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# The New Culture of The Global Security Paradigm

The Rise of Autocratic Populism and a New Islamic Culture of Rebellion

NedZad Basic\*

“As a consequence of growing economic global interdependence, domestic conflict over welfare and the economic and coercive structure of the internal welfare system can no longer be isolated from the struggle between states and the imperatives of global market competition that work to redistribute wealth and material capabilities among states.” (Edward A. Kolodziejew)

## Abstract

The relationships between the strategic interests of the numerous global actors and their power of influence on interactions between their interests globally, today are in the process of turbulence and change. In this system where power and military force are assigned to the state at the national level, and definitely separated from one another at the global level, the issue of surviving of the individual (group) grows into the determining factor of the global security paradigm in this millennium. In this dual global security paradigm, the economic and democratic development of the state becomes the main reference for the survival of the individual (group) with a focus on common awareness about the common interest of humankind. The creation of global awareness of the survival of an individual (group) in the global community becomes a decisive dimension of the new culture of the global security paradigm.

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## Global Structural Changes

The development of molecular biology, genetic engineering, biotechnology, nanotechnology, new materials, information technology (IT), cloning of living organisms, artificial intelligence, robotics ..., are the processes of global structural change in the 21st century. In these global structural changes, the major factors of production shift from land, labor and capital to creative knowledge, creative human mobility and creative capital mobility, forming a “global production” based on the fusion of knowledge, talent, innovation and technology.

The process of global structural changes is more complex than innovation and the fusion of new technologies and the creation of new products. Questions about how business processes are integrated, how corporations and institutions are managed, how knowledge is transferred, and how public policy is shaped, are also part of global structural change. Through these processes, a system of global production and system of global governance is created. New links between global production, innovations and integrations are also established. The nature of state sovereignty has been gradually changed, as is the nature of relations between states and other participants in global relations. A new culture of global security paradigm is emerging, blurring the boundaries between the physical, digital and biological spheres of humanity.<sup>1</sup>

Global structural changes requires a departure from the classic “discourse of danger” and the classical concept of international relations based on mistrust, cheating, threats, force and power. Global structural change requires a new “communitarian discourse”, in which the global security paradigm is viewed through the prism of interests and goals of different cultures, traditions, religions and different interpretations of the historical reality of the survival of individuals and groups.<sup>2</sup> This concept of a “global security paradigm” refuses to view global security in terms of universal anarchy and power, where politics of force is viewed as the solution to the survival of the state. The new culture of the global security paradigm seeks global interests and goals, as well as a shared global value system, shared global awareness and responsibility within the global system of surviving.<sup>3</sup>

In this global security paradigm, which is evolving from the relationship between knowledge, innovation, and integration, on the one hand, and the

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<sup>1</sup>Klaus Schwab, *The Fourth Industrial Revolution*, December 12, 2015.

<sup>2</sup>Buzan Barry (1991), *New Concept of Global Security*, *International Affairs*, Vol. 67, No. 3(Jul., 1991

<sup>3</sup>Baylis John & Steve Smith (2005), *The Globalization of World Politics*, Oxford University Press, p315)

conflict of interest of the state and society (individuals), on the other, a new decision-making matrix has been established through moving decision-making from the state level to influence of the state on decision-making at the supranational level.

In these changes, the international system is gradually transformed into a global system, in which conflict between states is increasingly shifting to the area of internal conflict between the state and society (individual), as a new type of global social conflict. The link between global production and the nation-state with a sensitive matrix of decision-making also calls for new accountability locally and globally.<sup>4</sup>

These changes inherently involve many participants in the global network (states, multinational corporations, transnational commercial banks (TCBs), international organizations and institutions, public media, the church, ethnic and religious movements, terrorist and criminal networks...).

A large number of participants in the global economy are imposing a new model of expanding power among them, creating a new model of global interdependence, seeking a new balance between the strategic interests of states, international organizations and institutions such as the EU, IMF, WTO, World Bank. non-governmental organizations, multinational corporations.<sup>5</sup>

Although the state is directly involved in the creation of many global actors, especially in the formation of global organizations and institutions, in financing their activities and in controlling their normative power, the state is unable to control the influence of these actors on the interaction of strategic interests at the global level. This weakness of the state, caused by global structural changes, changes the essence of the state and the relations between the states themselves, changes the nature of relations between states and global actors, and the nature of relations between the state and individuals. These changes urgently require a rethinking of the role of the state in global production.

Technological development, abandoned trade barriers, high levels of capital mobility, reduced transportation and communications costs, on the one hand, and increased global financial instability, environmental disasters, growing social frustrations, cultural and religious anxieties of marginalized social and religious groups, significantly increased inequality among individuals and by community, the rise of dictatorship and autocratic

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<sup>4</sup>Joseph S. Nye, Jr. & John D. Donahue (eds), *Governance in Globalizing World*, Brookings Institution Press, Washington D.C. (1999)

<sup>5</sup>Brooks Stephen G. (2005), *Producing Security: Multinational Corporations, Globalization and the Changing Calculus of Conflict*, Princeton University Press, Princeton and Oxford, p23

governments, on the other hand, has brought about the dramatic impact of global structural change on the nature of the global security paradigm of the early 21st century.

Technological innovation and automation have had a major impact on labor markets. The relationship between producers and consumers has changed. The use of new technologies and automation will result in lower job security and a steady increase in wage differentials between highly skilled and low skilled workers, leading to social tension. In these changes, the alliance between investment capital and intellectual property emerges as a major promoter of the new concept of global development. In this environment there is a growing sense of dissatisfaction and injustice in the middle class in the labor market. The rapid rise of aggressive populism, with ideologies of unrealistic change in the global political arena, requires a new global business platform and a new culture of global economic and political order.<sup>6</sup>

Global structural changes have also led to new risks and challenges in the global community, changing the structure and nature of conflicts in the late 20th and early 21st centuries. Mass migration,<sup>7</sup> poverty and hunger on a dramatic global scale, sensitive intracommunal antagonisms and conflicts, the emergence of weak and corrupt governments, a growing transnational criminal system, growing global terrorist networks, dramatic environmental changes, the spread of infectious diseases, have fueled the renaissance of nationalism and the extreme religious fanaticism, which significantly strengthened authoritarian populism, as a new challenge to the global security paradigm.

The concept of business collaboration, innovation organization, producer-customer relationships, and individual and group expectations has changed dramatically. The global economic, financial, technological, cultural and political platform is rapidly changing in this new environment at the beginning of the 21st century. The new power structure evolves from an interactive competitive relationship between states, corporations, global economic and financial structures and new technological changes, with an emphasis on the survival of the individual (group) as a deciding factor in the new culture of the global security paradigm.

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<sup>6</sup>Klaus Schwab, *The Fourth Industrial Revolution: What It Means and How to Respond* (<https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/01/the-fourth-industrial-revolution-what-it-means-and-how-to-respond/>)

<sup>7</sup>According to the United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR) the number of refugees and internally displaced people has reached its highest point since World War II. It is estimated that more than 65 million people because local armed conflict, of social violence, persecution, conflict, human rights violations, poverty, climate changes, joblessness, lack of social prosperity contribute in large scale to the phenomena of migration.

## New Global Changes in Sight

From the 1950s to the early 1970s, the concept of “full employment” was targeted by the developed country government. Large corporations and governments shared a common strategy that they adapted to the rapid growth of information technology as a driver for the growth of the overall economy. During this period, public and private institutions had sufficient space to act in the most efficient way. The concept of “full employment” led to an increase in wages, which led to an increase in commodity prices, resulting in “cost inflation.” “Cost inflation” leads to a real decline in the value of debt and a fall in corporate profits. The share of the workforce in national income has been a steady upward trend with the strengthening of trade unions and the reduction of income inequality.

In order to suppress inflation and to valorise the value of debt and to introduce discipline into the labor market through the “unemployment” mechanism, the concept of “price stability” was introduced in the late 1970s. The introduction of this concept into the economy revives the confidence of creditors and investors. The share of capital in national income is increasing, while the share of labor in national income is decreasing. Wages are stagnant and productivity is rising. Unions have been weakened. The increase in wages has been reduced by restrictive legislation and the globalization of production. Parliaments lose importance as central banks and technocratic politicians take control of the economy from those elected to rule.<sup>8</sup>

A global system of trade in goods and services has been created, with free fluctuation of capital, free investment, free flow of information and technologies and free movement of people, with the full support of international institutions. A neoliberal structure of the global economy has been created in which the most severe forms of poverty will gradually disappear. But new problems have also been created that will later lead to the collapse of the neoliberal concept of the global economy.

Huge social differences have been created, gradually creating a new global social gap with greater inequality between rich and poor people, which is more salient than ever before, which in turn will lead to increased social tensions. The gap between the world’s poorest and richest countries increased from 3 times in 1820 to 72 times in 1992. At the same time, the income gap between the richest and poorest population groups in rich countries increased from 30 to 74 times in the same period, At the beginning of the 21st century, the 35 richest people in the world controlled

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<sup>8</sup>Mark Blyth, *Why Trump’s Victory Was 30 Years in the Making and Why It Won’t Stop Here*, Foreign Affairs, Snapshot November 15, 2016.

more capital than the 3.5 billion poor.<sup>9</sup>

“The largest beneficiaries of innovation tend to be the providers of intellectual and physical capital—the innovators, shareholders, and investors—which explains the rising gap in wealth between those dependent on capital versus labor. Automatisation and technology is therefore one of the main reasons why incomes have stagnated, or even decreased, for a majority of the population in high-income countries: the demand for highly skilled workers has increased while the demand for workers with less education and lower skills has decreased. The result is a job market with a strong demand at the high and low ends, but a hollowing out of the middle... It also helps explain why middle classes around the world are increasingly experiencing a pervasive sense of dissatisfaction and unfairness. A winner-takes-all economy that offers only limited access to the middle class is a recipe for democratic malaise and dereliction.”<sup>10</sup>

A global cross-border alliance between powerful and rich people has already been created. Marginalized, powerless and poor people who cannot connect remain isolated within national borders. The polarization between rich and poor people has grown into a global phenomenon of a global liberal economy with indications of a global conflict between a “culture of domination and arrogance” on the one hand and a “culture of fear and rebellion” on the other. The conflict between these two cultures grows into a new global “hate culture” that leads to social conflict on a global scale. The necessity of redistributing the benefits of “global structural change” between the poor and the rich becomes a central problem of the “global security paradigm” by the end of the 20th century.

The growing gap between “expectations and opportunities” has produced a great polarization between traditional political culture and postmodern cultural values, creating a sense of insecurity for “identity survival.” The inability of the state to ensure “identity survival” will create a sense of loyalty of people to ethnic / religious groups rather than to the state, leading to a “state identity” crisis. Conflict with the “religious and ethnic identity” paradigm points to the essential links between different types of conflict, whose nature is often determined by the discrepancy between expected social security and the failure of the state to provide individuals (groups) with a sense of “survival.”

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<sup>9</sup>The World Economic Forum, 2014 (<https://www.weforum.org/events/world-economic-forum-annual-meeting-2014>).

<sup>10</sup>Klaus Schwab, *The Fourth Industrial Revolution: What It Means and How to Respond* (<https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/01/the-fourth-industrial-revolution-what-it-means-and-how-to-respond/>)

Already at the beginning of the 21st century, every segment of the global neoliberal economy will face fierce criticism. Free trade and free movement of capital will be blamed for widening the gap between the richest and the poorest. The ideal of free flow of information will clash with the ideal of privacy of privileged elites. Freedom of movement for people will be accompanied by fear of migration from the poor to the rich, while the freedom of technological progress will be responsible for the new wave of digital-cyber terrorism. Increasingly, new horizons are opening up for the future of humanity, with which a global “culture of fear” and a global “culture of hatred” are increasingly being created, leading to increasing isolationism and new divisions among people.

The UK wants to leave the EU, which will be a major victory for anti-globalism, nationalism and nativism. US adopts strategy: “America first.” This will force them to leave international organizations such as the “Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP),” the North American Free Trade Agreement, “the” Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership “, which opens a period of new isolationism. Distrust and fear” are created between the richest nations . The richest are increasingly afraid of each other. They fear for their future in collaboration with one another. They fear losing their own identity in the face of poor and rebellious migrants seeking survival. Tendencies to isolationism and self-interest in the richest countries lead to restrictions on the free flow of information, research and the availability of new technologies for all, which will further disrupt the global liberal economic order.

The changes taking place in the richest countries significantly diminish the credibility and influence of international institutions on emerging economic and technological developments, making them less and less influential on the fate of marginalized countries and nations. These changes lead to more direct conflict between the poor, who seek minimum living conditions, and the wealthy political elites, the directors of large MNCs and large transnational banks, the directors of estranged funds and the extremely wealthy dictators.<sup>11</sup>

These changes has been followed by a sharp decline in production.

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<sup>11</sup>Putin’s wealth is estimated at \$40 billion. Maha Vajiralongkorn king of Thailand controls more than \$30 billion. The Hassanal Bolkiah Sultan of Brunei has \$20 billion in personal wealth, while Khalifa bin Zayed al Nahyan, president of the U.A.E, and his deputy, Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum, have joint assets worth more than \$25 billion. They are followed by Mohammed VI King of Morocco, Salman bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud, King of Saudi Arabia, and others from the countries of gas and oil, which are not far behind. Behind their heels, Western tycoons are led by Donald Trump, the president of the United States, Hans-Adams, the Prince of Liechtenstein, Sebastian Pinera, former president of Chile, and other Western political leaders. All of them are firmly bound in the covenant by the eager desire to increase and preserve their wealth, which implies that they remain in power.

Trade in products and services is growing, leading to a sharp rise in prices. The number of manufacturing jobs in developed countries is declining. Automation, artificial intelligence, computerization and sensors are increasingly removing lower-level manufacturing workers and employees from the manufacturing process. As a result, there has been a sharp decline in wages, credit borrowing and a decline in the standard of living of the middle class, which is increasingly losing its social and political positions, and social cohesion and power. Workers' protests and demands for livelihoods are increasingly common. Where workers are organized into trade unions, primarily in France, Germany, the Netherlands and Scandinavia, changes in the tax system are sought in order to redistribute social wealth. Changes in the social security system, higher spending of national income on education and retraining of workers are being sought. Where unions were not powerful enough, most notably in the UK and the US, there was a huge difference in the wages and living standards of the population.

In this environment, there is increasing pressure from creditors on the over-indebted mass of people who are unable to repay loans. As debtors cannot pay their debt but are entitled to vote. Struggles for debtors' votes have transferred numerous political parties to parties with a populist character. With a rigid electoral program, but with an anti-government, nationalist and anti-immigrant agenda, populist rhetoric grows into a driver of social changes in the early 21st century. The inability of the government and ruling elites to finally find a way out of a depressed economic situation and put in place an effective mechanism to stop criminal corruption, which is increasingly affecting the highest institutions of government, reducing unemployment, halting the immigrant wave and further widening the gap between rich and poor. will be a major force in the growth of conservative and authoritarian populism.<sup>12</sup>

In this new political climate, corrupt, criminalized and disinterested authorities and the ruling political elite will face conservative populist groups seeking to guarantee security under the auspices of a powerful authoritarian government capable of incorporating sufficient nationalism into the system. religious and ideological allegiances of individuals and groups, marginalize or completely eliminate political opposition, derogate or completely destroy civil society institutions, neutralize public media and sharpen the issue of patriotism and self-censorship in order to completely eliminate the possibility of public scrutiny and critical treatment of the new populist (People's) Government. The lack of power and interest of the political elite

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<sup>12</sup>Mark Blyth, *Global Trampism*, Foreign Affairs, November 15, 2016

to eliminate any inability will support anger and rebellion among those excluded from the production process and pushed to the margins of the labor market.

Neoliberal globalization has also been accused of violating the national sovereignty of the state. This moves the conflict between the labor market and technological change into the political arena. The clash of neoliberal globalization and state sovereignty will directly impose the problem of migration, which will turn into a “cultural identity” issue as the most sensitive issue of globalization. The issue of “cultural identity” will also attract the attention of those who have been privileged in the neoliberal system of globalization. The new conflict between globalization and “cultural identity” will set off a large wave of populism that will first reach the most developed and then peripheral countries.

Populism will push the country into the center of the global economy, which is now entering the markets as one of the decisive players. However, the problem is that the state and political elites cannot directly change the situation on the labor market. The force shaping the labor market is technological change and automation, which is expanding to peripheral countries, where low wages and low production costs cease to be comparative advantages. A new role for the state is now being sought, both in managing economic processes and in controlling competition in the global market. Thus, populism is gradually being profiled in the context of the relationship between economics and technology. The world economy is gradually beginning to transform itself from a global economic community into a new economic order, with a new model of the world economy, with new regulations and new interests of participants in cross-border competitive relations.<sup>13</sup>

### **Internal Coherence of Populism**

The neoliberal economy expanded opportunities for exporters, multinational corporations, investors, and international banks, as well as for managers and professional groups that could take advantage of larger markets.

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<sup>13</sup>“In PwC’s 19th Annual Global CEO Survey, only 35 percent of the corporate leaders who responded said they believe the world is moving toward greater economic union. Instead, 59 percent of these chief executives believe that multiple models will coexist and compete. Consider, for example, how differently government and business investment is conducted in the United States, China, India, Japan, and the European Union. These nations and regions operate with fundamentally different assumptions about the way an economy should be organized. The tension among these assumptions is growing, not diminishing.” (Dennis Chesley, Miles Everson, and John Garvey, “Global Power Shift,” *Global Perspective* (2018).

But globalization has also triggered internal inequalities and divisions. It has caused multiple internal conflicts between capital and labor, skilled and unskilled workers, employers and employees, global and local producers and professionals, industries, regions with comparative advantages and those without, cities and villages, cosmopolitan and local elites and ordinary people.<sup>14</sup> Although globalization has opened many opportunities for developed and underdeveloped nations, it has also produced numerous economic hardships and discomforts, which have increasingly led to major social upheavals in the early 21st century. Many countries have been devastated by the financial crisis and the austerity effects.

The introduction of new technologies into production, the creation of a global economy and the global market, and the drastic growth of differences in the standard of living of people, increasingly expressed the need for a new form of distributive justice and equity in the redistribution of social wealth in the relations of states and between communities, groups and individuals. By transferring jurisdiction over important issues from economic, monetary and regulatory policy to institutions beyond public control, the issue of distributive justice remains beyond public control. It causes economic and political tension between the individuals and the groups, which creates political conflicts, encourages nationalism and extremism with different forms, intensity and effects of action.<sup>15</sup>

Social change is looking for new political power and political leaders who are able to solve the emerging difficulties and provide wider opportunities for the living standards of the marginalized population. In aggressive populist rhetoric, authoritarian populism is slowly turning into a social force in democratic parliamentary elections. In Europe, populist parties dominate parliaments in Greece, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Slovakia and Switzerland, while in Finland, Norway and Lithuania form part of the governing coalitions. In Southeast Asia, the United States, Turkey, Russia, China and some Latin American countries, populist movements are increasingly visible, giving much momentum to conservative nationalism, patriotism, and distinctly dissonant political parties.

However, the rise of populism at the very beginning of the 21st century is not just a consequence of neoliberal globalization, as most authors point out. New technologies, new forms of production and investment, changes

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<sup>14</sup>Dani Rodrik, *Populism and the Economics of Globalization*, *Journal of International Business Policy* (2018)

<sup>15</sup>In *The Virtue of Nationalism*, Yoram Hazony contends that a world of sovereign nations is the only option for those who care about personal and collective freedom. Yoram Hazony, *The Virtue of Nationalism*, (New York: Basic Books, 2018).

in monetary and financial policies and religions all play an important role in the global rise of populism.

Until the early 21st century, liberal democracy had no alternative. The collapse of the Berlin Wall, the collapse of the Soviet Union and Russia's emergence into a relatively open country, the political changes in China that have increasingly shifted this large country into an economically neoliberal world, the emergence of an educated and prosperous middle class in many developing countries, the economic and political integration of European countries, were the changes that marked the final triumph of neoliberal democracy in the late 20th century

However, at the very beginning of this millennium, the world was faced with a new alternative and new challenges. The state market economy has proven to be more successful than the concept of a market neoliberal economy. These changes at the beginning of the 21st century led to a sharp rise in populist rhetoric that, at first glance, grew out of the discontent, resistance and distrust of the marginalized, indebted masses against the ruling elites and government institutions, which lacked the capacity and interest to address them. These difficulties, especially to change the nature of the relationship between creditors and debtors. Debtors cannot pay debt that is overburdened to them, but they have the right to vote. In this nature of the debtor-creditor relationship, the relations between the traditional left and right center political parties become unclear as debtors (voters) identify them as political supporters of those seeking debt repayment in a rather uneven and unfair system. Coalitions against creditors and political-backed debts make for strong populist movements in many countries. Even the oldest neo-liberal democracies have been corrupted by autocratic populism.<sup>16</sup>

However, it would be too easy to interpret populism as an expression of emotional disappointment over a frustrating economic situation, anger over set rules and special interests, and fear of threats to physical and cultural security. Even if it lacks the formal theoretical foundations or canonical texts that define it in the 21st century, populism has its coherent internal structure.<sup>17</sup>

Populist rhetoric is based on resistance to trade liberalization, seeking in these processes the main culprit for all the economic hardship of the population. Trade liberalization is certainly causing job losses and loss of

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<sup>16</sup>Mark Blyth, *Why Trump's Victory Was 30 Years in the Making and Why It Won't Stop Here*, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Snapshot November 15, 2016

<sup>17</sup>William A. Galston (2018), *The populist Challenge to Liberal Democracy*, Journal of Democracy, Johns Hopkins University Press, Vol. 29, NO. 2 (April 2018), pp5-19)

income for some groups of workers. However, trade liberalization is only one source of change in the labor market. Technological changes, production automation, competition to foreign and domestic corporations ... produce significantly greater changes in the labor market than imports. Although it is difficult to separate automation and globalization from one another, many authors see automation as a major cause of declining manufacturing employment in developed countries. Nevertheless, a populist campaign against technology and automation does not pose as much political challenge to populists as trade liberalization does. In trade liberalization, it is much easier to find a direct foreign culprit for economic distortions in the domestic market and job loss.<sup>18</sup> In addition, trade liberalization facilitates the identification of the psychological cause of inequalities in resource allocation and economic injustice, which in particular has a psychological impact on the domestic producer and customer.<sup>19</sup>

As globalization is characterized by the stigmatization of injustice, technological development and automation have largely avoided the trap of blaming inequality and turbulence in the labor market. People think they are losing survival not because of market competition, but because competition rules are unfair.<sup>20</sup> Financiers, large corporations, foreigners - use these unjust rules at measurement sites. This injustice needs to be corrected, which has not always been changed by local elites for the sake of their own interests, the what explains of increasing populism in these countries.<sup>21</sup> “The populism of understanding itself as such is corrupt, the people as a monotonous virtue - which means that there is no reason for people to govern themselves and their societies without institutional constraints. Populist leaders claim that they themselves represent the people, the only legitimate force in society.”<sup>22</sup>

EU populism takes a specific platform, focused primarily on the political perceptions of the Brussels bureaucracy and the impact of Brussels on domestic policies and regulations. European populism is not basically anti-trade. Neither the right-wing nor the left-wing populists advocated for trade barriers. In fact, Brexit advocates in Britain have introduced free trade

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<sup>18</sup>Dani Rodrik, *Populism and the Economics of Globalization*, *Journal of International Business Policy* (2018)

<sup>19</sup>Starmans, C., Sheskin, Bloom, P., (2017), *Why people prefer unequal societies*, *Nature; Human Behaviour*, 1:82)

<sup>20</sup>Guiso. L., Herrera. H., Morelli. M., Sonno. T., (2017), *Demand and Supply of populism*, CEPR, Paper DP11871)

<sup>21</sup>Furceri, D., Loungani, P., Ostry, J.D. (2017), *The aggregate and distributional effects of financial globalization*, IMF)

<sup>22</sup>William A. Galston (2018), *The Populist Challenge to Liberal Democracy*, *Journal of Democracy*, Johns Hopkins University Press, Vol. 29, NO. 2 (April 2018), p10)

as their explicit goal. One of the benefits of leaving the EU, they argue, would be to allow Britain to pursue a free trade policy. The EU has been pursuing a strong social protection policy for a long time, which is why most EU countries are in favor of open and free trade. This openness to free trade is accompanied by a greater degree of equitable redistribution and significant social security.<sup>23</sup> The alternative diversity of populism mainly revolves around economic inequality between rich groups, which control the economy and determine the rules and effects of the economic system, and groups with lower incomes and lower access to the center of power.<sup>24</sup>

Economic insecurity - including exposure to competition from imports and mass immigration - has played a significant role in the rise of populism, as well as in the rise and strengthening of nationalist and radical political movements. Populism most often sees the danger of pluralism and the loss of the cultural, national, ethnic or religious identity of “its people” by outside groups that allegedly threaten the survival of the identity of “their people.” In the US, right-wing populists demonize Mexicans, Chinese, and Muslims. In Europe, right-wing populists portray Muslim immigrants, minority groups (Gypsies or Jews) and impersonal bureaucrats from Brussels as “others” from whom the threat to national identity comes.<sup>25</sup>

What is common to contemporary populists is the orchestration of changes in governmental institutions through democratic elections, and then in a “democratic” way to remove all institutional democratic constraints on their rule (free media, political opposition, institutional protection of minorities and individuals). This strategy legalizes the break with the democratization process and legalizes the establishment of a “democratic authoritarian

<sup>23</sup>Cameron, D. R. (1978) The expansion of the public economy, *American Political Science Review*, 72, 1261,

<sup>24</sup>“Its milestones have included the Brexit vote; the 2016 U.S. election; the doubling of support for France’s National Front; the rise of the anti-establishment Five Star Movement in Italy; the entrance of the far-right Alternative for Germany into the Bundestag; moves by traditional right-leaning parties toward the policies of the far-right in order to secure victories in the March 2017 Dutch and October 2017 Austrian parliamentary elections; the outright victory of the populist ANO party in the Czech Republic’s October 2017 parliamentary elections; and most troubling, the entrenchment in Hungary of Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s self-styled “illiberal democracy,” which seems to be emerging as a template for Poland’s governing Law and Justice party and—some scholars believe—for insurgent parties in Western Europe as well. This revolt threatens the assumptions that shaped liberal democracy’s forward march in the 1990s and that continue to guide mainstream politicians and policy makers of the center-left and center-right.”(William A. Galston (2018), *The populist Challenge to Liberal Democracy*, *Journal of Democracy*, Johns Hopkins University Press, Vol. 29, NO. 2 (April 2018), p3)

<sup>25</sup>Colantone, I., & Stanig, P., (2017), *The trade origins of economic nationalism import competition and voting behavior in Western Europe*, Baffi Carefin Center Research Paper no. 49

regime” capable of changing public policy without legal and democratic impediments.<sup>26</sup>

Populist authoritarian regimes are increasingly evolving into a personal dictatorship and removing the democratic legitimacy of resistance to the personal dictatorship, a path toward the elimination of constitutionalism and democracy in an era of global structural change. This makes the greatest threat to the development of democracy in the 21st century<sup>27</sup>

Authoritarian populist regimes with a personal dictatorship encourage a tendency to create new international relations with a coherent alliance of undemocratic and xenophobic regimes that cultivate aggressive domestic and foreign policies, posing a great threat to regional and global peace. The destruction of multilateralism and the domination of nationalism and political authoritarianism are increasingly leading to a war of psychosis, which is profoundly changing the culture of the global security paradigm. Due to the high degree of technological, social and cultural cohesion in the international community, it is quite certain that this psychosis cannot be prolonged for so long, although with painful consequences it will take some time to recover.<sup>28</sup>

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<sup>26</sup>William A. Galston (2018), *The populist Challenge to Liberal Democracy*, *Journal of Democracy*, Johns Hopkins University Press, Vol. 29, NO. 2 (April 2018), p.8

<sup>27</sup>“Data on authoritarian regimes show that until recently, coups have been the primary threats to democracy. From 1946 to 1999, 64 percent of democracies failed because of such insurgencies. In the last decade, however, populist-fueled authoritarianization has been on the rise, accounting for 40 percent of all democratic failures between 2000 and 2010 and matching coups in frequency. If current trends persist, populist-fueled authoritarianization will soon become the most common pathway to autocracy... Data show that just under half (44 percent) of all instances of authoritarianization from 1946 to 1999 led to the establishment of personalist dictatorships. From 2000 to 2010, however, that proportion increased to 75 percent. In most cases, the populist strongmen rose to power with the support of a political party but then proved effective in sidelining competing voices from within.” (Andrea Kendall-Taylor & Erica Frantz, *How Democracies Fall Apart*, *Foreign Affairs*, December 6, 2016, p 1-2)

<sup>28</sup>The United States has not started a war against Iran or North Korea. It has not left the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) or the World Trade Organization (WTO), nor has it taken its troops out of Syria or Afghanistan. Washington has not yet acted on its threat of a trade war with the European Union (EU). Various sanctions have been discussed, but not actually imposed. Almost any of these events, had they occurred, would have had a significant negative impact on Europe’s prosperity and security. The European Union, for its part, has not been engulfed by a tsunami of uncontrolled immigration, nor has it been torched by populists. It has not imploded or been abandoned by its member states. Even Britain is still in the EU – for now. (Constanze Stelzenmüller (2019), *Hostile Ally*, Brookings Robert Bosch Foundation). Constanze Stelzenmüller, *Hostile Ally: The Trump challenge and Europe’s inadequate response*, [https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/FP\\_20190820\\_hostile\\_ally.pdf](https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/FP_20190820_hostile_ally.pdf).

## Changing the Global Power Structure

The weakening of the neoliberal economic concept of globalization and the rise of authoritarian populism begins with the loss of the exclusive position of the US dollar as the world's reserve currency. By losing that exclusivity, the United States lost its dominant influence over the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank (WB), and the World Trade Organization (WTO). For a while, the US has lost control of the stability of the global economy and international cooperation. It also called into question the decisive role of the US in the globalization process.

The spread of new technology in all countries and regions will lead to significant penetration of China into the world economy and trade. China is growing into the fastest growing purchasing and trading force, questioning US leadership and position in the world economy. The US is gradually losing the ability to maintain its dominant influence over international financial and trading institutions.

With the growing influence of China in world trade, the importance of the World Trade Organization (WTO) is more eroding, while the role and importance of regional trade agreements is becoming increasingly significant. The Pacific Free Trade Area (FTAAP) and China-backed Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) remain in stark contrast to the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), supported by the USA. With these and similar regional economic agreements, the power of the USA to further monitor the global economic-market "consensus" is radically challenged.

With the establishment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) (2016), with an initial capital of USA \$100 billion, with the participation of 57 countries, including Germany, Vel. Britain, France and Italy and the establishment of the New Development Bank in Shanghai by Russia, India, Brazil, China and South Africa saw as a new global financial order. With the creation of new global financial institutions and the promotion of new sustainable global development, China is increasingly showing aspirations to be the locomotive of the new global economic, monetary and financial

order.<sup>29</sup>

Establishing regional banks for international cooperation enables the implementation of large projects with greater risk tolerance, speeds up the loan approval process, with greater transparency and debt sustainability. By eliminating local influence on credit policy by exclusively hiring local workers, securing technology transfers, protecting the environment and preventing natural disasters, with the support of recipient countries' development strategies, these banks become a strong competitor to the bureaucratic and slow global development systems and commercial banks.

Further disruption to the neo-liberal global economic and financial structure will follow the formation of a new international currency (RMB) in 2015, in which China played a crucial role, which the IMF will soon include in the Special Drawing Right (SDRs) currency basket with greater financial weight pulling from Japanese yen and British pound. The creation of this international currency has pushed the world economy even further into the new multipolar economic order. Other national economies are also penetrating the very top of the world's economic and financial power structure, seeking their individuality and independence. Here it is particularly important to point out India as the third fastest growing economy in the world among the G20 economies projected by the IMF, which is rapidly seeking a new redefinition of the global economic order with its embodied impacts and interests.

The US, EU and Japan were the most attractive markets for R&D investment by the end of the 20th century. At the beginning of this millennium, the situation is beginning to change dramatically. China, India and South Korea are becoming increasingly attractive markets for finding foreign investment in the R&D sector. Companies from the US, Japan and Germany have invested most in the R&D sector in China. Together with China, the Indian market is becoming increasingly attractive for foreign

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<sup>29</sup>“One potential example involves the global payment system. The Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT) network, which exchanges global payment information among more than 9,000 financial institutions around the world, is heavily influenced by American and European banks. In 2015, the China-backed Cross-Border Inter-Bank Payments System (CIPS) was announced as an alternative to SWIFT. If it proceeds as planned, CIPS will process cross-border payments denominated in RMB. It will not replace SWIFT, because 45 percent of cross-border transactions are dollar-denominated. Every international bank will still need access to the U.S. banking system. Yet with a well-functioning CIPS on the horizon, some international banks could decide to operate without a U.S. banking license, and the U.S. would be less able to exert its banking rules over non-U.S. banks. This would affect the interoperability of transaction payment systems, making global business harder to conduct.” (Dennis Chesley, Miles Everson, and John Garvey, “Global Power Shift,” *Global Perspective* (2018).

investment in the R&D sector, especially in software R&D. And South Korea is becoming more attractive to foreign investment in the R&D sector, which will make this country more attractive than the R&D sector in Italy, Israel or Canada. Investment in R&D in Japan remains very attractive to investors from South Korea and the EU.

The financially and economically ambitious megaproject initiative (One Belt, One Road), which has the ambition to build land and maritime infrastructure linking East Asia, the Middle East and Africa and Europe, has a particularly significant impact on the creation of a new international order and a new global culture of security paradigm.<sup>30</sup>

The “New Silk Road” aims to support emerging economies, increase trade between China and the rest of the world, and utilize excess capacity in China’s domestic economy. It also aims to support the political and economic interests of China around the world.<sup>31</sup> This Chinese initiative has attracted more than 150 countries and international organizations in Asia, Europe, the Middle East and Africa in need of new capital intensive infrastructure investments in the absence of appropriate flexible investment policies by international financial institutions.<sup>32</sup>

It is of great importance to find a more flexible way of dealing with debt problems that cannot be repaid by the recipient countries, which will have a major impact on their internal political development. Leaving options for paying off debt or leasing goods instead of cash necessarily requires an audit of the operations of global financial institutions. Guided by changing power dynamics and competing visions about the future of the international order, the nature of “strategic rivalry” in global relations also changes.

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<sup>30</sup>“BRI has the potential to offer another kind of world, another set of values, another set of imperatives, another way of organizing, another set of institutions, another set of relationships...Belt and Road, offers an alternative to the existing international order. The present international order was designed by and still essentially privileges the rich world, which represents only 15% of the world’s population. BRI, on the other hand, is addressing at least two-thirds of the world’s population. This is extraordinarily important for this moment in history.” Martin Jacques delivered the keynote address at the 32nd Annual Camden Conference in Camden, Maine, US on February 22, 2019.

<sup>31</sup>“To be sure, these efforts may be tempered by the recent decrease in the rate of Chinese economic growth. The U.S. economy remains strong, and the legacy of its postwar economic dominance continues to influence the behavior of many globally focused multinational companies and investors. Investors are also waiting for China’s capital account to open further before they adopt the RMB. Capital market investors are also cautious about China because they don’t yet see its business environment as friendly enough to their interests.” ( Dennis Chesley, Miles Everson, and John Garvey, “Global Power Shift,” *Global Perspective* (2018)

<sup>32</sup><https://www.brookings.edu/research/chinas-belt-and-road-the-new-geopolitics-of-global-infrastructure-development/>

Strategic rivalry, as an investment and development project, combining economic, political and strategic goals, is deeply changing the character of the international order. The design and concept of the new global order remains multilateral, but with bilateral decision-making, which will produce political tensions of great vibration. This will lead to a new international order to the problem of democratic governance and respect for international standards of environmental protection and labor, as well as to the problem of transparency of the strategic interests of participants in international relations.

### **The Nature of the New Global Power Structure**

Due to the high degree of mutual technological penetration and economic integration, climate change and contagious epidemics ..., there is still an urgent need to balance interests between national security, foreign policy, development and business sector between different countries, which forms a special dimension of “strategic rivalry” and security paradigms. in the new international order.<sup>33</sup> Deep commercial links, high-tech exports, artificial intelligence and broad cultural ties of people from different countries seek and open space and opportunities for cooperation between economic sectors, even when significant ideological and security differences exist between the strategic interests of states.<sup>34</sup>

The new nature of “strategic dynamic rivalry” is increasingly seeking a proactive form of “peripheral diplomacy,” with the goal of turning neighborhoods into a community of shared destiny. In this direction, economic incentives and political pressures are increasingly being used to promote a range of projects that influence the country of investors in a particular region. The strategy of integrating neighboring countries into a central network of economic sectors in different countries in the region is

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<sup>33</sup>Prime Minister Shinzo Abe returned from his summit meeting with Xi Jinping, where they signed an agreement for Japanese co-investment in BRI projects. There was a clear division among the national security, foreign policy, development, and business communities as to how, if at all, they wanted to implement this decision. Some absolutely wanted to implement that agreement, seeing China as a source of investment and a source of profits via joint investment in the developing world. Others clearly did not. (Bruce Jones, [https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/FP\\_20190625\\_global\\_china.pdf](https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/FP_20190625_global_china.pdf))

<sup>34</sup>That point is essential. What you're observing with respect to Japan puts something of an upper bound on the way the United States thinks about strategy in Asia in general. Japan, our closest ally in the region, has essentially tied itself to the mast when it comes to its long-term security alignment with the United States. Yet, it still sees a deep and abiding interest in economic and development cooperation with China, such that you're seeing this variegated response to BRI. That tells you something really profound—that countries in the region are unlikely to become amenable to simply choosing sides.. (Mira Rapp-Hooper, [https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/FP\\_20190625\\_global\\_china.pdf](https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/FP_20190625_global_china.pdf))

becoming one of the main drivers of a new investment policy in the 21st century, making the security paradigm extremely complex. One of the most important determinants of “strategic dynamic rivalry” is faster and cheaper access to sources of technological knowledge and research, above all, easier and faster involvement of talent and educated people in scientific and technological research. The widespread technological development makes for an interesting connection between the state, talent and corporation. This creates unpredictability and makes it even more difficult to rely on classical sources of geopolitical power and stability, which makes the global security paradigm even more complex, dynamic and difficult to understand.<sup>35</sup>

Innovative manufacturing is increasingly influencing the strategy of global competition, and thus the nature of the global security paradigm. At the very beginning of this millennium, most scientific research has been relocated outside the home countries. A growing number of companies are channeling their investments into research and development (R&D), to countries where sales and production are growing fastest and with the widest and highest quality talent base with the lowest labor costs and low production costs, as well as a favorable tax system. Countries with fairly high tax expenditures, through tax breaks, manage to attract foreign investment in the R&D sector. All this has implications for changes in the financial and

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<sup>35</sup>In this context, some embrace the strategy of “multilateral efforts”, while others tend to promote the “dynamic mercantilist race” strategy towards the top in global relations.... This is especially evident in Southeast Asia in the continental part of the country. At the same time, Southeast Asian countries have largely welcomed the BRI from a strictly economic point of view. They need infrastructure and they want investment. But now the discomfort is growing. In a recent survey by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) conducted by the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute in Singapore, 70 percent said their governments should be careful in negotiating BRI projects to avoid falling into unsustainable financial debt with China . In Malaysia’s elections last year, Dr Mahathir bin Mohamad defeated Najib Razak, in part, by an open campaign against Chinese tension. These issues also occasionally arise ahead of Indonesia’s April 2019 national elections, where presidential candidate Prabowo Subianto’s campaign suggested reconsidering China’s BRI projects if it wins. Nonetheless, it seemed that demand for investment from China had not slowed much in the region. Environmental and social impacts are increasingly being looked at, for example, and are monitoring local work content in BRI projects such as high-speed rail. Vietnam ensures that the sovereign debt-to-GDP ratio does not become too extreme. there is a dynamic of mutual learning that could make BRI more sustainable in the long run. (Jonathan Stromseth, <https://www.brookings.edu/research/chinas-belt-and-road-the-new-geopolitics-of-global-infrastructure-development/>)

monetary policies of many countries.<sup>36</sup>

Foreign investment in the R&D sector functions as a platform for sharing resources about technology, including domestic universities as science incubators, numerous local technology companies and local governments. From these platforms come new ideas and solutions for a number of consumer needs, whose interest and needs are driving a new form of innovative global manufacturing. An increasing importance for corporate competitiveness in the global marketplace is investment in the R&D sector. Investment in the R&D sector in foreign markets is increasingly important in creating a greater degree of technological interdependence between investor countries and countries where technology research centers are located. This link between R&D investment, talent, technology incubators and local governments ... forms a significant dimension of the global security paradigm, seeking a new kind of global relationship at the beginning of the 21st century.

If there is a rule of law, free trade and macro stability in the region with appropriate investments, then the return on capital is certainly high. If investments are directed towards an environment with poor infrastructure and poor management system, with little investment in the R&D sector, then the return on capital is low. In this environment, all risk goes to the recipient country.<sup>37</sup>

Investment providers will increasingly use political pressure to reduce the risk of default. In these circumstances, the recipient countries become less willing to oppose investor investment, which often gives great impetus to the development of authoritarian regimes in these countries, which is the main guarantee for the investor country that the debt will be duly paid. Therefore, there is a risk that some democratic countries will become less democratic in the 21st century. Authoritarian regimes of populism are indiscriminate and pursue policies that can disrupt democracy. The digital surveillance model is increasingly becoming part of the global authoritarian

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<sup>36</sup>According to the Global Innovation 1000 study conducted by Strategy&, PwC's strategy consulting business, 94 percent of large publicly held companies conduct research and development outside their home country. Moreover, those with a more global R&D footprint tend to outperform their less-globalized competitors financially.. (Dennis Chesley, Miles Everson, and John Garvey, "Global Power Shift," Global Perspective (2018).

<sup>37</sup>Encouraged by its major shareholders, the World Bank began to take a different view of development - this development was driven more by policy reform and institutional strengthening than by solid infrastructure - and therefore focused its activities in these areas. (Homi Kharas, <https://www.brookings.edu/research/chinas-belt-and-road-the-new-geopolitics-of-global-infrastructure-development/>)

ideological struggle and censorship of democracy.<sup>38</sup>

In this concept of a new culture of “global power structure”, economic power will increasingly be used to put pressure on the political and legal sovereignty of the recipient countries. Political corruption, a new approach to human rights and an increasingly restrictive approach to civil society institutions will increasingly encourage the sale of public media to foreign corporations, to avoid public criticism of the transparency of government and public sector work in these countries. In order to avoid economic and political conflicts over the violation of the legal and political sovereignty of States, it is certain that the concept of sovereignty will be increasingly revised with new more flexible legal and political standards.

Although there will be an increasingly apparent shift in international relations from a co-operation strategy to a competition strategy between the strategic interests of countries in world markets, there remains a need for a balance between the competition strategy and the co-operation strategy.<sup>39</sup> Technological interdependence, the global financial and environmental crisis and digital penetration necessarily seek the cooperation of all global actors, regardless of the ideological and political differences between the participants. The paradigm of rivalry and interdependence leaves open the question of the possibility of cooperation and rivalry between the private and public sectors, opposing states.

The technological and trade interdependence of countries with divergent strategic interests and in the absence of mutual trust remains a significant stabilizing factor in international relations, which is difficult to eliminate by introducing isolationist policies.<sup>40</sup> Therefore, there must remain open space for mutual communication between the countries themselves, as well as between countries and other global actors in the concept of “global strategic competition”, as a new international order. In the case of a response to a pandemic disease, in the case of climate change, at the root of any major

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<sup>38</sup>David Dollar: <https://www.brookings.edu/research/chinas-belt-and-road-the-new-geopolitics-of-global-infrastructure-development/>

<sup>39</sup>Hours after leaders of some of the world’s wealthiest countries pledged more than \$22 million to help combat fires in the Amazon rainforest, Brazil’s government angrily rejected the offer, in effect telling the other nations to mind their own business – only to later lay out potential terms for the aid’s acceptance and then, accepting some aid from Britain. (<https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/27/world/americas/brazil-amazon-aid.html?module=inline>)

<sup>40</sup>The timing of the Huawei actions, right after trade talks broke down, and then the president’s comments—suggesting that he’d be willing to revisit his decisions on Huawei as be part of a trade deal—are counterproductive at best, and especially so when many countries are looking for reasons not to exclude Huawei, because they are worried about jeopardizing Chinese foreign investment and access to the Chinese market. (Tarun Chhabra, [https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/FP\\_20190625\\_global\\_china.pdf](https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/FP_20190625_global_china.pdf))

transnational challenge that states face, it is very difficult to find a way to manage this challenge unless there is some degree of cooperation and coordination.

This space of communication within the concept of “global strategic competition” necessarily seeks the new nature of “primary competition.” The changing nature of “primary competition” requires new standards, new infrastructure, new instruments of “primary competition” application, new technologies, from artificial intelligence (AI) to biotechnology to smart manufacturing. It is looking for a new model of coordination between the public and private sectors in the global market.

This coordination of the private and public sectors of different countries creates new forms of cross-sectoral “global strategic competition” and global cooperation, which often leads to a blurred interaction in the strategic relationship of competition and cooperation. As “competition and cooperation” is taking place today in a new environment, where countries in Asia, Africa, Latin America are much richer than before, their populations are more educated, their cultural and political values are closer to the cultural and political standards prevailing in the developed world. the space of this country is less and less suited to the old “hostile” model of “strategic competition” of the great powers.<sup>41</sup>

The essence of the “strategic competition and cooperation” of the great powers in the new culture of the global security environment comes down to the question of how to protect their interests and at the same time pursue a mutually beneficial relationship with other countries in a number of areas. The high level of technological, cultural and interest interconnectedness of humanity at the beginning of the 21st century necessarily requires enormous investment in education policy, technological development and health - which would enable the state to take advantage of promoting democracy in the domestic market and pursuing its interests in “strategic competition” in foreign policy.<sup>42</sup>

The renaissance of authoritarian regimes in many countries that use technological development and digital infrastructure to prevent the

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<sup>41</sup>Some argue that we now live in a multipolar world in which important midsize countries have enough power to influence global affairs. On this view, while the world is not flat, it has many hubs in domains such as financial flows, trade, Big Data management, and the Internet. This hub-and-spoke structure gives rise, in turn, to many different forms of possible cooperation and competition among governments. (Jean Pisani-Ferry, Farewell, Flat World (<https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/digital-economy-fuels-geopolitical-competition-by-jean-pisani-ferry-2019-07>))

<sup>42</sup>Mira Rapp-Hooper, [https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/FP\\_20190625\\_global\\_china.pdf](https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/FP_20190625_global_china.pdf)

promotion of democracy, transparency and accountability will significantly change the character of “strategic competition and cooperation”, which will open up the issue of “global governance and transnational cooperation” in a new way.<sup>43</sup> Competition over strategic interests in correlation with global governance and transnational cooperation will lead to a revision of the country’s priorities, leading to difficult global cooperation and governance. Therefore, determining a non-negotiable the interests of state will grow into one of the significant components of a “new culture of the global security paradigm.”<sup>44</sup>

Identify consumer needs and aspirations, strive to be the first to market new products and services, closely monitor your customers and competitors, use a different startup strategy to reduce risks, use your own research to drive innovation and advanced change, develop original products and services through new technologies and nurturing a corporate culture that supports the corporation’s innovation strategy and fosters collaboration between local government and the corporation has grown into the major determinants of a new global security paradigm that confronts the state, society (individual) and the market, with its separate and divergent interests.<sup>45</sup>

## **A New Islamic Culture of Rebellion**

In the concept of a “new paradigm of the global security paradigm” in the process of creating a digital global economy, the Islamic world is given attention due to the geopolitical rearrangement of the Middle East, the renaissance of Islamic dogma and socio-demographic turbulence.<sup>46</sup> The Islamic part of the world is far behind in technological, economic and social development of highly industrialized countries. Thanks to the large reserves of natural non-renewable energy sources (oil, natural gas), some Islamic countries have undergone a turbulent transformation in the age of the global neoliberal economy. Trade and foreign investment in the oil industry

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<sup>43</sup>“..we should be working on measures of transparency and accountability so that it’s harder to co-opt elites in a covert and corrupt fashion.” (Tarun Chhabra, [https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/FP\\_20190625\\_global\\_china.pdf](https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/FP_20190625_global_china.pdf))

<sup>44</sup>Ryan Hass, [https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/FP\\_20190625\\_global\\_china.pdf](https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/FP_20190625_global_china.pdf))

<sup>45</sup>Dennis Chesley, Miles Everson, and John Garvey, “Global Power Shift,” *Global Perspective* (2018)

<sup>46</sup>“There are now 166 million people willing to emigrate to the United States, 46 million people to the United Kingdom, and 39 million people to France. The large majority of them are from poorer developing countries, above all in the Muslim world.” (Arno Tausch, *Migration from the Muslim World to the West: Its Most Recent Trends and Effects*, *Jewish Political Studies Review*, Volume 30, No. 1-2, 2019.

have been a fundamental driver of the development of these Islamic states.

At the very beginning of this millennium, things are starting to change. Tangible investments are increasingly diverging from intangible investments in digital networks, which concentrates the creation and appropriation of surplus value in innovation centers that are definitely located outside this region. Changes in financing, in investment flows and in currency markets have led to major transformations in the global economy, to which these countries are not always able to respond adequately.

The technological and economic development achieved in this region was not accompanied by appropriate social changes, which led to sharp conflicts between the state and society, which made this region a region of constant internal tension and local wars. In addition, these Islamic countries have largely remained outside of the global hierarchical structure of information and the financial network, with a loss of macroeconomic and financial autonomy, which significantly deprives them of the ability to participate in the distribution of profits in the global economy. With the growing propensity of China and the EU to set up their own information and financial network structures and their own security controls, these countries will be put in an even more precarious economic and security position. Under pressure from populist politics, multilateralism is largely withdrawing from international relations, which will increasingly push Islamic countries into new isolation globally. A new Islamic world is emerging in which religion is necessarily detached from economics and geopolitics, which will be disastrous for the ruling regimes.<sup>47</sup>

Faced with the dangers of new isolationism and the inability to participate in the distribution of profits in the world economy, with authoritarian regimes sandwiched between a globally radicalized “culture of fear” of Islam and an internal “closed circle of violence”, the Islamic world shyly enters a new phase of development where the individual becomes increasingly more visible in the rapid transformation of the Islamic community. This will be a century of great dogmatic reformation and the social and geopolitical transformation of Islam as one of the fastest growing religious-cultural agglomerations.

In the concept of a new “global strategic rivalry”, in which the conflict over territorial control is shifting towards innovative production centers and information and financial network structures, the traditional Islamic

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<sup>47</sup>Jean Pisani-Ferry, Farewell, Flat World (<https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/digital-economy-fuels-geopolitical-competition-by-jean-pisani-ferry-2019-07>)

geopolitical logic, which is largely in line with the “hate culture”,<sup>48</sup> gradually is being replaced by a new vision of Islamic society.<sup>49</sup>

The Biblical conflict over Palestine is no longer the centrepiece of Islamic geopolitics. This biblical intersection is increasingly being replaced by a new concept of Islam geopolitics, which continues to be dominated by traditional intrinsic misunderstandings and conflicts over the dominance of one or the other dogmatic factions (Sunnah – Shia).<sup>50</sup> This conflict, which coincides with the religious-dogmatic matrix of the division of Islam and the claim of political domination in the Islamic world, opens up a new dimension of “Islamic strategic rivalry” in which neither side can count on the unconditional support of the great powers.<sup>51</sup>

The time of military intervention by major powers in the Islamic world is over. The “new culture of the global security paradigm” has changed the nature of the interests of the great powers, the nature of the alliance and the nature of the state. No Islamic government can count on the open and sincere support of a foreign military force in a multi-Islamic conflict, in which is now establishes a direct link between social, political and religious mobilization, making any military intervention more complex and dangerous.

Islamic strategic rivalry, as an investment and development project, which mixes economic, political, religious and strategic goals, profoundly alters the character of the relations in the Islamic world. The design and concept of the new Islamic community (umma) remain unified but with bilateral decision making, which will produce high-level political tensions of high vibration. This will bring a new Islamic order to the problem of democratic

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<sup>48</sup>Dominique Moisi, *The Clash of Emotions, Fear, Humiliation, Hope and the New World Order*, Foreign Affairs, January/February, 2007.

<sup>49</sup>Although there is no developed concept of political system in Islam, there are several principles and postulates in the Qur’an that underpin the concept of rule in Islam: 1. the establishment of justice through social cooperation and mutual assistance; 2. establishing a non-autocratic and consultative management style; 3. Institutionalization of charity and compassion in social relations.

<sup>50</sup>Hassan Ahmadian (2018), *How Effective is Saudi Arabia’s ‘Counter-Iran Policy’?*, Harvard Kennedy School, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs

<sup>51</sup>“On Sept. 14, Saudi Arabia, as big and longstanding alliance to USA, suffered the single-biggest blow to its oil infrastructure in the country’s history when critical processing facilities were attacked...The attack created turmoil on oil trading desks from Tokyo to Houston... A call for direct military strikes on Iran, from Republican Senator Lindsey Graham among others, is not accepted because it is not seen as unlikely to be the preferred avenue for retaliation. U.S. or Saudi military strikes on Iran would lead to “all-out war,” Iran’s foreign minister Javad Zarif said in an interview with CNN.” Julian Lee, *Saudi Oil Attacks*. Bloomberg, September 21, 2019.)

governance and respect for environmental and labor standards, as well as the problem of transparency of the strategic interests of participants in their mutual relations.

Common interest of the Islamic business elite, the government and the military elite, which controls the largest percentage of national wealth, has led to an open coalition among them. The absence of Islamic opposition political parties in the uprisings that engulfed the Islamic community at the very beginning of the 21st century (Arab Spring) significantly influenced the rise of new generations of rebellion in the Islamic world. The lack of clear distance between authoritarian regimes and most left-wing political parties in Islamic countries created a special tacit alliance among them, which meant the automatic removal of small traders, small-scale commodity producers and rural elites from all rhetoric against the incompetence and corruption of the ruling authoritarian regimes.

In this political fragmentation, the “culture of rebellion” is increasingly relegated to parts of the lower marginalized oligarchic structure, to an educated urban middle class and a large number of urban poor seeking work in the encircled enclaves of big cities such as Cairo, Nairobi, Istanbul, Jakarta, Karachi and others. As political discourse shifts from corrupted institution, political parties and groups to the individuals, a new “culture of rebellion” increasingly creates a “demarcation” between the religious and moral virtues of the poor and marginalized, on the one hand, and the corrupt, predatory and brutal ruling elites. on the other side. On this demarcation line, a new model of the traditional concept of Islamic social justice and responsibility in Islam is being re-born, making it the most important mobilizing component of the new Islamic “culture of rebellion.”<sup>52</sup>

The new Islamic “culture of rebellion” is most clearly drawn through the massive refugee waves of youth who refuse to embrace the ideology

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<sup>52</sup>The Islamic concept of personal (divine) sovereignty is universal. All the legal, political, diplomatic and military activities of Islamic states are regulated in accordance with the unique Islamic legal and moral code as the ultimate expression of God’s universal sovereignty and the highest will of God. The highest will of God must be subordinated to the will and behavior of both Muslims and the rulers of Islamic countries. The legal basis of this view is found in the early dogmatic views of al-Fiqh al-Absat, Abu Hanife (699-767), who was the founder and most prominent advocate of that law school. Particularly interesting are the views of this law school in the context of a critical attitude towards government actions. Although it relies essentially on dogmatic teaching, the Hanafi mezheb proclaimed the religious duty of every Muslim to fight for what is right and forbid the authorities from doing what is wrong. The right to rebel against a ruler as a “sinful believer”, though not explicitly allowed for a military rebellion, but above all criticism of the ruler, as interpreted by Abu Hanif, will have revolutionary consequences for the further development of moral and political thought in Islam, which will be particularly relevant in the new “culture of rebellion” in Islam.

of violence and join terrorist groups under the banner of orthodox dogma. This rebellion represents a revolutionary attack on the ideology of “violence and death” and on the authoritarian Islamic regimes. This new “culture of rebellion” clearly demonstrates the rebellion of the son against the domination of the father in the family, the rebellion of the woman against the domination of the husband in marriage, the rebellion of the younger generations against the domination of the older generations in society, and the open rebellion of the individual against poverty and illiteracy. The rebellion of young people against the authoritarian structure of the family is also a rebellion against the authoritarian structure of society. The authoritarian structure of family and society is the main obstacle to fundamental democratic change in Islam.

The generation of a new “culture of rebellion” finds support in Islamic divine law and the Islamic identity of young and educated people from marginalized groups of an oligarchic structure and an emancipated marginalized city population. Their complaints about the political system, which favor only oligarchic elites, creating inequalities that create great anxiety for marginalized deeply religious masses, provide the religious and political legitimacy of a new “culture of rebellion.” The “culture of rebellion” is drawing new lines of division within the global Islamic community. These lines are not divisions between Sunnis and Shiites, nor divisions between Islamic states. These are not divisions between Muslims and non-Muslims. These are the dividing lines between those who run society and who are responsible for violence and political hardship and those who are marginalized and rejected without their fault. This is the line that could make Islam a “culture of hope.”<sup>53</sup>

The refugee crisis is a crisis of human morality that threatens human rights, democracy and equality. Nearly 50 million children migrated across the

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<sup>53</sup>“This is because inequality and marginalization in economic and social aspects has grown wider within society. In this mainstream, it is clear that the rich people become richer and the poor people become poorer and this condition has made easier for poor people to be radicalized. Thus, Islamic militancy is a response to poverty or impoverishment. Indonesia is not alone in this case. Many other countries also are hotbeds of militant Islam. The point is that militant Islam tends to surge in countries experiencing disillusionment, poverty and despair. Therefore, to reduce militancy is simply by improving economic condition and addressing economic inequality. The roots of Islamic radicalism must be looked for outside the religion, in the real world of cultural despair, economic decline, political oppression, and spiritual turmoil in which most Muslims find themselves today. In the case of the Middle East, many Islamic organizations also stress radicalism as a response towards political oppression and economic inequality.” (Wasisto Raharjo Jati, *Radicalism in the Perspective of Islamic-Populism: Trajectory of Political Islam in Indonesia*, *Journal of Indonesian Islam*, Volume 07, Number 02, December 2013, p269).

border or were displaced - More than half of these girls and boys avoided violence and insecurity - a total of 28 million. It is worrying and shocking that the number of refugee children has doubled in just 10 years. The largest immigration movement comes from Islamic countries and mainly Muslims. Many commentators say that the solidarity of Islamic countries in the refugee crisis is at least inadequate. Because of this, many see refugee crises as “a crisis of Islamic solidarity and morality.” They point out that in this process, the security of the ruling elite in many Islamic countries takes precedence over solidarity and humanitarianism against Islamic refugees.

The refugee crisis is turning into a significant factor in the moral rebellion that polarizes Islamic society politically and emotionally by separating the Islamic community. This creates a deadly challenge to the Islamic ruling elite. This could lead to enormous internal breakages and radicalization in the Islamic community and new political tensions between Islam and the West. The “culture of rebellion” in Islam openly raises open questions to the ruling Islamic regimes and Islamic dogma: how to manage cultural diversity, how to maintain social cohesion in Islam, and how to treat minorities. The refugee crisis raises legal and moral questions about the perception of the crisis in Islam, the inter-Islamic wars, the persecution of Muslims and others by Islamic regimes, the responsibilities of political regimes in Islamic and other countries.

This new generation of rebellions rejects the classical matrix of sacrifice in Islam and rejects the concept of the caliphate, thus altering the genealogy of violence in Islam. On this concept of a “culture of rebellion”, a generation of “culture of hope” is preferred in which Islamic society could definitely shift from a “closed circle of violence” to internal socio-political reform.<sup>54</sup>

The new generation of “culture of rebellion” confronts Islam with a departure from the classical concept of “Islamic security paradigm” based on “discourse of danger” with threat, deception, mistrust, forces and power. Islam urgently needs a “security paradigm” with an authentic interpretation of Islamic divine law and traditions, with the new needs of the Islamic community, and mutual cooperation and respect for the human being.

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<sup>54</sup>Olivier Roy (2016), *Le djihadet la mort*, Editions du Seuil, Paris