an attempt was made to define a Cyber Security Strategy, over five years, to achieve a high-security level in the MOB&H and the Armed Forces (AFB&H). There was no organization of structures within more efficient management; no one reacted to the threats defined as a risk that prevented the strategy's implementation. One of the problems is finances, as decision-makers have set priorities differently, although B&H urgently needs a state-level strategy, whatever it is called. The process of establishing cybersecurity requires that the public information and communication infrastructure be protected and the critical one. It means that providers of Internet access, mobile and fixed telephony services, and network operators must have a legally prescribed obligation to implement their systems' cyber protection.

Furthermore, the lack of scientific research and development in B&H makes it impossible to predict possible cyber threats and prevent them. Research and development should be done in an organized manner with a focus on cybersecurity areas specific to B&H. An analysis of the

activities of the Western Balkan governments as a whole, on the SNS (Social Networking Service), based on numerical data available on the official profiles of the SNS, shows that B&H lags significantly behind other countries. This lag refers to the number of followers, the number of follow-ups, the number of likes and shares, except for the number of posts. The reason for this lag may be in the fact that the Council of Ministers of B&H has been present on (example Twitter) only since April 2016, while the governments of other countries have been on Twitter for more than five years (Mabić, Gašpar, 2018: 36).

In a professional sense, there is no cyber threat that is local; it is always global. Hackers and criminals use the situation in B&H, which is extremely vulnerable at the state level. In MOB&H and AFB&H, there is no single cybersecurity system or unique plan for its establishment or a clear structure in charge of cybersecurity. At the entity level, the first CERT (Computer Emergency Response Team) was established in 2015 to establish the Information Security Department at the Republika Srpska Information Society Agency. As in the Republika Srpska (RS), information security procedures are similar in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FB&H). Based on desk research, incidents are handled by the Criminal Police Sector of the Federal Police Administration, as there is no specialized unit for cybercrime. (B&H Cyber Security Capacity Review, 2019). It applies in particular to the organizational structure and job descriptions. Within the legal framework, in the RS, and at the level of B&H, there are eight laws in force that contain relevant legal regulations that treat security on the Internet, namely: the Law on Electronic Signature of B&H, the Law on Electronic Legal, and Business Transactions of B&H, the Law on Laundering Prevention money laundering and terrorist financing in B&H, the Criminal Code of B&H (Articles 242, 243, 244, 245, 246) dealing with criminal offenses of copyright abuse, then the Criminal Procedure Code of B&H (Articles 20, 72a, 51,116), the Law on Personal Protection data of B&H (Article 11), the Law on Protection of Confidential Data of B&H (Article 77),

and the Law on Communications of B&H (Articles 5, 15).¹⁰

The B&H Ministry of Defense has developed its defense strategy to establish a secure cyber environment only for its Ministry's information systems. This strategy was developed without the adoption of an official national cybersecurity strategy. Therefore, such mechanisms and the organization itself will not solve and gather all partners to define the critical infrastructure and those who should be part of it. Regarding the lack of professional staff, we can problematize that almost all positions in the public sector, from managerial positions to auxiliary workers, are considered elective and partisan. Public competitions are a formality, often without any real significance, because various embezzlements become meaningless and a farce for the public, with the simple satisfaction of shallow transparency and correctness criteria. Good management, i.e., state, should be based on institutions' and individuals' independence, expertise, and integrity. In B&H, with 207 active political parties (per 3.5 million people), the party affiliation of candidates or other links with the ruling parties is almost, as a rule, an essential reference when appointing or recruiting in the entire public sector. It is almost impossible to get a civil service job, especially in higher positions, without personal connections, support, or membership in one of the political parties. 'The public does not have a clear picture of the number and structure of political appointments and employment, because some institutions and some political parties oppose public demands for transparent and fair procedures and employment according to qualifications. However, all are declaratively committed to the principles of transparency. This problem is still only a public secret, because no research, analysis or reports have dealt with this issue precisely, despite the substantial public interest' (Arapović, Lučić, 2014). There is no official estimate of how many traditional primary political positions (ministers, advisors) exist and how many secondary party appointments and employment from the presidency to kindergarten (boards, agencies, institutes, funds, public companies, public institutions, schools).

10 <http://www.mpr.gov.ba/biblioteka/zakoni/default.aspx?id=1894&langTag=bs-BA>

In a broader sense, the international community has been the driving force behind B&H's most security activities, exerting political pressure on local authorities. In the long run, this balance must change in favor of domestic institutions. Political instability and limited resources caused by government incompetence are a limiting factor in carrying out most activities. We see this and based on the last adopted document within the practical problem. Guidelines for the strategic framework of cybersecurity in B&H were presented in Sarajevo at the end of 2019. They were developed under the auspices of the OSCE Mission to B&H and with the support of the Delegation of the European Union and the Office of the European Union Special Representative in B&H and the Geneva Center for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF). It is a comprehensive document that addresses the most critical issues to increase the state's cybersecurity and its institutions by the highest international standards. This document defines a minimum number of objectives and activities that will lead to concrete and measurable cybersecurity management results (Kavalec, 2019). Therefore, this document's existence is necessary because, in B&H, there is no ordinary 'political' strategic approach to action in the field of cybersecurity and crime.

The essence of a state is determined by the ability to protect its territory, citizens, political order from various external threats, and establish internal order. This strength of state power is called institutional capacity (Fukuyama, 2007: 17). Institutional and administrative capacities are divided into strong and weak states. A healthy state, according to J. Migdalu (1988), can meet the set goals. It can 'penetrate society, regulate social relations, extract funds, and direct or use them in established ways'. A weak state can be considered one that does not possess three key elements: 1) the capacity to achieve internal cohesion of society; 2) capacity to provide development and security; 3) international sovereignty.

The structure of B&H itself, after the Dayton Peace Agreement in 1995, created ethnic-religious and territorial risk relations. Simultaneously, the long-term absence of a political will, which manifested itself through the ethnopolitical institutional vacuum in B&H, created a strategic basis for developing a fragile state of security (Mary, 2001). The crisis of

political governance and disagreements between the ruling group and the opposition party group does not occur as in most parliamentary democracies - it is a matter of disagreements over the development of the B&H state (Pejanović, 2011). The author suggests a lack of will and inability of ethnic parties to establish consensus on major state development issues, security issues, and social and economic development. In addition to the fact that they do not have the power to reach a consensus within the state's development, constant mutual ethnopolitical conflicts are transferred to the citizens. From the example of the post-Yugoslav space, one could learn a lesson about internal discord and destruction ideologies as inconvenient historical facts in this area: fear of the other (minority/majority discourse) is the greatest enemy of all social communities (Hadžić, 2020: 812). Besides, the problems that arise from the state's criminalization mainly occur in environments characterized by the weakness of institutions and the crisis of morality that usually accompanies weak institutions.

Furthermore, the region's countries are characterized by permeable borders and a porous security shield, which is currently being reformed. The best example of this is the current Migrant Crisis. Expanding the area of freedom of movement of people, goods, and services also facilitate organized crime activities. Systematic corruption at all institutional levels enables organized groups to protect their interests and prosper (Hadžić, 2020: 256). Also, the state and state institutions' stability depends significantly on the economic and political stability of society, and B&H is a politically and economically unstable country. Ensuring stability in the Balkans is a challenge for the EU. Success is not only crucial for European security interests but would also serve as a model in other fragile regions.

If we make a comparative analysis of the cyber parameters of the National Security of B&H with a smaller Western European country (the Kingdom of the Netherlands is taken as an example¹¹); and we theorize cybersecurity as a concept that came on the agenda after the Cold War in response to a mixture of technological innovation and changing geopolitical conditions, accepting the framework of securitization theory

11 <https://www.ncsc.nl>

(Buzan, Wæver, Wilde, 1998: 25), we can conclude based on a comparative analysis of security systems The Kingdom of the Netherlands and B&H, in addition to the above socio-political-legislative factors, that the cybersecurity of B&H as a separate sector with a particular constellation of threats and reference facilities is extraordinarily endangered and vulnerable. Based on all the above, we can problematize that B&H is an 'institutionally weak state' with dominant 'entity' roles and the rule of ethnopoltics, 'without' sufficiently adapted defense tools, general policies, research activities, developed awareness, primary purposes, institutional cooperation by influencing the procedures of adoption and implementation of adequate cybersecurity parameters. No established, unified general policies, essential purposes to be followed, adoption procedures, management within organizational parameters is inefficient, with particular reference to the use of social media by the civil service, then for organizations of B&H national security mechanisms (i.e., intelligence community, armed forces, the diplomatic corps, the police, and strategically relevant companies).

CONCLUSION

Social media are not per se a threat to national security or a resource for the protection of state strategic interests, but a threat, i.e., advantage, stems from the way they are used and the people who use them (mainly organized user groups can pose a potential threat). It is indisputable that the development of social networks affects the stability of the state and national security and that in the interests of national security, this area should be regulated appropriately. It must be a strategy that is integrated into the broader concept of a national security strategy; if we theorize cybersecurity as a concept that came on the agenda after the Cold War in response to a mixture of technological innovation and changing geopolitical conditions, accepting the framework of securitization theory, the author concludes that cybersecurity of B&H as a separate sector with a constellation of threats and reference facilities is exceptionally endangered, inefficient and vulnerable.

From the international community's point of view, B&H does not have a 'solid' point through which the rest of the world could address security incidents. In a broader sense, the international community has been the driving force behind B&H's most security activities, exerting political pressure on local authorities. In the long run, this balance must change in favor of domestic institutions. B&H is an 'institutionally weak state' with dominant 'entity' roles and ethnopolitical rule (s), and a lack of political will and institutional cooperation affects the process of adopting and implementing adequate cybersecurity parameters.

Furthermore, it is indisputable that state institutions' stability depends significantly on the economic and political stability of society, and B&H is an economically and politically precarious state. On the other hand, along with rapid technological development, new types of crimes appear. Competent law enforcement institutions should have adequate human and material resources. Prosecutor's offices and courts need to be informed and adequately trained on contemporary cybercrime. It is necessary to regulate the protection of user privacy, the obligation to inform about security incidents, and cooperation with other operators and law enforcement agencies in incident situations. Security threats on social networks are reflected in privacy threats, network and data threats, identity threats, and social threats. Given that the number of users of social networks in B&H is significantly above the world average, and that most users express concern about the security of data stored on networks, the cruciality of the phenomenon and the issue itself is insufficiently considered.

Continuous analysis of social media can serve as early warning, monitoring social media to identify the first signs of hostile or potentially dangerous activity for the state's security. Given that social networks are developing rapidly and expanding globally as a phenomenon, the adoption of a single national strategy of social networks is significant primarily for B&H in order to effectively combat the negative shares arising from use, and at the same time, take full advantage of national strategic interests countries. Emphasizing the importance of a strategic approach to the use of social media modeled on more developed

countries, the tools must be carefully adapted to specific circumstances and always used in the service of a broader strategy. It is necessary to establish general policies, implement more efficient management and organizational parameters, essential purposes to be followed, adoption procedures, with particular reference to the use of social media by the civil service, the public, especially for organizations with less or especially for organizations with more or less linear structures, direct structures (i.e., intelligence community, armed forces, diplomatic corps, police, strategically relevant companies). Investments are needed to achieve their goals. In cybersecurity, the problems are often not material, but human resources. Building the necessary professional staff is a process that cannot be realized in a short time, and therefore, this process should start immediately. On the other hand, the lack of a common approach of all participants to cybersecurity protection leads to fragmented and inefficient action. B&H needs to increase experts' numbers to protect itself in information and communication systems successfully.

On the other hand, good management, i.e., state, should be based on institutions' and individuals' independence, expertise, and integrity. Appointments and employment in the public sector under party patronage and practice need urgent analysis and systematic reforms. It is necessary to stimulate investments in scientific research in the security, define specific areas of cybersecurity to be researched, stimulate participation in international scientific research projects in cybersecurity, stimulate the participation of researchers in conferences dedicated to cybersecurity, and stimulate cooperation with academia and institutions. In addition to decision-makers, i.e. institution, all persons who come into contact with data that are considered critical and who work on critical information and communication infrastructure should be aware of the need to protect this data and infrastructure. To achieve all strategic goals, especially the one related to raising awareness and level of education, it is necessary to take measures to expand information on the need for information protection and information and communication infrastructure. These measures will raise the general level of citizens' education in this area, reduce the outflow of professional staff, and increase the number of competent persons who

can design and implement protection measures. Public awareness of cybersecurity is essential for adopting and implementing information security measures at all levels and in all time frames. A society that achieves a level of general information will be safer. Simultaneously, the lack of 'critical public' and the dominance of 'ethnic public', artificially produced by ethnopolitical indoctrination, within web portals, blogs, and social media, contribute to the escalation of ethnonational turmoil and security problems. The constant 'verbal political war', the 'persistent' lack of agreement between the parties regarding the political solution for B&H is a factor in the security sector's inefficiency, activities, adoption, and implementation of cybersecurity strategies. The adoption of a cybersecurity strategy focusing on social media by ethnopolitical leadership within the broader framework of a national security strategy means choosing a specific approach to social media due to a balanced choice between two opposed lines of action. The B&H cybersecurity system's inefficiency is inextricably linked to ethnopolitical leadership during the process of adopting and implementing the national strategy and all levels of implementation of the mechanisms involved in protection.

For the functioning of democracy in B&H and the smooth operation of institutions, there must be a consensus among political representatives in order to be able to make policies, i.e., political decision-making. Thus, B&H cybersecurity is inefficient: privatization of political influence, insufficient institutional cooperation, fundamentally hostile political environment (ethnopolitical institutional structure), fragmented cyberspace (state-entity-cantons), lack of finances, scientific-research frameworks, and professional human resources. Besides, B&H is the only country in Europe that does not have an established CSIRT system. In order for B&H to be a 'stable state' and to have an efficient and useful security system, it must primarily meet the conditions of a social creation of the rule of law and respect for the law and equality of all its citizens. The Balkan states' low level of efficiency and legitimacy means that organizations (criminal, terrorist, revolutionary, ethnonationalism) can operate with a high degree of impunity. A sound security system represents the most significant degree of unity of diversity, which means that all

the different details are brought into harmony. As such, it is complete, complex, orderly, dynamic, and consciously directed. To strengthen it, the contribution of the citizens of B&H, all state bodies of institutions, and the state as a whole are necessary, which means strengthening the security system and doing everything that contributes to society's development.

Furthermore, the Western Balkans as a whole is in a decades-long economic depression, with internal conflicts (stability and security continue to undermine unresolved status issues), and the diffusion of social media in the coming period may affect the increased coherence of organized crime, terrorist organizations, revolutions, and ethno-political turmoil. Violence remains the least desirable factor of implosion.

LITERATURE

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THE FUTURE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

EUROPEAN UNION AT INTERSECTION OF PAST AND FUTURE

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Abstract: What is the future of the European Union? Can the European Union look for solutions to its future in its past? In the search for answers to these questions, the author analyzes the development of the European Union through the development of European integrations through agreements between the member states, contemporary problems of the European Union such as the economic crisis, migration and the Bregzit and proposals for its future development contained in the White Paper on the future of Europe and others proposals on the future of European integration that can be found not only in the present but also in the past. The author uses the method of analysis and synthesis, induction and deduction, content analysis, comparison, historical method and compilation method. The future of the European Union can not be viewed only through the prism of the scenarios offered by the European Commission, but in the wider context and synthesis of ideas of Spinelli, Rossi, Churchill Monet, Schuman and other giants of the European idea, which means that the future lies in the small integration steps leading to the great goal, which is the European Federation.

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INTRODUCTION

Looking at the history of European integration, it can be seen that it was a slow and evolutionary development beginning in the second half of the 20th century. This is a consequence of the defeat of the ideas of Altiero Spinelli and Ernesto Rossi, who advocated the establishment of a federal Europe (Spinelli; Rossi, 1988: 19-41), or Winston Churchill, who supported the idea of establishing a United States of America (United States of Europe) (Churchill, 1946)² and defeated the idea of gradual construction as represented by Jean Monnet and Robert Schumann. Today it is best seen how much Schuman's words had a prophetic character when he said in his Declaration of 9 May 1950 that „Europe will not be made all at once, or according to a single plan. It will be built through concrete achievements which first create a de facto solidarity.“³ These gradual achievements through the development of European integrations were primarily reflected through the founding treaties and their amendments, so that the history of European integrations is primarily contractual.

With the entry into force of the Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community on 18 April 1951 in Paris (entered into force on 23 July 1952, expired on 23 July 2002) signed by Belgium, France, West Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Luxembourg a common market and a framework for the production and distribution of coal and steel have been formed with the High Authority, assisted by the Consultative Committee, the Joint Parliament, the Special Council of Ministers and the Court of

2 Winston Churchill, Speech delivered by Winston Churchill at the University of Zurich, 19 September 1946. Internet, https://www.cvce.eu/obj/address_given_by_winston_churchill_zurich_19_september_1946-en-7dc5a4cc-4453-4c2a-b130-b534b7d76ebd.html, 07/02/2020.

3 „Europe will not be made all at once, or according to a single plan. It will be built through concrete achievements which first create a de facto solidarity.“, Robert Schuman, „Declaration of 9th May 1950 delivered by Robert Schuman“, *European Issue*, No.204, Fondation Robert Schuman, Paris, 10. may 2011.

Justice. The political aim of this treaty was to establish trust and consolidate peace among former enemies (Hodak, 2010: 17).

The same states will sign two more treaties on 25 March 1957 in Rome (entered into force on 1 January 1958), namely the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community and the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community. According to the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, which aimed at establishing a common market and fewer common policies, the institutions responsible for its implementation are Parliament, the Council, the Commission and the Court of Justice. The Council and the Commission have been assisted by an Economic and Social Committee in an advisory capacity (Toepke, 1981: 645-652).

The Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community aimed at overcoming the energy dependency of its member states by unifying the nuclear industry and establishing the same institutions and consultative body as in the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community.⁴

As we can see, in this way, by 1958, three European communities were formed which had a larger number of homonymous and eponymous organs, which raised the question of their better organization and rationalization. This was done on two occasions. First, the Convention on Certain Joint Institutions of the European Communities, signed in Rome on 25 March 1957 (entered into force on 1 January 1958), by the same signatories to the said founding treaties, reached an agreement to form a single Assembly and a single Court for all three communities.⁵ The second step was achieved on 8 April 1965, when the above-mentioned signatories signed the Treaty establishing a Single Council and a Single Commission for the European Communities⁶ (entered into force on 1 July 1967, ex-

4 Article 3, Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:11957A/TXT&from=EN>, (07/02/2020)

5 Convention relative à certaines institutions communes aux Communautés Européennes, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/FR/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:11957K/TXT&from=HR>, 07/02/2020/.

6 In the literature known as the Merger Treaty or the Brussels Treaty.

pired on 1 May 1999), which, as we can see from the title of the Treaty, formed two executive bodies common to the European Communities (Toepke, 1981: 642).

The Single European Act was signed on 17 and 28 February 1986 (entered into force on 1 July 1987). According to this act, a functional internal market was to be established by 1 January 1993, new common policies were established, Council decision-making was reformed and the powers of the European Parliament were expanded.⁷

The next significant step in the European integration process was the signing of the Treaty on European Union on 7 February 1992 in Maastricht, which entered into force on 1 November 1993. The importance of this Treaty is reflected in the formation of the European Union, which rested on three pillars. The first pillar consisted of European Communities, the second pillar was formed by a common foreign and security policy, and the third pillar consisted of cooperation in the field of justice and home affairs (Hodak, 2010: 36).

The Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaty establishing the European Communities and certain related acts was signed on 2 October 1997 and entered into force on 1 May 1999. These amendments further expanded the competence of the European Union and strengthened the European Parliament. The changes also envisage enhanced cooperation.⁸

The Treaty of Nice was signed on 26 February 2001 and entered into force on 1 February 2003. This Treaty served as a preparation for a major enlargement of the European Union. It is reforming institutions and introducing new rules on enhanced cooperation (Hodak, 2010: 41-42).

The Treaty of Lisbon was signed on 13 December 2007 and entered into force on 1 December 2009.⁹ This Treaty brought the following new

7 Single European Act, *Official Journal* L 169, 29.6.1987, pp. 1–28.

8 Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties establishing the European Communities and certain related acts - Final Act, *Official Journal* C 340, 10.11.1997, p. 0115.

9 The Treaty of Lisbon was preceded by a failed Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe. This Treaty was signed in Rome on October 29, 2004 and was rejected owing to the unsuccessful referendums held in 2005, which were rejected by citizens of France and the Netherlands. Nevertheless, most of the solutions contained in this Treaty have been retained in the Treaty of

features: a greater role for the European Parliament in the legislative process, enlargement of the number of issues voted by qualified majority in the Council of the European Union, introduction of the post of President of the European Council and High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, equalization of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union of the Union by virtue of its founding treaties, the European Union gains international legal capacity and becomes a subject of international law, Treaty establishing the European Community renamed Hugo or on the Functioning of the European Union, the competence of the European Union are exclusive, shared and subsidiary, introduces the citizens' initiative, leaving the structure of the three pillars.¹⁰

MODERN PROBLEMS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION AFTER THE LISBON AGREEMENT: THE ECONOMIC CRISIS, MIGRATION AND BREXIT

Looking at the contemporary problems that the European Union has had since the signing and entry into force of the Lisbon Agreement, it can single out the European debt crisis, migration and Brexit as the three most serious problems that can lead to the survival of the European Union.

The European debt crisis started in 2009, culminating in 2010 and 2011, and the effects of this crisis will be felt in the years to come. It resulted in the individual EU Member States being unable to meet their commitments due to excessive budget deficits that could not be covered by their own revenues. The European debt crisis has hit Greece, Italy, Spain, Portugal and Ireland hardest (Christova, 2011: 49).

The crisis has threatened to endanger the financial stability of the European Union as a whole. The European Union, in order to help its

Lisbon. See Jacques Ziller, „Le processus des ratifications du traité établissant une Constitution pour l'Europe et la période de réflexion“, *European University Institute LAW Working Paper*, No. 2006/29, San Domenico di Fiesole, 2006, pp. 21-23.

10 Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community, *Official Journal* C 306, 17.12.2007, p. 1–271.

Member States, set up in 2010 the European Financial Stability Facility for the Eurozone Member States and the European Financial Stabilization Mechanism for all EU Member States (Olivares-Caminal, 2011: 5-9).

Migratory flows have always been present in the European Union, both between Member States and between the European Union and third countries. War conflicts and difficult economic conditions in Asia and Africa (Afghanistan, Eritrea, Syria, Libya, Iraq) and parts of Southeast Europe (Kosovo and Albania) have led to the European migrant crisis culminating in 2015. These are mainly three categories of population, namely refugees, economic migrants and asylum seekers (Đurić Džakić, 2017: 52).

Increased influx of population and fear of potential terrorist attacks have led some EU Member States to impose border controls and thus restrict freedom of movement in the Schengen area. (Djuric Dzacic, 2017 p.53) In order to help Italy and Greece during the refugee crisis on September 22, 2015, a decision was made at the meeting of Ministers of the Interior of EU Member States to relocate 120,000 refugees to other Member States which was so called migrant quotas, taking into account the size and economic strength of the Member States.¹¹ This decision was not adopted unanimously and caused great opposition in some Member States¹² (Boros, 2017: 2).

The discontent of UK citizens culminated in a referendum on leaving the European Union (Brexit). On June 23, 2016, the British voted with a percentage of 51.9% the option for the UK to leave the European Union. (Riedel, 2018: 107) This has resulted in the activation of Article 50 of the Treaty of Lisbon, which sets out the procedure for leaving the European Union.¹³(Circolo, Hamulák, Blažo, 2018: 212) The date set for departure

11 Council Decision establishing provisional measures in the area of international protection for the benefit of Italy and Greece, Brussels, 22 September 2015.

12 We can take Hungary as an example of such a Member State, in which a referendum was held on 2 October 2016, rejecting the aforementioned Migrant Quotas Decision, which directly opposed Hungary's EU institutions.

13 Thanks to this option, "... for the first time in European history, after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, Member States of the European Union have a provision explicitly permitting and prescribing the possibility of leaving the Union."

is March 29, 2019. However, due to the failure to reach an exit agreement between the United Kingdom and the European Union, at the request of the United Kingdom, this deadline was extended until 31 October 2019.¹⁴ The UK left the European Union on 31 January 2020 and became the first member to do so in the whole European integration process. There is now a transition period until the end of 2020 while the UK and EU negotiate additional arrangements. New rules will take effect on 1 January 2021.¹⁵

Key reasons for leaving the European Union were dissatisfaction with the many rules that hamper business, the fact that it pays more to the EU budget than it gets, the intention to take control at its own borders, as well as migration control and dissatisfaction with ever closer union policies between countries member of the European Union, which for supporters of leaving the European Union is a step towards “United States of Europe”¹⁶ (Schewe, Lipsens, 2018: 215-216).

FIVE SCENARIOS FOR THE FUTURE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

The crisis the European Union has been going through in recent years, the economic and migrant crisis, as well as the exit of the UK from the European Union expected in 2019, reflect on the further future and the forms and the common future of the 27 Member States. This is precisely why the European Commission has prepared a White Paper on the Future of Europe - Considerations and scenarios for the EU-27 by 2025, launching a debate on the future of the European Union, offering five sce-

14 Point 2, Conclusions adopted by the European Council (Art. 50), Brussels, 10 April 2019.

15 See more in Official Journal of the European Union, L 029, 31 January 2020;

https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.C_.2020.034.01.0001.01.ENG.07/02/2020/.

and more about framework for the future relationship between the European Union and the United Kingdom:

https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.C_.2020.034.01.0001.01.ENG.07/02/2020/.

16 See reasons for leaving the European Union at Christoph Schewe, Davids Lipsens, „From EFTA to EC/EU and Back to EFTA? The European Economic Area (EEA) As a Possible Scenario for the UK-EU Relations After Brexit“, in *Brexit History, Reasoning and Perspectives*, (Editors: David Ramiro Troitiño, Tanel Kerikmäe, Archil Chochia), Springer International Publishing AG, Cham, 2018, pp. 215-216.

narios under which Member States continue to work together, but with varying degrees integration depending on the scenario.¹⁷ These are the following scenarios:

Scenario 1 - We are not giving up

The European Union should work to continue and build on existing reforms. Problems are solved upon their occurrence and new regulations are adopted accordingly, and outdated regulations are repealed. (Avbelj, 2017: 5) The single market, currency, infrastructure and work on investment, growth and employment need to be strengthened. Cooperation needs to be strengthened in the area of counter-terrorism and defense. Promote a unique approach in foreign policy and in the management of external borders.¹⁸ This scenario is realistic and achievable, because according to it, the European Union continues to advance through its reforms the existing degree of integration, gradually, step by step, without radical and abrupt changes that could create resistance to individual Member States.

Scenario 2 - Common market only

Under this scenario, Member States cannot agree on many policies, in particular not on a common policy on migration, security and defense, which would result in enhanced border controls, and therefore focus attention on the functioning of the single market (Avbelj, 2017: 3). This should not pose a problem in the exercise of the freedom of movement of goods and capital, but problems in the exercise of the freedom of movement of workers and services may be expected. In areas where

17 Bijela knjiga o budućnosti Evrope - razmatranja i scenariji za EU-27 do 2025, Europska komisija, Bruxelles, 2017, str. 5.

18 Bijela knjiga o budućnosti Evrope - razmatranja i scenariji za EU-27 do 2025, Europska komisija, Bruxelles, 2017, str. 16.

mutual agreement cannot be reached, problems will be addressed bilaterally. The reforms also entail a reduction in the regulatory burden, which implies that when the new regulation is passed, the two are repealed.¹⁹ Scenario 2 is not so realistic because it is not possible to concentrate solely on the common market policy, because in order for it to work successfully, many assumptions can be made that can only be achieved through common policies of the Member States, including joint control of external borders, freedom of movement of persons, goods, services and capital, single currency, etc.

Scenario 3 - Those who want more do more

Member States that are ready to increase the degree of integration and cooperation with other Member States can come together to work together on specific policies. Other Member States will have the opportunity to join when they meet the conditions (Avbelj, 2017: 4). This cooperation could relate to the judiciary, security, especially the police and intelligence, but also taxes and social issues.²⁰ Scenario 3 is realistic if Member States cannot unanimously agree on further progress of the European Union. In such situations, it is logical to allow the member states' groups to achieve a deeper degree of integration through enhanced cooperation in areas where they have a common interest. Such cooperation could have a positive impact on further integration processes, as other Member States could join if good results of such cooperation were achieved.

Scenario 4 - Doing less but more efficiently

In this scenario, the European Union must identify and prioritize common policies, while on the other hand, the policy may be reduced or suspended altogether (Avbelj, 2017: 4). Strengthening the common

¹⁹ Bijela knjiga o budućnosti Europe - razmatranja i scenariji za EU-27 do 2025, Europska komisija, Bruxelles, 2017, str. 18.

²⁰ Bijela knjiga o budućnosti Europe - razmatranja i scenariji za EU-27 do 2025, Europska komisija, Bruxelles, 2017, str. 20.

market, combating terrorism, external borders, asylum, common defense could be prioritized, and health, regional development, employment and social policies (in non-functioning areas) to be highlighted.²¹ Scenario 4 is also feasible, as it is possible for Member States to agree on issues of interest to all and to achieve a greater degree of integration in them.

Scenario 5 - We do a lot more together

Under this scenario, EU Member States decide to act much more in all common policies. This is characterized by a unique international approach with a single representative, a defense community, enhanced security cooperation, a common approach to migration, enlargement of the single market in energy, digitalisation and services, with greater coordination in fiscal, financial, tax and social issues.²² Scenario 5 is hard to come by. The European Union is made up of a large number of Member States with often conflicting interests, and it is hard to expect that they will agree on all issues, which would further lead to more determined action in all common policies.

COMPLEMENTARY VIEWS OF THE SCENARIOS FOR THE FUTURE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

The most important complementary views of scenarios for the future of the European Union can be seen in the Rome Declaration of 25 March 2017 and the Sibiu Declaration of 9 May 2019.

White Paper on the Future of Europe - Considerations and scenarios for the EU-27 to 2025, which launched a debate on the future of the European Union, had as its first result the adoption of the Rome Declaration

21 Bijela knjiga o budućnosti Europe - razmatranja i scenariji za EU-27 do 2025, Europska komisija, Bruxelles, 2017, str. 22.

22 Bijela knjiga o budućnosti Europe - razmatranja i scenariji za EU-27 do 2025, Europska komisija, Bruxelles, 2017, str. 24.

on 25 March 2017, which addresses four objectives: 1. protected and a secure Europe (an area with free movement and a protected external border, with a responsible migration policy and an effective fight against terrorism and organized crime), 2. a prosperous and sustainable Europe (an area with steady growth through investment, reform, job openings 3. a social Europe (an area of social and economic prosperity, respecting the role of social partners, equality and equality of all citizens, while combating unemployment, poverty, discrimination and social exclusion, a youth development space that respects cultural heritage and cultural diversity) and 4. a strong Europe on the global stage (developing partnerships with immediate neighbors and globally, shared security and complementary to NATO, greater role in the United Nations, free trade and responsible global climate policy).²³

On the other hand, the Sibiu Declaration is also a declaration on the common future of the Member States in the European Union, which underlines the responsibility for strengthening the European Union, with an agreement on ten commitments to realize this responsibility. These commitments stem from the defense of a united Europe without historical divisions, mutual solidarity in good and evil, mutual respect on the road to finding common solutions, respect for human rights and freedoms, lifestyle, democracy and the rule of law. Obligations also include achieving results on the most important issues for Europeans, respecting the principles of fairness in all areas of European Union action, achieving the European Union's objectives with adequate resources, securing Europeans' future by investing in young people, protecting citizens and responsible global leadership in cooperation with international partners.²⁴

In addition to these official views on the vision of the European future, there are numerous looms on the same issue that can be found in the literature. So e.g. according to Philippe Defarges, the future of the European Union lies in explaining what Europe wants. According to him, there are

23 The Rome Declaration, Declaration of the leaders of 27 member states and of the European Council, the European Parliament and the European Commission, European Council, Brussel, 25.03.2017.

24 Point 5-10 of the Sibiu Declaration, European Council, Brussel, 09.05.2019.

four scenarios for the future of the European Union. The first two are negative and they predict the brutal or gradual disappearance of the European Union, depending on the strength and effect of the economic crisis and the political strength of nationalist and populist parties. The other two are positive and foresee the existence of an agreement that guarantees a safe survival that would maintain the status quo of the European Union or the victory of federal forces that would redefine the structure of the European Union into a European Federation (Lúcio, Pereira Marques, 2018: 1337-1338).

On the other hand, according to authors Alberto Alesina and Francesco Giavazzi, a key challenge for the future of the European Union lies in preventing the “progressive loss of competitiveness of European economies in an international context”, which further implies taking measures to further liberalize markets, including attracting skilled labor from other countries. Mark Leonard insists on the economic conditionality of the future of the European Union, according to which the European Union must accelerate the economic growth of its members, take adequate measures due to the aging process of the European population and stabilize the processes in the Economic and Monetary Union. We also attach the views of these authors to the position advocated by Joergen Moeller, for whom a communitarian future depends on maintaining a welfare state system and economic competitiveness based on a common currency (Lúcio, Pereira Marques, 2018: 1338-1339).

CONCLUSION

European integration is a political, legal and economic project that began in the second half of the 20th century. Although there were ideas for the creation of a federal state, the idea of a gradual, evolutionary development of European integration was overwhelmingly driven by the fear and unwillingness of Member States to relinquish their sovereignty and transfer it to the European institutions. To date, a number of treaties have been signed between Member States that have strengthened integration processes and given European integration a treaty character.

European integration processes have never been simple or easy, but the last decade has been especially difficult for the European Union. The economic crisis that has shaken European financial flows, migratory movements that have stifled freedom of movement and solidarity with regard to the allocation of refugees by Member States, as well as the exit of the United Kingdom from the European Union, have called into question the idea of a commonality between the European countries and the future of the European Union.

The European Commission acted on these issues in a timely manner and prepared a White Paper on the future of Europe, launching a debate on the future of the European Union, offering five scenarios for a common future. The most realistic scenario is 1 - We do not give up, according to which reforms are gradually moving towards a greater degree of integration, given the resistance of Member States to abruptly relinquish a significant part of their sovereignty in favor of the European Union.

However, in considering the future of the European Union, one should not only pay attention to the scenarios offered by the European Commission, but also pay attention to the very roots of European integration and the ideas that preceded them. Therefore, the future of the European Union should lie in the synthesis of the ideas of Altiero Spinelli, Ernesto Rosi and Winston Churchill, on the one hand, and Jean Monet and Robert Schumann, on the other, so the future is in the evolution of European integration through a gradual path of concrete achievements that will lead to the ultimate goal being the United States of Europe and the European Federation, respectively.

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**STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT
AND FOREIGN LANGUAGES**

THE IMPORTANCE OF LEARNING FOREIGN LANGUAGES IN COMPANIES

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Abstract: Human resource development is slowly taking precedence in human resource management processes, precisely because of its importance for the success of the organization and the achievement of organizational goals. Modern educational technologies create preconditions for acquiring new knowledge, develop creativity and provide greater human resource activity. The development of personal autonomy and complex communicative, social and cognitive competencies and skills of employees, increasing their responsibility, engagement and motivation, stand out as a priority. Very good use of foreign languages in formal and informal situations is a prerequisite for successful business in many organizations. Such environments often require the use of more than one language of communication. The aim of this paper is to point out the importance of learning foreign languages for the success of the organization in a multilingual environment,

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and the author's motivation for this topic is the growing demand for foreign languages in the labor market, and insufficient sources of knowledge in education and business.

Keywords: human resources; foreign language; creativity; multilingualism.

INTRODUCTION

Knowledge of human resources is the key factor for the success of an organization. The global environment in which most organizations operate brings many challenges and turbulences with it. The need to modernize foreign language learning is especially evident among employees in multilingual companies, as a prerequisite for effective communication.

Multilingualism has become a specificity for many companies, both transnational and small and medium enterprises. A significant percentage of today's business is based on small and medium enterprises, especially in transition countries, which clearly speaks in favor of the fact that these companies also emphasize the multilingualism and use of opportunities that this concept offers in the global market. For these companies, the term interoperability is common, which is defined as the property of organizations and their information systems and business processes to cooperate and act in harmony, in order to achieve a certain goal, regardless of organizational ownership of processes and location or level of technological support (Strahonja & Simic, 2010). The interoperability of SMEs in a multilingual environment is very complicated to achieve, however, many authors, such as (Bonfatti, Monari & Marinelli, 2011) have worked to create practical guidelines for enabling the interoperability of these enterprises in a multilingual environment, to enable both small and medium-sized enterprises. medium-sized enterprises benefit from doing business in a multilingual environment.

The paper is designed to start from the concept of human resource management in a multilingual environment, defining the specifics of this environment and the companies that work in it. Furthermore, the paper defines the theoretical setting of human resources development and the importance of learning foreign languages for them, through modern tools, technologies and techniques of learning foreign languages.

GLOBALIZATION AND MULTILINGUALISM

Today's trends of globalization and internationalization of business have become evident in all countries of the world, both more developed and less developed. Coping with employees in such conditions is certainly not easy, and the context of using multiple languages in business makes it very difficult for employees to communicate on a daily basis. On the other hand, multilingualism has become a common skill for many young people, and often companies operating in this environment have an advantage, as they can choose staff from many labor markets who speak different languages. Hiring people who come from different cultures is a competitive advantage in today's business, which greatly facilitates communication with clients and external business parties. On the other hand, challenges in multilingual business certainly exist, but investing in the intercultural skills of employees certainly pays off (Sosna, 2017).

The general place of scientific studies and public discourse dealing with globalization is that it is, above all, about the growth of world interdependence, that is, mutual connection between nations and people. This objective process is reflected in all areas of society: economy, politics, culture, communication, etc (Avramović, 2007).

Globalization has a significant impact on many social spheres, while, we can agree with many authors, its greatest impact on international business, and consequently, on the education of new staff. In a globalized society, the improvement of production results and the increase of

national wealth come to the forefront (Avramović, 2007)

According to the same author, one of the most powerful factors in the overall social development of modern humanity is new technology. Thanks to the development of new technologies, among other things, the process of globalization has gained new forms and contents in recent decades, as well as new civilizational labels in the form of changes that have encompassed almost all countries, except that their scope and intensity are different in different parts of the world. The most developed countries in the world, much more than before, base their latest development strategies on high-tech solutions. Countries in transition, despite all the problems with the reform and democratization of society, are paying more and more attention to the development of technologies and knowledge.

Another key effect of globalization is continuous learning, ie the knowledge society. The term knowledge society is defined by a management theorist, Peter Drucker, as a knowledge-based society, or a society in which knowledge plays a key role (Drucker, 2008). The knowledge society is another name for a post-capitalist society in which the basic economic resource is knowledge (Avramović, 2007). The characteristics of post-capitalism are a change in the ownership structure (shareholder ownership), the replacement of the nation-state by a mega-state, concentration on labor results, the basic value is labor productivity, organizational restructuring (teamwork and external cooperation), and class structure is fluid, not crystalline. But a key feature of the knowledge society is the new role of knowledge: it has taken on a central role and the meaning of the term knowledge has changed - knowledge has become the most important resource, not one of the organization's resources.

We conclude that it is the phenomenon of globalization, aided by the very rapid development of technology, that has influenced the creation of multinational companies operating in a multicultural and multilingual environment. In order for such business to be sustainable, a significant change in traditional processes and perceptions of education and learning is necessary, especially in the field of foreign language learning.

Multilingual environment

Many authors even in the middle of the last century dealt with the specifics of cultural and linguistic factors in the learning and education of human resources. One such example is Lambert (1973), who in his works dealt with the specifics of ethnic groups on the basis of their linguistic characteristics. Namely, he dealt with the management of expectations and relations in social relations in relation to the linguistic characteristics and cultural factors of certain groups. Even then, the linguistic factors that separate social groups, and which influence the formation of opinions in organizations about given groups, were noticed and analyzed.

Some twenty years later, the focus of research on multilingualism was the phenomena of population migration, which were then in full swing. Some papers (Tollefson, 1991) have dealt with research on population migration patterns and their impact on future linguistic and cultural factors, and an assessment of the necessary investment in education to form modern, multilingual societies.

At the beginning of the 21st century, the authors have already turned to the phenomenon of globalization and its impact on foreign language learning and business in terms of using multiple languages for communication in organization and everyday communication. Therefore, today's market requires that, in addition to the knowledge, skills and attitudes necessary to do the job, you also have knowledge of at least English. Learning foreign languages and cultures is one of the necessary analytical skills for effective participation in the business world. Because, in order for someone to progress in the business sense, it is necessary to know a foreign language. Such resources provide the company with prosperity and open the door to new foreign markets and business opportunities. More precisely, it leads to an improvement in the quality of business of the company that hires him. A very important segment of business communication and the importance of a foreign language are meetings with business partners who require knowledge of a foreign language and knowledge of their culture in order to better meet their requirements and

benefit from negotiations.

International contacts are an integral part of many careers, and people without subject skills, without knowledge of language, culture, and the ability to interact with other cultures are in a significantly subordinate position (Oana-Roxana, 2012). The same author mentions the following changes that globalization has brought to the learning of foreign languages, ie the multilingual environment:

- Necessary deeper understanding of the cultural specifics that shape the subject foreign language;
- Increasing intercultural awareness, as well as empowering students to face stereotypes and the main goals of the curriculum;
- Development of new perspectives by comparing the cultural specifics of the language being learned with the mother tongue;
- Bridging the cultural gap, and enabling effective communication while respecting the other party is the basic goal of learning a foreign language.

Many countries, but also communities, such as the European Union, even have a policy related to multilingualism. The main goal of European Union policy is to promote the learning of foreign languages. In the European Union, it is possible to address official institutions in any of the 24 recognized languages in the European Union, which is further obliged to respond in the language in question. Also, all regulations are translated into these languages. On the other hand, some 60 regional languages are recognized in the European Union, spoken by almost 40 million people (European Union, 2017). Although the European Union does not use these languages as official languages, and leaves it to the member states to determine their official treatment, the European Union supports the diversity of these languages through various support programs.

One of the specific goals of the European Union in the field of multilingualism is that every citizen of the European Union speaks at least two languages, in addition to their mother tongue, and achieves this through learning foreign languages from an early age, to achieve the following benefits (European Union, 2017):

- Better foreign language skills enable more people to study and / or work abroad, and to improve their life prospects;
- Speaking foreign languages helps people from different cultures to understand each other, which is the basis of a multicultural Europe;
- Efficient exchange of resources in Europe;
- Using the effects of one of the fastest growing branches of the economy - language industry (translations, interpretations, language teaching, language technology, etc.)

The European Union has launched many projects to promote a multilingual environment, such as the Modern Language Project which had the following objectives (Vez, 2009):

- Promoting a multilingual environment, by helping Member States to encourage all citizens of the European Union to reach a satisfactory level of communication skills in many languages, and to continue to improve foreign languages throughout their lives;
 - Diversification of languages in the learning offer and setting appropriate goals for their learning;
 - Improving education and training for foreign language teachers and promoting centralized communication methodologies.
- Another European Union project called Language Policies for a Multilingual and Multicultural Europe had the following objectives (Vez, 2009):
- Assisting national institutions in promoting multilingualism and multiculturalism and raising public awareness of the role that language learning plays in defining European identity;
 - Development of ideas, approaches and strategies for the promotion of linguistic diversification and improving the quality of education in the field of foreign language learning;
 - Promotion of foreign language learning from the very beginning of schooling, whereby every European student acquires an awareness of European linguistic and cultural diversity;

- Development and implementation of common instruments of the European Union for planning and assessment of foreign language learning, joint recognition and qualifications and coordination of the implementation of multilingualism policy;
- Development of instruments and coordination of networks for the design and implementation of modular courses;
- Further development of the intercultural dimension in foreign language learning.

European Union survey from 2012 survey found that 98% of citizens agree that learning foreign languages will have a positive effect on their children, 88% of citizens think that knowing other foreign languages is very useful, 72% of citizens agree with the above-mentioned goal of the European Union. on a minimum of 2 foreign languages, while 77% of citizens point out the improvement of language skills as a priority in this area (<http://www.itbusinessedge.com/slideshows/show.aspx?c=87336&slide=10>)

If we look at another community - e.g. The United States and its policy of multilingualism, we will note that these policies do not exist in that part of the world, although the United States is considered one of the largest, if not the largest multilingual environment in the world. According to many authors, such as (Woog, 2017), the use of another language in the business world in the United States is considered almost indecent, and such an environment is in theory called a “language hostile environment.” In this environment, if English is not used, it is considered that a hostile situation is created in the social work environment, and these people are excluded from social flows. It is for this reason that many companies in the US develop their own multilingual policies aimed at developing a multilingual ethic in everyday communication.

On the other hand, the member states of the European Union are committed to the fact that all citizens learn at least two foreign languages from the earliest age. They encourage professional mobility and knowledge of several foreign languages is considered desirable. It is seen as a general culture, higher education and a form of intelligence.

Multilingual companies

It can be said that most multinational companies operate in a multilingual environment - whether they have employees from multiple language areas, or are assigned stakeholders, partners and suppliers from different language areas, it is not too important for global business.

Thus, globalization is a key factor that has shifted the business paradigm to a global level, and forced organizations around the world to engage in organizing their activities in a multilingual environment. Such efforts of organizations have evolved over time into many forms of adapting the organization to the multilingual environment, such as:

- Organizations of various forms of training, for all types of management;
- Establishment of special departments in the organization that deal with the specifics of employees and stakeholders from other language areas;
- Corporate multilingualism promotion programs;
- Foreign language learning programs at organizations and many others.

The initial assumption, when we think about multilingualism in companies, is the use of English as the agreed language of communication. Maybe that is the initial assumption of people from our speaking area, but when viewed from a global point of view, English has less and less primacy as a central language of communication in organizations (Multilingual Executives Blog, 2017).

The challenges of English-speaking companies are different compared to organizations that are from a minority-speaking area, such as e.g. our language environment. English-speaking organizations often do not have a culture of learning foreign languages. Although the trend is to encourage this more and more, it will be a long time before staff who have learned foreign languages enter the labor market.

It is a mistake to assume that English is the only language necessary for communication in the global economy. Because, in the western

world, the English language is dominant, but not in the eastern world, say China, Russia, etc. Many surveys conducted in the global business world, such as the 2014 UK survey conducted by CBI / Pearson, showed that almost half of the country's export companies characterize linguistic and cultural barriers as underlying business problems, while one of the five surveyed companies experienced business losses due to these factors (Multilingual Executives Blog, 2017). The same survey found that 65% of organizations in the UK recognize the need to learn foreign languages, while 41% of organizations consider knowing foreign languages to be key to their business. From the point of view of the United Kingdom, the following foreign languages are the most represented in international business in this country (Multilingual Executives Blog, 2017):

- French - 50%;
- German - 49%;
- Spanish - 44%;
- Mandarin - 31%;
- Arabic - 23%;
- Polish - 19%;
- Russian - 18%;
- Cantonese Chinese - 16%;
- Japanese - 15%;
- Portuguese - 11%;
- Other languages - 16%;

So, it can be said that language competencies today, regardless of which language area (minority or majority from a world perspective) is an organization, are one of the key competencies of every employee, in addition to relevant experience and education in the subject area. It is these competencies that ensure efficient communication in the organization, which is the key to the success of any organization. International teams are commonplace today, and the prerequisite for their success is certainly successful communication (Multilingual Executives Blog, 2017) lists the following factors for the success of the organization in a multilingual environment:

- Good business planning;
- Research and understanding of a foreign or global market;
- Enabling efficient and effective communication with clients, partners and employees;
- Positive attitude towards learning foreign languages and getting to know foreign cultures;
- Development of successful and sustainable international business relationships.

When globally considering the perspectives an organization has in a multilingual environment, we can define three basic perspectives of an organization's business in a multilingual environment (Sherman & Strubell, 2013):

- Organizational perspective, which includes questions about how to manage the presence or learning needs of foreign languages in organizations. Organizations can be guided by national or other policies in the field of using different languages in the work environment, and on the other hand, they can have their own policies and procedures;
- Individual perspective, which explores the ways in which employees manage the presence of foreign languages in the work environment;
- The methodological perspective provides answers to questions on how best to collect and integrate various data (in qualitative and quantitative research) on the use and satisfaction of employees regarding the use of foreign languages in the work environment. The following methods and techniques are often used for these purposes:
 - Theoretical and methodological principles such as language planning and policy;
 - Sociology of language;
 - Ethnographic communication;
 - Sociolinguistics;
 - Language management theory.

It is certainly a fact that in organizations that operate in multilingual environments, primarily top management must respect the general postulates of doing business in such an environment (Multilingual Executives Blog, 2017):

- Prerequisite is a very good knowledge of foreign languages;
- Deep understanding of the other party's messages in communication - understanding the meaning (which is often conveyed in business meetings), not just understanding foreign words and expressions;
- Intercultural awareness - empathy with another business culture must exist, one must know the way of behavior, and various business protocols, as well as hierarchical determination;
- Appropriate humor - top management must know how to behave in situations of humor, to know how to react to a joke, to recognize it, but also to initiate a joke in accordance with the cultural and linguistic specifics of the other party.

The need to learn foreign languages for business purposes certainly depends on the strategic orientation of the subject markets, so more than a quarter of respondents from 26 countries defined that their job includes working with people from other countries (Segar, 2017). Employees in India, Singapore and Saudi Arabia do business with foreigners 59%, 55% and 50% respectively. As for the language in use, the fact is that English is the most common. Japan and Russia use the least English. They firmly preserve their tradition and culture of communication in their own language. Many studies have also dealt with the phenomenon of the English language as Lingua Franca (it represents a common language, a language of commerce, a language that bridges differences). As for the English language, it is mainly studied in the business context in the following three disciplines (Kankaanranta, Louhiala-Salminen & Karhunen, 2015):

- applied linguistics,
- international management and
- corporate communications.

These disciplines can be studied in various educational institutions, especially those that deal with international business. These institutions should provide multicultural competencies, which are defined as knowledge and skills in managing communication situations with representatives of different cultures, in relation to different nations, organizations and professions (Kankaanranta, et al., 2015).

Human resource development and the importance of learning English

The development and expansion of the application of information technology have led to an unexpectedly rapid change in the need to know and use the English language. Searching and using the benefits of the Internet is painstaking and slow, and often fruitless, work without knowledge of English. Considering that the Internet allows synchronous communication in written and oral form (tele-conference), there is an unequivocal need for knowledge of English not only at the basic, but also at higher levels, preferably at the conversational level. There is no doubt that education in the present must be reorganized and adapted to the requirements of electronic literacy. Education should be provided for both teaching staff and students (Tobolka, 2002).

Success in globalization, as already mentioned in this paper, depends on innovation, skills and knowledge of employees, organizational learning of organizations and their employees. The globalization of corporate training is key to the success of global business strategies. E-learning, which has the potential of global distribution, enables organizations to share knowledge and train their employees, suppliers, partners and users faster, more consistently and cheaper than ever before (Beni Laabassi, 2015). The same author defines e-learning in the field of human resources as education, information, communication, training, knowledge management and performance management in an organization. Such systems are mainly based on web technologies, and enable access to information in the organization anywhere and anytime. E-learning was created in re-

sponse to the demands of meeting the knowledge needs of the rapidly growing number of multilingual and multicultural individuals that exist in every organization.

Trends of globalization and e-learning have created the concept of globalization of e-learning in organizations, which is defined as a corporate process, which maps company values and goals to internal and external goals of employee knowledge. This concept includes areas such as (Beni Laabassi, 2015):

- Human resources and capital management;
- Training of employees, customers and suppliers;
- Training regarding products / services, etc.

Learning foreign languages is often a big part of the above item two. The concept defined in this way enables communication between suppliers, customers and employees through modern technologies, and the exchange of knowledge and experiences in the chosen language of communication. In the field of multilingualism, such solutions include (Beni Laabassi, 2015):

- Getting to know students, employees and their lecturers;
- Online access to learning requirements and materials;
- Providing educational materials in the mother tongue and in a culturally appropriate context;
- Internationalization of knowledge.

Thus, it is clear that such solutions are created to meet the learning needs of employees, in order to define, implement and monitor their development. These solutions are based on two main roles - the role of technology and the role of people (lecturers). In addition to these roles, the cultural environment must certainly be analyzed, and a system designed based on research data. Beni Laabassi defines the methods and techniques used for these roles as follows (Beni Laabassi, 2015):

- Technological role in electronic language learning systems:
 - o machine translations,

- about translation memory,
- o automatic word processing,
 - o automatic summarization of text,
 - o Multilingual search.
- The role of human resources in electronic language learning systems:
 - o designers of the learning process,
 - about translators,
 - o content creators, etc.
 - Cultural perspective:
 - o respect for cultural, sexual and religious differences,
 - o taking into account differences in expectations from education systems,
 - o avoidance of historical and political references, as well as taboos,
 - o careful choice of colors and presentation in the solution,
 - o avoiding the use of abbreviations and slang in the solution itself,
 - o choosing the most common meaning of the word.

Figure 1: Tools, methods and techniques of information technologies for learning foreign languages

Tools for stand alone work	Communication tools	Read and write tools	Listening tools
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Web pages • Presentation software • Podcast • Video Creation Tools 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Email and mailing list • SMS, messenger and instant messaging • Discussion table • VOIP (Voice Over Internet Protocol) • The social network • FTP (File Transfer Protocol) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Writing table • Viki • Blog • Search the web 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Podcast • Votkast • Audio blogs

Source: (Knezevic, 2017; Tobolka, 2002)

CONCLUSION

Business communication is nowadays a basic competence that every employee in any organization must have developed at a very high level. A significant part of this competence is the availability of knowledge from the required foreign languages, which are increasing every day. In order to apply this competence on the labor market, it is necessary to focus on learning foreign languages from the earliest period of schooling, with further business professionalization of language learning.

New technologies bring changes in all spheres of business, even in learning foreign languages. Although changes are often associated with a negative connotation, the change that information technology has brought to foreign language learning is positive, by facilitating this process and defining new motivators for students to learn foreign languages.

Human resources in every organization have their own career path, which includes education in many spheres, especially in learning foreign languages. Therefore, all employees in organizations expect a defined training and education plan, and learning foreign languages is often a large part of such programs. Therefore, organizations must find ways to motivate employees to learn foreign languages, by applying modern information and communication technologies and integrating these systems into HR information systems. In addition to the fact that employees will be more motivated and more engaged in the organization, when there are adequate conditions for learning foreign languages, such defined foreign language learning will have the following benefits for the organization and the employee:

- Creating positive attitudes and lack of prejudice for different people;
- Development of employee analytical skills;
- Business skills combined with foreign language skills make the employee a more valuable team member of any organization and more competitive in the labor market;

- Understanding of stakeholder culture has improved;
- Increased creativity;
- Restoration of mother tongue and greater speaking security;
- Encouraging respect for other nations;
- Expanding business and personal views;
- Understanding the modern culture of the language being learned, which facilitates informal communication and building a business and personal network of contacts;
- Respect for cultural diversification;
- Opening up opportunities for business and private travel.

Thus, learning foreign languages is a prerequisite for human resource development in a multilingual global environment in which most organizations operate today. Adequate programs, plans, methods and techniques must be used in the education of human resources in the field of foreign languages, so that human resources are motivated for this area and achieve the above benefits both personally and organizationally.

It is concluded that continuous learning must be at the core of the development of all human resources, and as such must be woven into the education system. Foreign language learning can no longer be defined as a special competence of human resources, but as a prerequisite for the realization of other business competencies of employees, which further emphasizes the importance of this area in theory and practice, especially in developing countries where professionalization of human resources is defined as global economic competence.

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**BH CONSOCIATIVE DEMOCRACY AND
THE DAYTON PEACE AGREEMENT**

THE DAYTON PEACE AGREEMENT - SYNTHESIS OF THE ARBITRATION PROCESS AND ESTABLISHMENT OF INSTITUTIONALIZED CONSOCIALISM

Professional paper

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Abstract: The article is dedicated to the process of creating the Dayton Peace Agreement and introducing institutionalized consocialism in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Dayton Peace Agreement foresees a complete change in the state structure of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Namely, Bosnia and Herzegovina has been transformed from the previous unitary system into a complex state, which consists of two entities, one of which is governed by federal principle and consists of ten federal units (Cantons) where each canton has its legislative and executive power, while the second entity is governed by a unitary principle. This transformation was necessary, given the fact that the unitary system was unsustainable due to the rise of negative nationalism on all three sides. The article gives an overview of the failed attempts to achieve peace in the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina and their elements that became part of the Dayton Peace Agreement, as well as an overview of all eleven annexes of the Dayton Peace Agreement and the two principles that preceded its signing. The author concludes that the original Dayton Peace Agreement is the best

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solution for the peoples of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Keywords: Dayton Peace Agreement; Annexes; Principles; Consociation; Democracy

INTRODUCTION

Almost three decades have passed since the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement. This document was initialed at Wright Patterson Military Base in Dayton, Ohio on November 21st, 1995. and formally signed on December 14, 1995. in Paris². Although the agreement stopped the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, representatives of the West, generally believe that the act is not a long-term solution, and that it is the result of a compromise reached under the auspices of the international community. The main objective was to end the long war, which was achieved by signing the said act. Due to the latter fact that the international community is of the opinion that the goal has been achieved and a further revision of the agreement for the continued survival of peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina is needed. Bosnia and Herzegovina established in Dayton is often cited as an example of a dysfunctional state. However, a serious impartial analysis shows the opposite, for this agreement provides the functionality of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which has not been recorded in its history. The alleged dysfunctionality discussed persistently stems not from the agreement itself, but from the constant long-standing effort to break Dayton Agreement from within and outside. Given the agreement itself, we claim that the Dayton-Paris Document not only represents the best model for Bosnia and Herzegovina in its history, but also the best peace agreement in the modern history of the Balkans. We can only compare it with the Lausanne Treaty, which ended the conflict between Turkey and Greece in 1923. The Dayton Accords are one of the more successful examples of solutions to armed conflicts in the post-Cold War world. This agreement establishes a model of consociational democracy, which is only possible

2 <http://www.blic.rs/vesti/republika-srpska/Dajtonski-sporazum-21-godinu-posle-dan-kada-je-okoncan-rat-u-bosni-i-hercegovini/p9t8lse>, access date 02. 06 Feb 2017

in divided societies such as Belgium, Switzerland and Bosnia and Herzegovina, unlike the majority of democracy model, which is justified only in societies of homogeneous identities, that is, in countries where there is a single people who can ideologically divide it into majority and minority. On the other hand, the majority model of democracy is not applicable where there are ethnically and religiously divided societies, as it could lead to the exclusion of one group from political decision-making, thereby jeopardizing the survival of the state union. It would be unthinkable for Belgium to survive with the Flemish override of the Walloons. Attempts to override the model of majority democracy in divided societies have already led to armed conflicts, such as the armed conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina provides for a very good model of consociational democracy. There are many elements of consociational democracy in the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina that make this model almost ideal, primarily because of proportional representation and power of veto. The veto barrier precludes the overriding characteristic of the majority model of democracy (Trapara, 2016).

This article presents elements of the agreement that preceded the Dayton Peace Agreement, which later became an integral part of the agreement itself. The consociational democracy model introduced by the Dayton Peace Agreement is the best guarantor that makes impossible for the votes of any people in Bosnia and Herzegovina to be overridden. The author of this article is of the opinion that the Dayton Agreement should therefore be preserved in its original form. The paper also provides some authors' opinions on the Dayton Peace Agreement.

THE DAYTON PEACE AGREEMENT

Institutionalized consociationalism in B&H was established by signing the Dayton-Paris Peace Agreement on December 14th, 1995. The Dayton Peace Agreement was strongly advocated by the United States of America, which actively participated in the creation of the agreement itself. It

was preceded by several unsuccessful attempts to achieve peace, by various international mediators and contact groups. Unsuccessful attempts to achieve peace include the Cutileiro Plan, the Vance-Owen Plan, the Owen-Stoltenberg Plan and the Contact Group Plan.

Although these attempts to reach peace were unsuccessful, they are significant because of the fact that at least one element is incorporated into each of the Dayton agreements. Therefore we will highlight only the most important elements of each proposal for an agreement, which are incorporated into the Dayton Peace Agreement.

The first in a series of attempts to make peace on the territory of B&H is the Cutileiro Plan, which became part of the final agreement, of course, with some modifications and adjustments was the two-party Parliament. According to this plan, two councils were envisaged: the Citizens Council and the Council of Constituent Peoples; its Annex 4 also defines a bicameral Parliament but composed of the House of Representatives and the House of Peoples.

Following the failure of the Cutileiro Plan, in late March 1993, the Co-Presidents of the Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, Cyrus Vance and David Owen, offered a new plan for B&H, according to which the B&H Presidency should be composed of three members, elected representatives of the three peoples, which also represents one of the elements of Annex 4 of the Dayton Agreement ie. of the B&H Constitution. Apart from the B&H Presidency, this proposal has provided another element, namely the B&H Constitutional Court, which has also become part of the Constitution.

This plan envisaged another element that becomes part of Annex 4, namely that the federation has limited minimum competencies that primarily relate to citizenship, freedom of movement for persons, goods and services throughout B&H. As we can see, this principle has been upgraded in the Constitution of B&H and certain powers have been added to it, which were not mentioned in this proposal.

The next attempt to achieve peace in the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina is the Owen-Stoltenberg Plan, which stipulates, among other

things, that there are two areas with special status in B&H, however, ultimately, the Dayton Treaty itself provides for one area with a special status, that is, an area with was seconded to the Republic of Srpska pending a final arbitration award. However, after the final decision, the area becomes de facto and de iure territory with special status, ie. co-ownership (condominium) of both entities (Brcko District). This territory is under the direct jurisdiction of B&H.

Following the Owen-Stoltenberg Plan comes the Washington Agreement, which was accepted by the Muslims and Croats, which formed the Federation of B&H, and whose principles, following the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement, are partly incorporated into the Constitution of the Federation of B&H. Due to this fact, here we will only mention basic terms the importance of this agreement, as well as mention only those parts of the mentioned agreement contained in the present Constitution of the Federation of B&H.

The Washington Agreement has one specificity, namely that it starts from the fact that B&H is an internationally recognized entity, as well as the fact that the USA itself, without European partners, played a mediating role in achieving it. As for the FB&H Constitution itself, it had two goals that were political in nature: the transformation of the state system of the state from a simple or unitary state into a federal or complex state, and the second objective was the reintegration of B&H within its borders, with the invitation to legitimate representatives of the Serbian nations to accept the said project.

Namely, with the adoption of the Constitution of the Federation of B&H from 1994, in the transition period in the territory of the FB&H two mutually different constitutional systems were established. The FB&H constitutional system, which was to ensure that the Federation of B&H was reformed on federal principles as part of the constitutional system of the Republic of B&H, which, unlike the former, implies a single (unitary) state with a high degree of decentralization in terms of state organization. According to Kasim Begic, there is no collision between the two constitutional systems (Begic, 1997).

According to the Dayton Peace Agreement, the Federation of B&H is one of two equal entities in B&H, and we are of the opinion that since the Republic of B&H ceased to exist as an independent legal entity after the signing of that agreement, Kasim Begic's position can only be accepted in order to reach a peace agreement. B&H, because, as we have already stated, it is indisputable that B&H is a complex state (federation *sui generis*) in character, not a single (unitary) state.

By implementing Partial Decision No. U 5/98 III of the Constitutional Court of B&H on the constitution of peoples in 2000, the proportional representation of all three constituent peoples was ensured, which contributed to the strengthening of consocial democracy in B&H.

Legislative power in the Federation is the Parliament of Federation of B&H, consisting of the House of Representatives and the House of Peoples. The House of Representatives consists of twenty-eight members, with one of the constituent peoples being represented in that House with at least four members. The House of Peoples consists of fifty-eight delegates, seventeen each from the constituent peoples and seven Others.

In the aforementioned community, the President and the two Vice-Presidents are elected from the accepted joint list of three candidates for President and Vice-Presidents of the Federation, by a majority of votes in the House of Representatives and then by a majority in the House of Peoples, including the majority of each constituent people's club.

The election of the Government of the Federation is also aligned with the Partial Decision of the Constitutional Court of B&H on the constitution peoples of 2000, with the confirmation of its election by the House of Representatives of the Federation of B&H. The mandate for the composition of the new Government is given by the President of the Federation with the consent of both Vice-Presidents. The Government is composed of the Prime Minister and sixteen ministers, including eight Bosniak ministers, five Croat ministers, and three Serb ministers. One minister may be appointed by the Prime Minister from the quota of the largest constituent people. The government also has two deputies from different constituent peoples, who are elected among ministers.

As in the Washington Agreement, this federal unit is envisaged to have a Constitutional Court and a Supreme Court. The provisions on the Court of Human Rights ceased to apply, in accordance with Amendment LII on 28th July 2002. The composition of the Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court ensures equal representation of all three constituent peoples, as well as the representation of «Others». Unless otherwise provided in the Constitution, the decisions of the Federation Parliament require the approval of both Houses. Laws and decisions are made by a simple majority in each Home. Laws and other vital national interest issues need the support of 2/3 of each of the constituent peoples clubs in the House of Peoples.

The agreement, signed in Vienna at a conference held from 7 to 11 May 1994, laid down the principles for the formation of Cantons, stipulated that municipalities with a majority Croat and Muslim population were included in the said units. The map provides for eight federal units (Cantons). The Federation of B&H today has ten Cantons. By establishing the constituent peoples, the Constitution of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina defines as an entity of three constituent peoples and others, and is composed of 10 federal units (Cantons).

After the Washington Agreement another series of failed attempts to achieve lasting peace in B&H occurred. This attempt, called the Contact Group Plan, contains one of the very important elements of the Dayton Agreement, which is the allocation of territory between the entities. This agreement provides that 49% of the territory of B&H belongs to the Serbian people, and 51% of the remaining state territory falls to the other two peoples in B&H.

The Dayton Peace Agreement envisages a complete change of B&H's state system, transforming it from a former unitary system into a complex state. This transformation was necessary, since the unitary system hitherto was unsustainable due to the rise of negative nationalism (chauvinism) on all three sides.

International community led by US was becoming aware that Bosnia and Herzegovina cannot be maintained within borders estab-

lished during WWII without the change of the state structure of the former federal unit withih SFRY. Of course, local leaders were aware of this. The need for B&H decentralization dates long before and did not arise as the sole consequence of the conflict in B&H. With that in mind, US diplomats had prepared a peace conference in Dayton. Respecting the situation on the ground and the existence of the Bosniak-Croat federation, established in 1994 by the Washington Agreement and Republika Srpska, which declared independence in 1992. The United States was preparing a conference through shuttle diplomacy, implemented solely to create possible solutions. Before the Dayton negotiations began the US Department of State has compiled a Book of Scenarios, in which it stated in clause 4 that under the future Constitution there would remain a single state composed of two federal units, one of which would consist of the Serb majority and the other Croat-Bosniak, and that details would be agreed by the warring parties through negotiations. Prior to the agreement itself, the basic principles of September 1995 were agreed, i.e. the Geneva and New York principles. In the light of the foregoing, we shall summarize these two principles and all eleven annexes to this Agreement and explain the substance of each annex:

- Annex 1-A
 - Military aspects of the peace settlement
 - NATO-SOFA Bosnia and Related Cover Letters
 - NATO-SOFA Croatia
 - NATO-SOFA FRY
- Annex 1-B - Regional Stabilization
- Annex 2 – Inter Entity Border Line
- Annex 3 – Elections
- Annex 4 – Constitution
- Annex 5 – Arbitration
- Annex 6 - Human rights
- Annex 7 - Refugees and Displaced Persons
- Annex 8 - Commission to Preserve National Monuments

- Annex 9 - Public corporations of Bosnia and Herzegovina
- Annex 10 - Civil Enforcement
- Annex 11 - International Police Forces

Geneva principles

The Geneva Principles (September 8, 1995) agreed that B&H would continue to exist within its borders. B&H will consist of two territorial units: the FB&H (constituted by the Washington Agreement) and the Republika Srpska. The basis for this solution was the Contact Group proposal, with the percentage of territories among the entities being 51:49 in favor of the FB&H. This proportion was offered for reconciliation by mutual agreement. It is stated that each entity will continue to exist with its existing Constitution, which will of course be amended or supplemented through these basic principles.

What is very important is that both entities have the right to establish special and parallel relations with neighboring countries. Both territorial units have an obligation to respect international human rights standards and to allow freedom of movement and allow displaced persons to recover their pre-war property or to pay fair compensation. Also, entities must engage in binding arbitration to resolve mutual disputes.

New York principles

The Geneva Principles are followed by the New York Principles (September 26, 1995), where it was determined that each Entity would respect the international commitments of B&H, which they had jointly undertaken, but that this would not include obligations assumed by one Entity without the consent of the other. The goal of holding a free and democratic election is set when the social conditions are met. In order for the elections to be democratic, it was stated that both entities must implement certain measures, including the facilitation of free movement, restitution of property to displaced persons or payment of fair compensa-

tion, then the protection of all human rights in order to hold democratic elections.

After the election, all state affairs will be the responsibility of the state authorities. State bodies include the Parliamentary Assembly, with two-thirds of MPs from the Croat-Muslim Federation and the remaining third from Republic of Srpska, then the Presidency, which also uses the same proportions when electing members. All decisions of the Presidency shall be taken by majority vote, except where at least one third or more of the members are not satisfied with the said decision. In this case, the disputed issues will be forwarded to the Parliament of the entities from which the member comes. Unless Parliament confirms it by a qualified majority of two-thirds, no such decision by the Presidency will be implemented. The Constitutional Court decides on violations of the constitutionality and legality of the Constitution, which will be revised in accordance with the agreed basic principles. All these institutions will be responsible for B&H's foreign policy, and the parties will negotiate other competencies of these institutions in accordance with the basic principles.

Annex 1-A

The Agreement on the Military Aspects of the Peace Agreement (1A) obliges the signatories to establish as soon as possible the conditions for a normal life in B&H with the assistance of international multinational military forces composed of ground, air and naval units that are members of the NATO Pact and those that do not belong to that Alliance, and which are deployed in the territory of that State. The main task of multinational forces, according to the agreement, is to establish peace and ceasefire, which states that no entity will threaten or use force against another entity. Also, the military forces of one of the entities will not enter the territory of the other without authorization or the approval of the government of that territory or the B&H Presidency. All B&H military forces will function in accordance with the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the state. The

Parties also undertake to provide support to IFOR's mandate. This applies in particular to the competence of international forces to take the necessary force, if necessary, to ensure the implementation of the agreements and their own protection in order to establish lasting peace and arms control in the territory of that State.

Annex 1-B

Annex 1-B covers the general obligations of the Parties to establish measures for regional stability and arms control, all with a view to establishing a stable peace in the region and creating confidence and security within B&H. Negotiations related to this agreement were conducted under the auspices of the OSCE, followed by confidence-building measures and arms control mechanisms, including a 5: 2: 2 limitation for the countries of the region: FRY, Croatia and B&H, and for B&H the ratio is 2: 1. The main objective of this annex is to establish a balance within the former Yugoslavia in the function of regional stabilization.

Annex 2 (Inter Entity Border Line)

This agreement contains the state structure of B&H, ie. the internal borders of the Republic of Srpska and the FB&H as provided by the topographic line 1: 50000 in the appendix as an integral part of the document. Also, this Annex provides for binding arbitration for the Brcko area whose termination under the agreement should be at least one year after the agreement enters into force.

Annex 3 (Election Agreement)

This agreement assumes that the elections are for the sake of achieving democracy quickly in B&H. It also contains the obligations of the parties to create the preconditions for democratic and fair elections, as well as the OSCE's mandate to adopt and establish an election program

on the territory of the state within six months, at the latest, ten months after the entry into force of the agreement. Also, this agreement defines other conditions such as the voting body, active and passive voting rights, as well as the manner of exercising electoral rights and the obligation to organize elections at the state and entity levels, and if conditions are created at the local level.

Annex 4 (B&H Constitution)

What is specific about this Annex in relation to the others is the omission of the name agreement. This Annex is, in fact, a constitutional document that contains all the elements of the constitutional structure of a complex state. It proceeds from the state continuity of B&H and international subjectivity within internationally recognized borders with a change in internal organization and distribution of competences between B&H and its entities. It defines the state as federation *sui generis*. Bearing in mind that the B&H Constitution is the highest legal and political act, which means that it is above all laws in the country, ie. all lower legal acts from him must comply with it.

Accordingly, it is stipulated that within three months after the entry into force of the Constitution, the Entities are obliged to harmonize their constitutional acts with the Constitution of B&H, ie. with its Article III (3) (b) (Begić, 1997).

Interestingly, the US Constitution has methodologically served as a model in the drafting of the B&H Constitution. When analyzing the text of the B&H Constitution, many similarities are seen with the US Constitution, which is largely a copy of it. Article 9.2 deals with a matter which is not of a constitutional nature, and stipulates that no compensation may be reduced for persons holding titles in state administration during their service. This text is, in fact, a rewritten Amendment 27 to the US Constitution, which states that no law changing the remuneration of senators and other presidents will enter into force until a new presidential election is made.³

³ www.predsjednikrs.net, accessed on 2/17/2015

Annex 5 (Arbitration Agreement)

Basically, the text of the Geneva Principles was taken over and represents only in principle the obligation of the Entities with regard to the arbitrary operationalization of the two determinants. The mechanism for resolving state-level arbitration disputes is elaborated here, so that the impact of international arbitration is significantly reduced, especially in the context of the overall peace package.

Annex 6 (Human Rights Agreement)

In this Agreement, the Parties undertake to ensure to all citizens within their jurisdiction the highest level of human rights and fundamental freedoms provided for in the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, as well as in other international agreements listed in the Annex to this Agreement, and where the 1948 Convention on the Protection and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide is incorporated. Under the Agreement, the Human Rights Commission presented an institutional framework for the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms throughout B&H, which involves working together with both governmental and non-governmental organizations to protect and advance those rights.

Annex 7 (Agreement on Refugees and Displaced Persons)

This is one of the most fundamental agreements in the whole Agreement and is intended to mitigate the effects of ethnic persecution during the war. It has an irreplaceable role in consolidating peace in this region. This Agreement guarantees to all refugees and displaced persons the right to repossession of confiscated property or, if this is not possible, the right to just compensation for the same. One of the obligations of the Parties under this Agreement is to create in their territories political, economic and social conditions that will contribute to the process of return,

harmonization and reintegration of refugees and displaced persons without giving preferential status to any ethnic group.

***Annex 8 (Agreement on the Commission to Preserve
National Monuments)***

This Annex establishes a Commission for the Preservation of National Monuments, which endeavors to take appropriate legal, scientific, technical, administrative and financial measures necessary for the protection, conservation and rehabilitation of objects representing these monuments (Popovic & Lukic, 1999).

***Annex 9 (Agreement on Establishment of B&H Public
Corporations)***

This Annex is based on the fact that, under the Constitution, B&H is a single market. Its basic task is to create the preconditions for the revival of economic flows and the smooth functioning of the institutions and organizations tasked with being active in the implementation of the peace agreement. What is important to note is that this agreement made two important steps. First, that a Public Corporation for the Functioning of Transport was formed to organize traffic capacities such as railways, ports, roads, etc. Second, this agreement establishes a Public Corporations Commission, which also includes international members appointed by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, with the task of considering the establishment of public corporations for the management of electricity, water, energy, PTT and utility services.

Annex 10 (Civilian implementation)

Civil implementation refers to the request of the parties to appoint a High Representative whose mandate relates to the implementation of the civilian aspects of the peace agreement and involves two tasks: facil-

itating the efforts of the parties in fulfilling their obligations under the agreement or its annexes, and mobilizing and coordinating the activities of organizations and agencies involved in the peace agreement. implementation of the civilian aspects of the peace agreement.

Annex 11 (Agreement on International Police Forces)

Annex 11 uses as its starting point that the parties have pledged to provide a safe and secure environment for all persons in the areas under their control. The Parties are required to cooperate with the United Nations International Police Force (IPTF). In order to provide these forces with a program of assistance and fulfill their obligations, the said program includes monitoring, observing and inspecting law enforcement facilities and activities, advising and training law enforcement personnel, assessing threats to public order and peace, advising state authorities in organizing effective agencies enforcing laws, assisting with law enforcement, participating directly with domestic police forces, and specifically assisting parties in meeting their obligations, which is primarily about creating conditions for holding democratic elections.

Opinions of some of the authors on the Dayton Peace Agreement

Of particular interest is the opinion of Richard Holbrooke that the Dayton Peace Agreement has been one of the most perfect agreements of international law since the end of World War II. The point is to understand it through implementing it. Holbrooke is otherwise considered the creator of the agreement itself, which ended the bloody war in B&H. The success of this document in stopping the war conflict is seen by many in the fact that the agreement radically changed the state system. B&H has transformed from a unitary (simple) to a federal (complex) state.⁴

Professor Emil Vlajki says Dayton peace accord is the most impor-

⁴ www.predsjednikrs.net, датум приступа 17. 02. 2015. год.

tant peace agreement has brought to B&H, but agreement is in fact the great deception of the West. He also emphasizes that the West initiated a war in this area for geo-strategic reasons and had to end it in his neo-colonialist manner. After such a war drains a country, reconstruction must be made in order to recycle the capital of the West and put the state in a colony position. Thus, after the end of the war, the West had about 100,000 of its men, in the capacity of soldiers, administration, police and other roles, which at the moment significantly reduced the unemployment of the current masters of the world. He also states that Western capital recycling was done through various aid programs, where he exclusively hired his own companies to raise aid funds. Vlajki notes that 1996 was an election year in the US, so it was helpful for Clinton to appear as a peacemaker in the face of public opinion. All in all, these small-scale war arrangements, which are occasionally extinguished and set on fire, have the economic function of sustaining capitalism. He also believes that Dayton is important primarily because it gave practically country to the Serb people in B&H. This is the greatest treasure that Serbs all have together and should not be lost in any way.⁵

However, it is clear that due to pressure from foreign actors rather than the product of a basic internal consensus, the parties to the conflict have agreed to establish a complex federation that has mechanisms of consociational democracy. These are parity, mutual veto and segment autonomy. The governments of the entities and the Council of Ministers are formed on the basis of large coalitions formed by representatives of Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats. Such a B&H with a strong national-federal structure is not a classical society, but rather a political system with three ethnic communities.

It follows from all the foregoing that the parties to the conflict agreed to sign the Agreement due to pressure from the major powers, among which was the United States. What is important to note is that the Constitutional Consociation established by Annex 4 to this Agreement made it possible to end the conflict and establish democratic forms of government. This is the greatest success of this Agreement.

⁵ <https://www.blogger.com/profile/05822920267673861308>, accessed 19.02.2015. god.

INFERENCE

The signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement was preceded by years of dilemma in European and American diplomacy. Numerous proposals for reaching an agreement were not adopted during this process, but parts of them eventually became part of the Dayton agreement, with the exception of the Washington Agreement establishing the FB&H, and their contributions incorporated in the final act.

From the Cutileiro Plan was taken, with some modifications and adjustments, a part defining the bicameral Parliament. The Cutileiro Plan provides for two councils: the Citizens Council and the Constitutional Peoples Council, and Annex 4 of the Dayton Peace Agreement to the House of Representatives and the House of Peoples.

Parts of the Vance-Owen Plan were incorporated into the Dayton Peace Agreement, namely that the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina should be composed of three members, ie. elected representatives of the three constituent peoples and the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

From the Owen-Stoltenberg Plan was taken the part that regulated the existence of a special status area in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The Constitution of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which is an integral part of the Dayton Peace Agreement, incorporates the basic principles of the Washington Agreement.

Following the Washington Agreement another series of failed attempts to achieve lasting peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina occurred. This attempt, called the Contact Group Plan, contains one of the very important elements of the Dayton Agreement, which is the allocation of territory between the entities.

Prior to the agreement itself, the basic principles of September 1995 were agreed, namely the Geneva and New York principles, which were drafted into the agreement. The Geneva Principles (08. September, 1995) agreed that Bosnia and Herzegovina would continue to exist within its borders and consist of two territorial units: the Federation of Bosnia

and Herzegovina (constituted by the Washington Agreement) and the Republika Srpska.

The New York Principles stipulate that all state affairs will fall under the authority of state authorities.

It follows from all of the above that the Dayton Peace Agreement is the result of the synthesis of the arbitration process, which established institutionalized socialism in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

As we can see, the Dayton Peace Agreement is the result of years of continuous diplomatic activity aimed at finding a lasting solution for peace in B&H. The process itself was marked by proposals for peace that came one after the other, and from each one a part of the elements was provided until an acceptable framework was found for all three peoples.

It follows from all of the above that the Dayton Peace Agreement is the result of the agreement of the political representatives of the constituent peoples in B&H, with the intervention of great powers.

But notwithstanding the fact that the implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement was altered primarily by the imposition by the so-called international community and then by the Constitutional Court of B&H, continues to make the agreement the most acceptable solution for peace in B&H, with the need to consistently apply (the letter) of Dayton, and not further elaborate on the act referring to the (spirit) of the agreement, because this is a necessary condition for the survival of the consociational model of democracy, which is necessary for the survival of B&H as a state.

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